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This thesis consists of three empirical studies investigating, from various perspectives, 
the corporate motivations to join one of the largest voluntary initiatives promoting 
sustainability: the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC). I employ three different 
statistical techniques, logistic regression analysis, event history analysis and structural 
equation modelling. The first study provides evidence from a field experiment on 
shareholder engagement effectiveness in general and on which tactics are more 
effective in engaging publicly traded firms. The experiment consists of an invitation 
letter sent by the Principles for Responsible Investment Clearinghouse, one of the 
largest worldwide coalition of investors, to encourage companies to sign up the United 
Nations Global Compact. I use a theoretical model for investor salience in order to 
understand the impact of the engagement. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first large-scale research on engagement using randomized controlled trials in the 
academic literature and in practice.  
The aim of the second study is three fold. First, most academic literature 
focuses on how the adoption of the UNGC impacts on the implementation of 
environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance; this study 
addresses how ESG performance shapes the CSR strategy, namely, the UNGC. Next, 
I explore to what extent the ESG performance of firms adopting the UNGC change 
over time. Finally, this paper investigates whether the existence of controversies is a 
determinant for joining the initiative. Results show that, in all cases, ESG performance 
is significant and positively related to the adoption of the Ten Principles. Furthermore, 
results show that ESG performance differs across different points in time. Contrary to 
my expectations, controversies have no influence on UNGC membership. 
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The third and final study examines the effect of the characteristics of the board 
of directors on the adoption of the UNGC/GRI by US-based firms. I investigate 
whether and how a CSR oriented board chooses the UNGC/GRI as part of their firms 
reporting strategy. I also consider the level of environmental and social performance 
as a mediator for such a decision. Results show that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the board and environmental and social performance, and 
between environmental and social performance and the adoption of voluntary CSR 
initiatives. This relationship is stronger for social performance and for the GRI.  
Overall, this thesis provides further evidence about motivations to join the 
UNGC. The outcomes of this thesis are of relevance for shareholders and investor 
coalitions, policy makers, and other groups of stakeholders. Theoretically, this thesis 













































































First and foremost, I would like to thank Almighty God for being my guide and strength in 
every stage of my life. I would also like to express my gratitude to my beloved family for their 
care, support and patience over these four years. My parents, Bertha and Esteban (†), have 
always been my inspiration; they are an example of hard work, perseverance and love. I thank 
my sisters, Laura and Fátima, for being my confidants and the extra fuel that I need. 
I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Professor William Rees, for his continued 
guidance, patience and encouragement during my studies. I really appreciate his kind advice 
on career development and support on administrative issues. I would also like express my 
gratitude to Dr Andreas Hoepner for his insightful and inspiring comments and support. 
Additionally, I would like to thank Dr Craig Mackenzie, Valeria Piani and Danielle 
Chesebrough for their support in the early stages of this work.  
I also appreciate the stimulus provided by the University of Edinburgh Business 
School (UEBS) to attend and participate in academic events in order to enhance our training 
and knowledge as PhD researchers. Attending conferences, workshops and seminars was very 
inspiring and I would like to thank those who acted as chairpersons and those attendees that 
contribute to enrich my work during my presentations.  
Likewise, I am grateful to Giovanna Michelon, Tessa Hebb, Steven Kays and Diego 
Cueto for their critical comments on my work and suggestions. I would also like to express 
my gratitude to Susan Hancock, Alistar Haig, Ja Kim and Michael Rezec for reading parts of 
my thesis and providing very useful comments. 
The UEBS staff also deserve to be mentioned. Particularly, I would like to thank 
Christine Proudfoot, Susan Keatinge, Natalie Honeyman and Tony Jenkins for their fantastic 
work in the PGR office. I appreciate the efforts of the Accounting and Finance group in 
organizing seminars and encouraging us to meet with speakers. I am grateful to Frances-Helen 
viii 
 
Hay and Ingrid Jeacle from whom I have learned many things as a Teaching Assistant. I also 
applaud the work done by Anna Domagala in support of such activity.    
During this journey, I enjoyed the pleasant company of Tatiana Rodionova, Milo 
Paviera, Cecilia Ranovsky, Nancy Díaz, Pamela Villamar, Alex Stanley, Clémence Rannou, 
Michael Rezec, Mariló Morales, Ja Kim, Elizabeth Montoya, Theodor Cojoianu and Dalinda 
Pérez-Alvarez with whom I share many important memories. I also appreciate the enthusiasm 
and energy of the Latin Community, and the experiences shared with my colleagues within 
the Business School. 
Additionally, I would like to thank to my Viva Examiners, Prof Ian Thomson and Dr 
Maria Michou, for their helpful comments and suggestions for the improvement of this thesis. 
Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the financial support that I received 
from my country, Mexico, through the National Council of Science and Technology 
















Table of Contents 
 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………...xv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………..xvii 
CHAPTER 1. Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2. How to Engage Corporates Effectively? Evidence from a 
Field Experiment of the United Nations ............................................................ 9 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 9 
2.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 11 
2.2. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 16 
2.2.1. The United Nations Global Compact ................................................... 16 
2.2.2. Shareholder Engagement ....................................................................... 19 
2.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................... 29 
2.4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ...................................................................... 34 
2.4.1. The Experimental Setting ....................................................................... 34 
2.4.2. Testing Investor Salience ....................................................................... 40 
2.4.3. Other Helpful Tactics ............................................................................... 44 
2.5. RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................................ 49 
2.5.1. Field Experiment ....................................................................................... 49 
2.5.2. Model Specification .................................................................................. 50 
2.5.3. Sample Description .................................................................................. 54 
2.6. RESULTS ............................................................................................................ 62 
2.7. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................... 79 
2.8. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................. 82 
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................... 84 
Appendix. Example of a standard letter ................................................................. 85 
CHAPTER 3. ESG drivers for the Adoption of the UN Global Compact . 87 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 87 
3.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 89 
3.2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT .............................. 92 
3.2.1. Introducing the UNGC ............................................................................. 92 
x 
 
3.2.2. ESG Performance as a Driver for UNGC Adoption ......................... 97 
3.2.3. Changes over time ................................................................................... 99 
3.2.4. Controversial Actions ........................................................................... 101 
3.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY ....................................................................... 104 
3.3.1. Event History Analysis ......................................................................... 104 
3.3.2. Sample and Descriptive Statistics ..................................................... 111 
3.4. RESULTS .......................................................................................................... 120 
3.4.1. ESG Practices as a Driver for UNGC Adoption (H1) ..................... 120 
3.4.2. Members ESG changes over time (H2)............................................. 120 
3.4.3. Controversial Actions (H3) .................................................................. 122 
3.4.4. Expelled Firms from the UNGC .......................................................... 132 
3.5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH ................................................. 135 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 138 
CHAPTER 4. Board Composition, Environmental and Social Performance 
and the Adoption of Voluntary Initiatives ........................................................... 141 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 141 
4.1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 143 
4.2. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS ..................... 147 
4.2.1. Theoretical Framework ......................................................................... 147 
4.2.2. Board Composition ................................................................................ 149 
4.2.2.1. Board Gender Diversity ................................................................ 151 
4.2.2.2. Independent Directors .................................................................. 152 
4.2.2.3. CSR Committee .............................................................................. 153 
4.2.2.4. CEO Duality...................................................................................... 154 
4.2.3. Voluntary CSR Initiatives as Mechanisms for CSR Strategy ...... 155 
4.2.4. The Board of Directors and voluntary CSR initiatives ................. 159 
4.3. RESEARCH DESIGN ...................................................................................... 161 
4.3.1. Data and Methods .................................................................................. 161 
4.3.2. Sample Description ............................................................................... 169 
4.4. RESULTS .......................................................................................................... 176 
4.4.1. SEM Results ............................................................................................ 176 
4.4.2. Sensitivity Analysis ............................................................................... 183 
4.5. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH ................... 188 
4.6. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 190 
xi 
 
CHAPTER 5. Conclusions ................................................................................ 193 


























List of Tables 
 
1.1 UNGC: The Ten Principles ................................................................................ 2 
1.2 Communication on Progress Assessment ......................................................... 3 
1.3 UNGC Annual Contribution ................................................................................ 3 
2.1 UNGC: The Ten Principle ................................................................................ 17 
2.2 Shareholder Engagement related Elements .................................................... 21 
2.3 PRI: The Six Principles .................................................................................... 36 
2.4 Investors Participating in the Experiment ......................................................... 36 
2.5 Recipient of the Invitation ................................................................................ 41 
2.6 Treatments and Units per Treatment ............................................................... 52 
2.7 Correlations Full Sample ................................................................................. 55 
2.8 Testing Prior Probability to Join the UNGC ...................................................... 56 
2.9 Sample Description - Country .......................................................................... 57 
2.10 Sample Description - Industry ........................................................................ 58 
2.11 Sample Description ....................................................................................... 60 
2.12 Groups Comparison and Descriptive Statistics (H1a) .................................... 66 
2.13 Correlation Matrix .......................................................................................... 67 
2.14 Testing the Effectiveness of Joining the UNGC ............................................. 69 
2.15 Testing the Effect of Replying on Joining the UNGC ...................................... 70 
2.16 Testing the Effect of Replying on Joining the UNGC- High Probability ........... 71 
2.17 Testing the Effect of Replying on Joining the UNGC- Europe ........................ 72 
2.18 Testing Tactics for Engagement .................................................................... 73 
2.19 Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample with Treatment and Sub-samplesa ...... 76 
2.20 Treatment Groups Comparison ..................................................................... 77 
2.21 Testing Tactics for Engagement - Treatment ................................................. 78 
2.22 Testing Tactics for Engagement - Strength .................................................... 78 
3.1 UNGC: The Ten Principles .............................................................................. 93 
3.2 Variables Description ..................................................................................... 109 
3.3 Sample Description ....................................................................................... 113 
3.4 Sample Description ....................................................................................... 114 
3.5 Testing ESG Performance on the Adoption of the UNGC .............................. 123 
3.6 Distribution of Year- Membership .................................................................. 124 
3.7 Comparison of Binary and Categorical Variables ........................................... 125 
3.8 Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) ........................ 126 
xiv 
 
3.9 Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) ......................... 127 
3.10 Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) ....................... 128 
3.11 Testing ESG Performance on the Adoption of the UNGC (Group 1)  ............ 129 
3.12 Testing ESG Performance on the Adoption of the UNGC (Group 2)............. 130 
3.13 Testing ESG Performance on the Adoption of the UNGC (Group 3)............. 131 
4.1 Variables Description ..................................................................................... 165 
4.2 Sample Description ........................................................................................ 171 
4.3 Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics ............................................... 172 
4.4 Distribution and Characteristics of the Sample by Industry ............................. 174 
4.5 Distribution and Characteristics of the Sample by Year .................................. 175 
4.6 Results of SEM (UNGC) ................................................................................. 177 
4.7 Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics of Predicted Values ................... 180 
4.8 Results of SEM (GRI) ..................................................................................... 182 
4.9 Results of SEM with Clustered Standard Errors by Firm (UNGC) ................... 184 
4.10 Results of SEM with Clustered Standard Errors by Firm (GRI) ..................... 185 
4.11 Results of SEM with Environmental and Social Scores (UNGC) .................. 186 

















List of Figures 
 
1.1 Main Research Question and Sub-questions ..................................................... 8 
2.1 Collective Engagement Process: Analysis of Tactics ....................................... 39 
2.2 Effectiviness of Tactics Employed in Soft Engagement ................................... 48 
2.3 Treatment Distribution ..................................................................................... 53 
2.4 Engagement Procedure ................................................................................... 63 
2.5 Full Sample ..................................................................................................... 65 
3.1 UNGC Timeline ............................................................................................... 96 
3.2 Hypothesis Development ............................................................................... 103 
3.3 Corporate Governance - Society ................................................................... 119 
3.4 Corporate Governance - ESG ....................................................................... 119 
3.5 UN-UNGC Membership ................................................................................. 133 
3.6 Duration in the UNGC .................................................................................... 134 
3.7 Enrolled / Expelled to the UNGC 2003-2016.................................................. 133 
3.8 Companies Expelled by Sector ...................................................................... 134 
4.1 Theoretical Model .......................................................................................... 161 














































List of Abbreviations 
 
Acronym Definition 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
AUM Assets Under Management 
AW All World- refers to the FTSE index 
BoD Board of Directors 
CDP Carbon Disclosure Project 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CEPA Center for Environmental Policy Analysis 
CFA Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
CFI Comparative Fit Index 
CO2  Carbon Dioxide 
COP Communication On Progress 
CSP Corporate Social Performance 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
EHA Event History Analysis 
ESG Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance 
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
HUKFF The Hermes UK Focus Fund 
IAS International Accounting Standards 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
ICB Industry Classification Benchmark 
IR Investor Relations 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
PRI Principles for Responsible Investment 
RBV Resource-Based View 
RDT Resource Dependence Theory 
RMSEA Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation 
SEDOL Stock Exchange Daily Official List 
SEM Structural Equation Modelling 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises  
SRMR Standardized Root-Mean Square Residual 
 TIAA-CREF The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America and 
the College Retirement Equities Fund 
TLI Tucker-Lewis Index 
UNEP FI The United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 





























Launched in July 2000, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) is one of the 
largest global initiatives promoting sustainability through responsible behaviour. The 
initiative encourages entities to implement Ten Principles covering the areas of human 
rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption within their normal practices and 
operations. The UNGC is considered by a number of academics, NGOs and 
practitioners as a channel for legitimization of practices, enhancing reputation and 
providing economic benefit and as a major framework for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR1) (Chen and Bouvain, 2009; Kell and Ruggie, 1999; Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2010; Gilbert, Rasche and Waddock, 2011). However, it has also been 
criticized for the poor environmental and social performance of its members. 
Currently, the initiative accounts for over 8,000 small and medium enterprises as well 
as large multinational firms in a wide variety of industries, and more than 4,000 non-
business organizations (e.g. NGOs, academia, and the public sector) in 170 countries 
and with about 85 local networks. The UNGC excludes a few companies, namely 
those enterprises with fewer than 10 workers, those in unethical sectors (i.e. tobacco 
and bombs), and those banned by the United Nations (UNGC, 2015b).  
                                                          
1 There is no official definition for ‘corporate social responsibility’. Furthermore, the concept of 
CSR has evolved since it was first suggested in the 1950s (Carroll, 1999; Carroll, 2000; 
Garriga and Melé, 2004). However, there are four aspects that are related to the responsible 




Business participants are required to submit a yearly report, called 
‘Communication on Progress’ (COP), concerning their implementation of the Ten 
Principles. Members that fail to disclose such information are classified as non-
communicating participants and, if the omission is not rectified, companies are 
delisted from the initiative (UNGC, 2014). Table 1.1 lists the Ten Principles included 
in the initiative and Table 1.2 describes the assessment categories of the report 
submitted to the UNGC. In 2014, the UNGC implemented an annual contribution 
policy (Table 1.3) with the aim of supporting their administrative functions and 
providing a number of membership benefits (UNGC, 2016a). These benefits include 
the use of the UNGC “We support” logo, invitation to events, and use of platforms 
and networks among others.  
1TABLE 1.1 
UNGC: The Ten Principles 
Human Rights 
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights. 
Principle 2: Make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.  
Labour 
Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining. 
Principle 4: The elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour. 
Principle 5: The effective abolition of child labour. 
Principle 6: The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
Environment 
Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental 
challenges. 
Principle 8: Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. 
Principle 9: Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies. 
Anti-Corruption 
Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion 
and bribery. 
Notes: Adapted from The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact (UNGC, 2016c). 






The most recent version of the UNGC-Accenture Strategy CEO study shows 
executive support for the Sustainable Development Goals (UNGC-Accenture, 2016); 
large groups of investors encourage environmental and social reporting through the 
UNGC (PRI, 2013); and, European financial markets also welcome UNGC 
membership (Coulmont and Berthelot, 2015; Janney. Dess and Forlanial, 2009). The 
importance of the UNGC for business appears therefore to be evident. Academic 
analysis of its development, however, is incomplete. Despite the academic work done 
so far in terms of why firms adopt the UNGC (Arevalo et al., 2013; Cetindamar and 
2TABLE 1.2 
Communication on Progress Assessment 
Status Description 
GC Advanced 
A COP that meets all minimum requirements and provides information 
on additional advanced criteria including governance and leadership. 
GC Active A COP that fulfils all minimum content requirements. 
GC Learner 
A COP submitted within the deadline but does not meet the minimum 
requirements (1 year limit). 
Non-
communicating 
A company that has failed to submit a COP within the deadline, or fails 
to submit a COP that meets the minimum criteria after the 12 month GC 
Learner grace period. 
Expelled 
A company that is removed from the Global Compact for failing to 
submit a COP that meets the minimum requirements within 1 year of 
becoming non-communicating or for other reasons. 
Notes: Adapted from The Communication on Progress (COP) in Brief (UNGC, 2014). 
Retrieved from  http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/index.html  
3TABLE 1.3 
UNGC Annual Contribution 
Annual sales/revenue Annual contribution 
Less than USD 50 million USD 250 (suggested minimum)  
USD 50 million - USD 250 million USD 2,500 - 5,000  
USD 250 million - USD 1 billion USD 5,000 - 10,000  
USD 1 billion - USD 5 billion USD 10,000 - 15,000  
Greater than USD 5 billion USD 15,000+ 




Husoy, 2007; Pérez-Batres, Miller and Pisani, 2010; Perez-Batres et al., 2012), drivers 
such as investor pressures, corporate social performance and board of directors have 
received little attention.  
Thus, this thesis contains three empirical chapters addressing particular 
aspects of the overall question: What drives the adoption of the UNGC? My research 
methods include a field experiment and secondary data analysis. I employ three 
quantitative techniques: logistic regression, event history analysis (EHA) and 
structural equation modelling (SEM).  
The first empirical study, “How to Engage Corporates Effectively? Evidence 
from a Field Experiment of the United Nations”, provides evidence of the 
effectiveness of shareholder engagement on persuading firms to enhance their 
environmental and social performance and report their results through the UNGC. In 
recent years, investors have used their ownership power not only to influence 
corporate governance and financial performance but also to improve corporate 
commitment to responsible business. A large number of studies in the field of 
shareholder engagement has focused on the impact of resolutions at annual general 
meetings (Clark, Salo and Hebb, 2008; David, Bloom and Hillman, 2007; Gillan and 
Starks, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri and Volkan, 2011). Other studies have focused on the 
drivers for shareholder salience (Gond and Piani, 2012; Hamilton and Eriksson, 2011; 
Vandekerckhove, Leys, and Braeckel, 2007), on dialogue with target companies 
(Ferrero and Beunza, 2014), on impact of engagement (Becht et al., 2010), and also 
on management attitude towards engagement (Becht et al., 2010; Vandekerckhove, 
Leys and Braeckel, 2007). Yet, the effectiveness of the tactics employed in the process 
of engagement remains unexplored.  
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This paper empirically and theoretically analyses the effectiveness of 
engagement and of a number of tactics used in engagement letters. The letters were 
sent by the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) Clearinghouse on behalf of a 
group of investors, representing US$3.3 trillion in assets under management (AUM), 
to international publicly traded firms to invite them to join the UNGC. As such, my 
research is based on a field experiments comprising a sample of firms listed on the 
FTSE All-World index that are not members of the initiative (laggards). In terms of 
the tactics tested and the number of experimental groups, this is one of the largest 
experiments in academic research to date. 
My results for Chapter 2 show that the business case for this particular 
engagement strategy is non-existent. My results also show that contacting the chair in 
addition to the CSR department to invite them to join the UNGC and following up the 
engagement (i.e. invitation letter) with target companies are the most effective tactics. 
It is also reasonably helpful to contact the CEO referencing peer companies that have 
adopted the initiative. These findings are in line with previous research where the 
preferences of management (i.e. sympathy for sustainable practices) are basic for 
successful engagement (Becht et al., 2008; Gifford, 2010; Hamilton and Eriksson, 
2011). I also find that the engagement process is stronger when firms have a high ex-
ante likelihood of signing up to the initiative and are located in countries where 
concern about environmental, social and governance issues is predominant (e.g. the 
UK, Germany).  
In Chapter 3, “ESG drivers for the Adoption of the UN Global Compact”, I 
study the impact of environmental, social and corporate governance performance on 
deciding the strategy for CSR disclosure. In a study carried out by Perez-Batres et al. 
(2012), the authors mention that firms that sign up to the UNGC tend to use it as 
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‘window dressing’ mainly to report activities related to community and consumers. 
These activities involve low rates of investment and by reporting to the UNGC firms 
gain some legitimacy (Perez-Batres et al, 2012). In addition, Rasche,Waddock and 
McIntosh (2013) highlight that the aforementioned relationship has received no 
attention when forecasting the impact of the initiative. In this study, I provide 
additional evidence on how the level of corporate social performance is related to the 
adoption of the UNGC and how this level changes over time. 
My sample for this chapter consists of all the firms in the FTSE all world index 
with environmental, social and corporate governance information as provided by 
ASSET4 for the period 2003-2012. The method I employ for analysis is event history 
analysis (EHA), which allows me to track firms from the moment of their appearance 
in the sample until the moment they adopt the initiative, or are censored (disappear 
from the sample for any reason). I divide the period of study in three subsets: Group 
1 (2003-2005), Group 2 (2006-2009) and Group 3 (2010-2012). My results show that 
CSP is important at the moment of joining the UNGC. However, the dimension of 
CSP is different for each subset. For Group 1 only the social dimension is important 
while for Group 2 the corporate governance is also important to some extent. Finally, 
for Group 3 all three dimensions are relevant but the emphasis is on the environmental 
score. These findings provide evidence of the changing environment around the 
adoption of voluntary initiatives such as the UNGC as a strategy for CSR reporting. 
Furthermore, it offers a rationale for future study of the impact of the initiative. 
Chapter 4, “Board Composition, Environmental and Social Performance and 
the Adoption of Voluntary CSR Initiatives”, investigates the link between the 
characteristics of the board of directors, corporate social and environmental 
performance and the adoption of the UNGC among US-based firms. Examples such 
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as the recent Volkswagen scandal regarding faulty carbon emission tests and the 
ensuing resignation of the CEO suggests that executives are to some extent held 
responsible for misleading product strategies related to the impact on the environment. 
Therefore, I consider the characteristics of the board of directors including CEO 
duality, CSR committee, board gender diversity and independent directors as 
determinants of the CSR strategy (Mallin et al. 2013; Shaukat et al., 2016). In this 
chapter, I extend the growing literature in this field by considering the UNGC/GRI as 
the strategy for disclosure of corporate social performance. 
The key questions of this study are: a) what are the characteristics of the 
directorates of the US-based firm members of the UNGC/GRI and b) are the levels of 
environmental and social performance a driver for the adoption of the initiative? In 
order to answer these questions, I use structural equation modelling (SEM). The 
sample comprises all the firms in the ASSET4 database with headquarters in the USA 
for the period 2002-2013. 
Findings show that board of directors characterized by a stakeholder approach 
tend to support environmental and social performance, particularly where the CSR 
committee is strong. This is in line with resource dependence theory (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) and the resource-based view 
(Barney, 2001; Hart, 1995; Porter and Kramer, 2006), which in general suggest that 
these type of boards can enhance reputation and legitimize corporate social 
performance at the same time as creating a competitive advantage. My results also 
show that there is a greater impetus for the UNGC from social performance rather 
than from environmental performance. GRI results show similar patterns, however, 
coefficients are larger for this initiative. 
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This thesis contains five further chapters. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are the empirical 
part of this work. Each chapter is self-contained, and therefore, has its own research 
questions, literature review, methods, results, discussion and conclusions. Figure 1.1 


































Does engagement from 
investors matter?
What tactics are the most 
effective?
Chapter 3
Is CSP related to the 
adoption of the UNGC?
Does CSP change over 
time?
Are controversies related 
to the adoption of the 
UNGC?
Chapter 4
Are CSR oriented boards 
related to the UNGC/GRI?
Is CSP related to the 
UNGC/GRI? How?
Figure 1.1. This figure shows my main research question of the thesis and the set of sub-questions for 
each empirical chapter. 
Main Research Question and Sub-questions 





How to Engage Corporates 
Effectively? Evidence from a Field 





This paper provides evidence from a large field experiment on shareholder 
engagement effectiveness, more broadly, and on the most effective tactics to engage 
with international publicly traded firms, more specifically. Shareholder engagement 
is a growing practice among investors who believe long-term profitability is related 
to corporate social responsibility. The so-called responsible investors use their 
ownership power to promote environmental, social and corporate governance 
practices, programmes and policies among the different departments and activities of 
their firms. The experiment is designed to test the effectiveness of shareholder 
engagement and nine different tactics. It consists of an invitation letter sent by the 
Principles for Responsible Investment Clearinghouse, on behalf of a group of 
                                                          
2 I am very grateful to the PRI and UNGC, particularly to Danielle Chesebrough, Ailee Katz, 
Atur Tetty Lubis, Valeria Piani, Shubhra Singhal, Olivia Watson, and Felicitas Weber. I am 
also thankful to Kais Bouslah, Quian-Li Jan, Ja Kim, Arleta Majoch, Marcus Nilsson, 
Clemence Rannou, Tatiana Rodionova, Rupini Rajagopelan, Ben Sila, Alexander Stanley, Mo 
Yan, Pei-Shan Yu and Tiffany Leung.  
3 Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the British Accounting and Finance 
Doctoral Colloquium at University of Newcastle, April 2013; PhD Day at University of 
Edinburgh, May 2013; Scottish Doctoral Colloquium in Accounting and Finance at University 




investors representing US$3.3 trillion in assets under management, to encourage 
target companies to sign up to the United Nations Global Compact. The invitation 
letter employed in the experiment is a form of ‘soft engagement’. I draw from 
Institutional Theory and Stakeholder Approach, to understand which tactics are more 
effective. Firms are distributed across control and treatment groups according to their 
prior probability of joining the United Nations initiative. The experiment shows the 
importance of contacting CEOs and chairpersons from target companies as a means 
to start dialogue; however, the arguments used by stakeholders should show ‘a 
business case’ in order to catch the attention of the management and result in 
successful engagement. A model for investor salience is used in order to understand 
the impact of the engagement, and social movement theory to analyse the way firms 
respond to the engagement. To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the largest 
randomized controlled trials in the shareholder academic literature and in practice. 
The outcome of this study is of relevance for shareholders and investor coalitions, 
policy makers, and other groups of stakeholders. As a result, this paper adds to the 
literature on shareholder engagement, public relations, marketing, accounting and 
strategy.  
 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility (CSR); Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI); United Nations Global Compact (UNGC); shareholder 








In recent years, investors have used their ownership power not only to influence 
corporate governance and financial performance but also to enhance corporate social 
and environmental responsibilities (Clark and Hebb, 2004; Sjöström, 2008). 
Corporate scandals, such as the bankruptcy of Enron and more recently the 
Volkswagen emission scandal, have put in the spotlight the need of more rigorous 
codes of conduct, plans and programmes with their appropriate measurement of 
outcomes that contribute to ethical and responsible business towards their 
shareholders, consumers, society and environment. Investors who participate as 
activists have the belief that the adoption of a corporate social responsibility approach 
will improve corporate financial performance in the long term (PRI, 2013). This 
philosophy has prompted investor coalitions to speak-up and make pressure on the 
companies they invest in. There are different forms of shareholder activism, for 
example, participation in the annual general meeting of companies, divestment, and 
letter writing (Sjöström, 2008). Most of the literature in the field has focused on the 
impact of resolutions and annual meetings (Clark, Salo and Hebb, 2008; David, Bloom 
and Hillman, 2007; Gillan and Starks, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri and Volkan, 2011), on the 
drivers for shareholders salience (Gond and Piani, 2012; Hamilton and Eriksson, 
2011; Vandekerckhove, Leys, and Braeckel, 2007), dialogue with target companies 
(Ferrero and Beunza, 2014), impact of engagement (Becht et al., 2009), and also, on 
management attitude towards engagement (Becht et al., 2009; Vandekerckhove et al., 
2007). However, the effectiveness of the tactics employed in the process of 
engagement remains unexplored.  
My research aims to explore this gap. To be more specific, this paper 
empirically and theoretically analyses the effectiveness of ‘soft engagement’ and of a 
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number of tactics used in engagement letters. The letters were sent by the Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI) Clearinghouse on behalf of a group of investors, 
representing US$3.3 trillion in assets under management (AUM), to international 
publicly traded firms to invite them to join the United Nations Global Compact 
(UNGC) initiative. As such, my research is based on field experiments comprising a 
sample of firms listed on the FTSE All-World index4, which are not members of the 
initiative (laggards).  
The UNGC is one of the largest initiatives promoting responsible business 
through the adoption of Ten Principles covering human rights, labour, environmental 
issues and anti-corruption practices. The initiative includes 8,000 business and 4,000 
non-business participants coming from 170 countries (UNGC, 2015b). The process to 
join the initiative is straightforward: the CEO of the firm sends a letter to the UNGC 
Secretary stating that they accept to implement the principles within their operations 
and policies. Thereafter, UNGC members submit an annual report called 
‘Communication on Progress’ (COP) where companies disseminate the actions that 
they have taken and the outcomes of such actions; these reports are publicly available5. 
The benefits of joining the initiative include access to the UNGC network, 
partnerships, and support from local networks (UNGC, 2016a). In addition to the 
economic and reputational gains highlighted in the literature (Arevalo, Aravind, 
Ayuso, and Roca, 2013; Cetindamar and Husoy, 2007). 
                                                          
4 ‘The FTSE All-World Index is a market-capitalisation weighted index representing the 
performance of the large and mid-cap stocks from the FTSE Global Equity Index Series and 
covers 90-95% of the investable market capitalisation. The index covers Developed and 
Emerging markets and is suitable as the basis for investment products, such as funds, 
derivatives and exchange-traded funds’ (FTSE Russell, 2016). 
5 The initiative has been criticized by NGOs, activist and academic researchers by the lack of 
monitoring of the COPs, the UNGC has established different levels of reporting (learner, active 
and advance) to distinguish among the commitment of its members (UNGC, 2015) 
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The invitation letter used in the experiment can be considered as ‘soft 
engagement’. Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) distinguish between two types of 
engagement: ‘passive marketing signalling’ and ‘active engagement’. The former 
involves sending signals through the financial market by investing in companies that 
have good environmental, social and ethical performance. Passive marketing 
signalling has been developed mainly by ethical funds in the UK but results are 
questionable in terms of impact. On the other hand, active engagement is the preferred 
strategy in the US and seems to be more fruitful. In the US, shareholders’ demands 
are usually submitted to be considered in the Annual General Meeting (AGM). Many 
of the demands are discussed before the AGMs, and if agreement is reached 
shareholders withdraw the proposal. According to Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) ‘soft 
engagement’ is an hybrid of the ‘passive marketing signalling’ and ‘active 
engagement’ and involves not only contacting and persuading particular firms (e.g. 
letters, meetings and surveys) but also participating in more broad events and practices 
such as conferences and initiatives to promote ethical behaviour. 
The success of engagement depends to some extend on how shareholders are 
perceived by the management of target companies, and also on the significance of the 
demanded issue. I base the first set of tactics on the proposal made by Gifford (2010) 
to determine shareholder salience. He considers the three attributes identified by 
Mitchell et al. (1997) as relevant for stakeholders in general. Those attributes are: 
power, legitimacy and urgency. Within each attribute Gifford (2010) proposes a 
subcategory of relevant items in the context of shareholders. For power, he suggests 
coercive, utilitarian and normative characteristics of shareholders. For the legitimacy 
attribute, he identifies four subcategories namely individual, organisational, pragmatic 
and societal, and their corresponding source. Finally, Gifford (2010) highlights that 
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the urgency attribute can be built in two type of arguments: time-sensitivity and 
criticality of the request. 
The second set of tactics refers to other tools that might be helpful in the 
engagement process. These tactics are related to elements embedded in the invitation 
letter itself such as language; environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) 
statement; and channels of communication. In terms of language, I measure the 
difference between sending a letter in English rather than in the local language of the 
target company. Regarding the ESG statements, I consider if quoting some of the 
firm’s own achievements on environmental, social and corporate governance issues 
make a difference. Channels of communication refers to testing the effectiveness of 
sending the invitation letter by email or by post.  
Because the firms included in the experiment are based in different countries, 
it is necessary to include a theory that can help us to understand the reaction of 
managers by not only considering the attributes of shareholders but also the 
institutional field of targeted firms. Social Movement Theory explains the influence 
that a group of activist can exert over firms and the respond in terms of its 
organizational field. 
The field experiment was based on a nested design which allows researchers 
to analyse the individual effect of each independent variable as well as the combined 
effect of all the independent variables together on the dependent variable. This is one 
of the largest experiments in academic research to date, in terms of the tactics tested 
and the number of experimental groups. However, the small number of responses 
obtained do not allow me to analyse the interactions of the independent variables but 
only their individual effect (main effects). I test nine different tactics selected by the 
investors based on their own experience. All the tactics were combined with each 
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other creating 64 treatment groups plus a control group. Target firms were randomly 
distributed within all the groups. 
Overall, my results show that the business case for this particular engagement 
is non-existent. Gifford (2010) specifies that the business case is crucial for the 
salience of shareholders. Likewise, my results show that contacting the chair in 
addition to the CSR department and following up the engagement with target 
companies are the most effective tactics. It is also somewhat helpful to contact the 
CEO and referencing peers’ companies that have adopted the initiative. These findings 
are in line with previous research where the preferences of management are basic for 
successful engagement (Becht et al., 2009; Gifford, 2010; Hamilton and Eriksson, 
2011). I also find that the engagement process is stronger when firms have a high ex-
ante likelihood to sign up the initiative and are located in countries where the concern 
about environmental, social and governance issues is also predominant (e.g. Australia, 
Sweden). Understanding the effectiveness of engagement tactics is not only important 
for shareholders and coalition of investors who use ‘soft engagement’ to enhance 
sustainable practices in target companies but also for a number of stakeholders as 
policy makers, NGOs and other activist. This paper also adds to the literature on public 
relations, marketing, accounting and strategy.  
Finally, the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the literature on the UNGC and on Shareholder Engagement. The third 
section presents the Theoretical Framework. Then, I present the development of the 
hypotheses.  Next section, describes the data used, the selection of sample and the 
methods for analysis. The results are presented in the sixth section. Then, I discuss the 





This section has three main parts. In the first one, I briefly portray the UNGC current 
situation and existent academic literature, and provide a number of general reasons to 
join CSR voluntary initiatives. Then, I depict the shareholder movement: I present 
some definitions and other key words, and previous work on this area. With this on 
mind, we will be introduced to the last subsection where I discuss the theoretical 
framework used to answer the research questions of this paper. 
 
2.2.1. The United Nations Global Compact 
The UNGC is a multidimensional initiative that encourages entities to implement Ten 
Principles covering the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption 
within their normal practices and operations (Table 2.1). The initiative was launched 
in July, 2000 and is regarded as one of the most important and largest memberships 
promoting sustainable practices (Chen and Bouvain, 2009; Kell and Ruggie, 1999; 
Perkins and Neumayer, 2010; Gilbert, Rasche and Waddock, 2011). Currently, the 
initiative accounts for over 9,500 business firms classified as small and medium 
enterprises as well as large multinational firms in a wide variety of industries; and 
more than 3,000 non-business organizations (NGOs, academia, and public sector 
among others) in 160 countries and with about 85 local networks. The UNGC 
excludes a few companies: those enterprises with less than 10 workers (under revision 
from 01/08/2018), those in unethical sectors (i.e. tobacco and controversial bombs), 
and those banned by the United Nations (UNGC, 2015b). Business participants are 
committed to submit a yearly report, called ‘Communication on Progress’ (COP), 
about their activities on the accomplishment of the Ten Principles. Members that 
failed to disclose such information are classified as non-communicating participants 
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and, if the omission is not amended, companies are delisted from the initiative 




A number of scholars describe the UNGC as a way to “bluewash” companies’ 
image. Banerjee (2007, p. 99) suggests that the “Global Compact is a form of 
‘bluewashing’ where corporations wrap their credentials in the blue UN flag to 
escape scrutiny of their actions at the global level”. For instance, Bennie et al. (2007) 
find that the industry of oil and gas are more willing to participate in the UNGC as 
they can be the target of human rights defences. Similar arguments are raised by 
4TABLE 2.1 
UNGC: The Ten Principles 
Human Rights 
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights. 
Principle 2: Make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.  
Labour 
Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining. 
Principle 4: The elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour. 
Principle 5: The effective abolition of child labour. 
Principle 6: The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
Environment 
Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental 
challenges. 
Principle 8: Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. 
Principle 9: Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies.  
Anti-Corruption 
Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion 
and bribery. 
Notes: Adapted from The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact (UNGC, 2016c). 
Retrieved from https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles. 
18 
 
Hamann et al. (2009) who give special attention to human rights within the extractive 
industry in South Africa. More recently, in a study about economic crisis and the 
Global Compact in the US, Arevalo and Aravind (2010) argue that there are firms that 
adopt the ten principles but do not really commit to them, even less in times of crisis. 
On the other hand, Janney et al. (2009) claim the Global Compact membership is not 
a fact of bluewashing a company’s reputation but making it stronger. In accordance 
to this statement, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2010:1185) conclude that “firms recognize 
that their commitments to human rights, environmental standards, and good 
governance have to be credible”. Recently, the UNGC has implemented two 
mechanisms to empower itself and improve its legitimacy: a) an annual contribution 
according to the size of the firm (applicable only for business) and b) a new model to 
evaluate practices reported in the COP (UNGC, 2014).  
In more general terms, other research has explored why firms decide to engage 
with CSR practices. Jo and Harjoto (2011) distinguish two main reasons, the first one 
is that CEOs might create a good reputation as responsible citizens, thus, granting 
them benefits not only inside but outside the firm; however, the cost of that image is 
borne by the shareholders. The second reason is related to the stakeholder theory; 
where the conflict-resolution hypothesis is taken into account and, this inspires the 
engagement with CSR standards, which in turn is positively related to corporate 
governance. 
Some scholars, however, argue that engagement with voluntary initiatives has 
some drawbacks. In an early study, McLaren (2004) argues that voluntary CSR 
initiatives might discourage companies from adopting them due to the cost of market 
competition and the lack of a strong framework to disclose information that allows 
stakeholders to evaluate the company’s practices and therefore, to obtain a 
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competitive advantage. A recent study carried out by Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) 
finds that competition at the nation-level is reflected in lower corporate social 
performance (CSP). Campbell (2007) points out that not only competition but also a 
contracting economy impact on CSP, although not to the same extent. Therefore, 
companies might opt for neglecting CSR initiatives if they judge that the potential 
benefits of implementation do not exceed their costs. 
 
2.2.2. Shareholder Engagement 
This relatively new philosophy of Shareholder Engagement started in the second half 
of the 20th Century. Although the origin is not clear, researchers have found evidence 
of this practice by the end of the 40´s in the UK, in the decade of 1960 in Sweden and 
late in the 70´s in the US (Bengtsson, 2007; Vogel, 1983). A fact that is common 
across studies is that social responsible investment was primary carried out by 
Churches from different denominations, and therefore influenced by religious criteria 
such as excluding producers of alcohol, tobacco and weapons (Bengtsson, 2008). This 
practice was then spread among other type of investors who demanded changes not 
only with the purpose of firms becoming ethical but also more profitable (Bengtsson, 
2008).  
As a consequence of the above historical events, there have been several 
attempts to define shareholder engagement; however, there is no formal concept. 
Hamilton and Eriksson (2011) identify two concepts that are closely related in this 
field: shareholder activism and shareholder engagement. The former refers to the 
actions taken by investors to induce a change regarding any aspect of corporate 
governance, while the latter is the denomination for investor inquiries not only related 
to corporate governance but also to social and environmental issues; however, 
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currently both terms can be interchangeable. Gillan and Starks (2007) refer to it as the 
use of shareholders “voice” in order to induce a change without the intention of taking 
control of the firm. Another definition is taken from Sjöström (2008, p. 142): 
“shareholder activism is defined as the use of ownership position to actively influence 
company policy and practice”. From these definitions, it can be concluded that 
shareholder engagement refers only to those with a current stake within the company. 
However, Gillan and Starks (2007) suggest that shareholder activism can be visualised 
in a continuum from simple trading up to takeovers with intermediate points; in this 
continuum, we can include the coalition of investors with power to trade target 
companies’ stakes. Table 2.2 shows a summary of the different concepts related to 
shareholder engagement. 
As mentioned above, shareholder engagement might pursue two objectives: a 
change in economic aims (Denes, et al., 2017; Holland 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 2001) or 
a change in environmental and social behaviour (Becht et al. 2009; Gifford, 2010). 
These objectives are not exclusive and an effort has been made to present a ´business 
case´ for this practice particularly showing that in order to serve the maxima stated by 
Friedman (1970) about maximizing shareholders wealth social, environmental y 
corporate governance issues should be attended. However, evidence still is mixed 
showing that CSR does not affect financial performance (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; 
Dam and Scholtens, 2012) and that CSR and financial performance are positively 
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Meeting/Dialogue with the board of 
directors/ managers (e.g. CEO) 
Participation in Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) 
Campaigns (collision)   
Channels of 
Communication 




Notes: This table shows different elements related to Stakeholder Engagement. The first 
section ‘Stakeholders’ lists a number of parties that act as activist. The next section shows 
a list of synonyms used in the academic literature to refer to Stakeholder Activism. Then, 
‘Engagement Tactics’ presents a list of activities that stakeholders adopt in order to pursue 
target companies. Finally, the table shows the way through which target companies are 
contacted. 
 
In order to present an overview of Shareholder Engagement, Sjöström  (2008) 
conducts a comprehensive analysis of the existing literature on this field. She claims 
a growth in the number of publications from 1983 to 2007 and identifies five trends. 
First, she describes how studies in this period addressed shareholder proposals and 
their targets. The next category includes papers about the outcomes shown by 
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companies that have been targets of shareholder efforts. The third and fourth trends 
belong to NGOs and unions, respectively, which might be misrepresented in the 
literature. Although, according to Sjöström (2008) for NGOs, this might be due to 
their new enrolment in capital markets. However, unions are by default an important 
piece of social practices in corporations and the studies cited are mainly based in 
Australia. The last trend that the author covers is pension funds which she concludes 
might positively endorse CSR practices. The study highlights that letter writing is one 
of most recurrent artefacts for engagement. Denes, Karpoff and McWilliam (2017) 
present an updated review of shareholder engagement literature where they highlight 
the improvement of engagement over the years. 
Engagement strategies typically involve one or more of the following 
activities: letter writing, private meetings with the board of directors, participation in 
Annual General Meetings (AGMs), campaigning, and collaboration with other 
activist. For instance, Becht et al. (2009) found that the Hermes UK Focus Fund 
(HUKFF) preferred strategies are to meet with the board of directors, to ask support 
from other investors and to launch press campaigns, and that some of the contact 
methods are via telephone, letter and face-to-face meetings. In addition, Becht et al. 
(2009) distinguish between three levels of attitudes of the target companies towards 
engagement: collaborative, mixed and confrontational. The former refers to the 
agreement among parties. A mixed attitude is considered when the company does not 
completely agree with the HUKFF request but still, they comply with it. The final 
attitude, confrontational, is when stronger actions need to be done in order to 
implement the change, for instance, the CEO (Becht et al., 2009). In a previous study, 
Holland (1998a) finds similar attitudes from being cooperative to breaking down the 
relationship between financial institutions and the management; however, as Thomson 
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and Bebbington (2005) highlight the involvement of dialogue is necessary to excel in 
the engagement. From these studies we can observe that the contribution from both 
sides of an engagement process is important (i.e. activist and target). 
In the same vein, Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) consider that ‘soft 
engagement’, an hybrid of the ‘passive marketing signalling’ and ‘active 
engagement’, involves not only contacting and persuading particular firms (e.g. 
letters, meetings and surveys) but also participating in more broad events and practices 
such as conferences and initiatives. Levit (2014) studies ‘soft shareholder activism’ as 
an option for influencing companies on issues related to corporate governance when 
controlling the firm is impossible or impractical due to costs. More particularly, the 
author focuses on the relationship between communication and exit and how these 
actions are reflected in the stock price, CEO compensation structure and other 
investment characteristics. Both studies mention the use of different approaches to get 
in touch with the management but they do not focus on the tactics or elements used, 
nor test their particular effectiveness. Holland (1998b) finds that firms are willing to 
disclosure private information when they meet with investors in relation to financial 
issues. In addition, Solomon and Darby (2005) points out that the practice of private 
disclosure used in financial queries is also beneficial for social and environmental 
demands. Although Bourveau and Schoenfeld (2017) assert that a common practice 
across managers is to release information on earnings and sales forecasts when they 
feel they are at risk to be approached by activist.  
While I have referred to Stakeholder Engagement from the perspective of 
shareholder to companies, engagement from companies to stakeholders is also 
plausible. Thomson and Bebbington (2005) denotes that the logic for this practice is 
to enhace the quality and strenght of Social and Environemal Reporting, although to 
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achieve this aim dialogue needs to be meaningful. In a more recent study, Barone, 
Ranamagar and Solomon (2013) suggest the introduction of guidelines on how to 
conduct successful engagment by companies is necessary even if it not a mandatory 
mechanism, the idea ,they say, is to assist on how to disclosure information in sensitive 
cases as it could be a takeover.  
Furthermore, engagement processes can be considered as well as a learning 
curve for both activists and target firms. Holland (2011) proposes a ‘systematic 
strategy for change concerning ESG issues in fund management´ (p. 169) which 
includes the identification of areas within the accountability chain (firms, fund 
managers, trustees, clients) based on knowledge and change. Reid and Toffel (2009) 
study the effect of shareholder activism and government politics in relation to 
organizational change, and find that shareholder activism does not only change 
corporate behaviour of target companies (direct effect) but also change the norms, 
beliefs and practices of the industry where the target is located (spillover effect). 
Sikavica, Perrault and Rehbein (2018) suggest that managers can learn to interpret 
who are the activist and what kind of objectives they persue, in this way, managers 
can easily disregard those proposals that are not in line with their own objectives (e.g. 
profitability). For instance, Walls and Berrone (2017) find that environmental 
expertise of CEOs on environmental issues confer them informal power within 
corporations improving their environmental impact.  
In addition, investors can focus on target firms where they have opportunity to 
succeed or on target firms with entrenched managers that might difficult any possible 
change that might not be of his/her interest; it depends on activists’ resources (e.g. 
time and money) (Benton and You, 2018). Cundill, Smart and Wilson (2018) conclude 
that target firms might respond in a substantive or symbolic manner depending on the 
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activist perceived salience. Bengtsson (2008) suggests that engagement from investors 
changes over time according to the institutional context where actors participate and 
at the same time the institutional context changes due to the pressures from investors 
demanding the implementations of certain practices. In this sense, according to 
Bengtsson (2008) the list of actors includes investors, governments, NGO´s, Pension 
Funds, Managers and providers of SRI services. In sum, the study of the environment 
where the engagement takes place is crucial for supersede.  
Regarding pension funds, they have become more important in encouraging 
firms to get involved in CSR activities. For instance, the Teachers Insurance and 
Annuity Association of America and the College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-
CREF), the largest pension fund in the US, established an engagement programme to 
encourage target companies to develop specific corporate governance practices. The 
results showed a positive impact (Carleton et al., 1998). More recently, a study about 
Swedish pension funds was carried out in order to determine the strategies that are 
used in this sector (Hamilton and Eriksson, 2011). The authors find out two channels: 
exclusion and engagement. The first refers to sell the shares owned in case the 
company has failed to comply with a CSR global agreement in which the Swedish 
Government is involved. The second strategy refers to engagement with companies 
that have failed in some aspects of CSR, but whose failures are not serious. In this 
case, the engagement comprises proposals and pressure from coalitions. In both types 
of engagement, underperforming companies are identified through portfolio screening 
and ratings provided by external agencies. 
Target firms tend to comply in different ways. Drawing from the insights of 
corporate political strategy literature Clark and Crawford (2012) compare direct 
(shareholder resolutions) and indirect (request for environmental disclosure) 
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engagement. They find that companies showing poor and good performance prefer to 
engage with stakeholders by fulfilling their disclosure inquiries, whereas companies 
showing no strengths or concerns about environmetal issues and those with a similar 
number of strenghts and concerns tend to engage in environmetal policies by agreeing 
the withdrawl of resolutions and by communicating their practices. Eding and 
Scholtens (2017) study the relationship between type of investors, proposals in AGMs 
and firms. They find that Institutional Investors with the label of socially responsible 
tend to demand higher performance on environmental practices rather than in social 
practices. In terms of financial performance, Denes, Karpoff and McWilliam (2017) 
conclude from an analysis of 73 papers that poor and large performers are in the 
spotlight of activist particularly from Hedge Funds. 
The engagement analysed in this paper is based on experimental designs which 
have been used before in this field. For example, Dyck et al. (2008) study the influence 
of media on corporate governance practices on Russia. The authors classified evidence 
from foreign and local press regarding violations to corporate governance structure 
into seven groups according to the kind of strategy used by shareholders to produce a 
change on the governance. Employing a clinical trial approach, Becht et al. (2009) 
explore the impact of private engagement by the HUKFF on the returns of target firms. 
The engagement consisted of a series of interventions in policies and procedures 
related to the governance and financial performance of the firms. Their results show 
that engagement does improve financial performance. These benefits are distributed 
among all shareholders, including those that did not participate in the engagement. 
Similarly, Mackenzie, Rees and Rodionova (2013) present a clear setting for a natural 
experiment: the intervention of the FTSE management in target companies and the 
threat to be excluded from the index if they do not comply with the environmental 
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requirements established by the index. Companies’ allocation to the treatment or the 
control group depends on whether they were or were not listed in the FTSE4Good 
Index. The authors conclude that when the engagement comes from an international 
and well-regarded index, such as FTSE, and it is strengthened with the threat of being 
publicly delisted from the index, there are higher possibilities that the company will 
improve its environmental performance. 
Furthermore, this growing phenomenon has also been studied according to its 
geographical application. Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) highlight the difference 
between shareholder engagement taking place in the US and in the UK. They argue 
that in the US, ethical funds invest in ‘sin’ companies with the purpose of influencing 
corporate behaviour, whereas in the UK the screening policies of the ethical funds 
forbid investment in this type of company. Therefore, engagement practices are also 
different between these two countries. In the US, shareholder activists tend to 
participate in AGMs by submitting proposals requesting the improvement on social, 
environmental but mainly, governance issues. Evidence shows that management pay 
attention to these requests, and if agreement is reached, the proposals are withdrawn 
before the AGM takes place. In the UK, shareholders invest in those companies with 
good performance, fact that sends signals to the financial market with the aim of 
inducing responsible behaviour (‘passive marketing signalling’). Australia follows a 
similar pattern to the US by using negative screening and the rest of Europe also 
employ a best-in-class approach (Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2012). According to 
Hamilton and Eriksson (2011) engagement through dialogue is the preferred strategy 
of Swedish pension funds to influence corporate behaviour, although, they highlight 
that exclusion is also practiced when foreign shares are involved. In Japan, 
shareholder activism has recently started causing some confusion in target companies 
28 
 
which argue that questionnaires made by SRI are based on Western ethics; authors 
suggest the use of engagement and dialogue over screening (Solomon et al. 2004). A 
can be seen there are several differences within developed countries on how tactics 
used by investors and the responses that they can obtain from target companies. 
In developing countries, although the literature is less developed there also 
exist differences on how investors approach corporations and how these corporations 
react. For instance in Nigeria, shareholder activism is considered a bullying practice 
with negative results which are influenced by the country’s political environment 
(Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao 2012). In a recent study Kim, Sung and Wei (2017) 
analyse the effect of investors’ activism in emerging economies (i.e. Korea) showing 
that the type of investor (e.g. activist) and the country of origin, as a reference for the 
corporate governance practices, are determinants to enhance corporate governance 
performance. Overall, findings suggest that engagement should be designed according 
to the environment of the firm. 
There is also evidence of how different types of ownership can  have different 
outcomes on corporate social responsibility. According to Dam and Scholtens (2012), 
shares held by employees, individuals and corporations have a poor impact on CSR, 
whereas large investors’ ownership (banks, state and institutional investors) remains 
neutral. As shareholders, institutional investors play an important role in corporate 
social responsibility. Institutional investors comprise insurance companies, mutual 
funds and pension funds among others and therefore they are considered as the largest 
investors in a number of countries (Dam and Scholtens, 2012). The authors argue that 
these differences can be the result of the role of each party within the society. They 
analyse separately three CSR dimensions: ethics, environment, and stakeholders 
finding that each group of shareholders might have especial interest in one or another 
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dimension within European firms. On a broader study, Rees and Rodionova (2013) 
employ a global sample to investigate how strategic shareholder ownership and 
closely held equity impact on different aspects of CSR, namely social, environmental 
and governance scores. Although these papers provide some useful insights for 
engagement (i.e. preference for CSR practices), they do not indicate whether 
shareholders employ any tactic to approach the management and hence influence 
corporate behaviour. 
 In general terms, the studies in the preceding paragraphs show the impact of 
engagement, target firms, type of activists and communication and dialogue between 
firm managers and activist. It was pointed out that characteristics of engagement such 
as CEOs and activists’ preferences, organizational context of application and dialogue 
are critical for achieving the objective of engagement. Based on a field experiment, I 
test different tactics identified in the literature used by a large group of Institutional 
Investors to determine if engagement works. Furthermore, as the experiment targets 
firms from all over the globe, I am also able to test how companies react based on 
their countries. Therefore, the research questions of this study are: does engagement 
from Institutional Investors matter?, what are the most effective tactics to approach 
target firms? And does firms from different countries react differently to engagement? 
 
2.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Shareholder engagement has been widely studied through the lenses of agency theory 
due to its relationship with corporate governance in general, and managers in 
particular (Gillan and Starks, 2007). However, in order to respond to the actual 
demands of stakeholders it is impossible to think just about the self-interest of the 
management without considering internal and external pressures that come from the 
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institutional environment where the firm operates. Therefore, I ground the bases of 
this paper on Stakeholder Theory and Institutional Theory. 
  Stakeholder theory establishes that ‘any group or individual who can affect 
or be affected by the decisions and the achievement of corporate objectives’ (Freeman, 
1984:25) must received attention from the management. However, as organizations 
interact with multiple actors (e.g. goverments, suppliers and customers, local 
communities) it is not possible to engage with all them. Consequently, the 
management evaluates demands from stakeholders who are typically classified in 
primary and secondary groups according to the nature of their relationship. In this 
sense, Mitchell et al. (1997) propose a model for stakeholder salience which includes: 
power, legitimacy and urgency.  
According to Mitchell et al. (1997) a stakeholder has power ‘to the extent it 
has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means, to impose its will 
in the relationship’ (1997, p. 865). Mitchell’s et al. (1997) classification of power is 
based on Etzioni’s (1964), cited in Gifford (2010, p. 80), work and applied by Gifford 
(2010) to deepen our understanding of shareholder salience. Gifford (2010) relates 
coercive power to the formal use of ownership, for instance, by submitting a proposal 
in the AGM; utilitarian power to the use of financial means to compensate corporate 
behaviour (e.g. investment/divestment); and, normative power to actions taken by the 
investors that can affect either the reputation of the company or its management. In 
the engagement that we are analysing the coercive and utilitarian powers are not very 
clear as the stake of the investors is unknown and it might be the case that not all the 
investors have a stake in the company; however, the normative power still can be used. 
The second attribute to capture the attention of the management is legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is defined by Suchman as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the 
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actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (1995, p. 574). 
According to Gifford (2010) there are four levels to be considered: individual, 
organisational, societal and pragmatic. These levels result from the combination of 
Wood’s (1991) and Suchman’s (1995) categorization of legitimacy. Individual 
legitimacy refers to the ‘credibility, expertise, experience and status of the individuals 
engaging with the company’ (Gifford 2010, p. 81); in this case, it is the legitimacy of 
the PRI as a platform for shareholders to facilitate engagement processes and 
communication with target companies. Organisational legitimacy denotes the 
position and perception of the PRI itself in the market. Societal legitimacy comes from 
the significance of the issue for the society, in this case, the acceptance of the UNGC. 
Finally, pragmatic legitimacy refers to the business case of the issue requested, this 
is, how target companies might benefit from becoming members of the UNGC. 
The engagement under review meets all these types of legitimacy: meetings, 
phone calls, emails and any sort of communication between the group of investors and 
target companies was addressed by the PRI Clearinghouse, the department in charge 
of all the engagement practices related to the PRI (individual legitimacy). Also, the 
PRI is a large highly regarded network of investors who include in their investment 
decisions and operations six principles related to responsible investment and 
encourage other parties to be more sustainable (organizational legitimacy). The 
request of this group of investors is based in adoption of the ten principles established 
by the UNGC, one of the largest voluntary CSR initiatives backed by the United 
Nations (societal legitimacy). Finally, joining is straightforward with no membership 
fees6, companies can improve their environmental, social and corporate governance 
                                                          
6 Membership fees were integrated after the experiment took place. 
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performance which in turn is highly appreciated by investors and other important 
stakeholders (pragmatic legitimacy).  
The urgency of the claim made by stakeholders is third attribute for 
shareholder salience. According to Mitchell et al. (1997), for a claim to be considered 
urgent, it needs to be time-sensitive and ‘important or critical to the stakeholder’ 
(1997:867). Gifford argues that the element of time-sensitivity is easy to identify 
whereas criticality ‘reflects the subjective importance the investor places on the claim’ 
(2010:82). In this case, the time-sensitive condition is met with the deadline 
established in the invitation letter (24 May 2013). However, in order to establish the 
criticality of an engagement, Gond and Piani (2012) point out that the issue of interest 
must be important for investors and for a broader public (for example, as a result of a 
trend) and emphasized by the arguments used in the negotiation. Therefore, we can 
visualize the critical aspects of this experiment in the justification given by the PRI in 
the invitation about the importance of joining the UNGC. In a review of literature 
made by Garanova and Ryan (2013), they conclude that urgent and legitimate 
demands coming from large and powerful investors are attended by managers. 
On the other hand, Institutional Theory is used to understand how and why 
organizations behaviour is shaped in certain ways. For instance, DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) suggest that actors exert influence in organizations through isomorphic 
processes which the authors define as coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive 
isomorphism refers to pressure created by governments and the application of laws. 
Mimetic isomorphism is the imitation of successful practices carried out by similar 
organizations eluding the cost attached to finding the best way to achieve an objective. 
And finally, normative isomorphism is related to professionalization of the subject. 
Later, Scott (2001) strengths DiMaggio and Powell´s processes as pillars for 
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Institutional Theory. Up to here, Institutional Theory was meant to explain 
homogeneity across organizations.  
In contrast, recent research on Corporate Social Responsibility and on 
Shareholder Engagement has claimed that cross-sectional variations arise from cross-
nation level institutions. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) carry out a large empirical 
study covering over 40 countries and a variety of industries and firms. They find that 
multi-level characteristics explain about 47% of their Corporate Social Performance. 
According to Scott (2008) field-level analysis helps to understand that ‘organizations 
operates in systems composed of both similar and diverse forms’ (p. 435). In this line 
Comyns (2018) studies climate change policies and multinational corporations and 
how the intensity in which subsidiaries adopt those policies changes according to the 
country where they are located. Reid and Toffel highlight that ‘social movements 
theory offers a promising theoretical framework for understanding why firms might 
respond to these appeals´ referring precisely to engagement from activist such the PRI 
(2009, p.1158). They conclude that firms that have been targeted by activist in a 
particular issue will be more willing to engage with activists; they will react similarly 
if a peer from the same industry has been already contacted by activists. Reid and 
Toffel (2009) also find that political context influences the target response, this is, if 
legislation related to the activists demands are in place, then there are higher 
probabilities that this firm will engage with investors.  
Further studies use social movement theory, a theory based on institutional 
change which establishes the link with Institutional Theory. Under these lenses 
scholars aim to explain why firms react to activist they way they do and taking in 
consideration the characteristics of their organizational field (Wooten and Hoffman, 
2008). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define organizational field as ‘those 
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organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: 
key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products’ (1983, p. 149). Den Hond and 
Bakker (2007) take these premises and combine the influence of activists over the 
organizational level and the mechanisms to change it. 
 
2.4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The final part of this section presents the experimental setting. I introduce the PRI, the 
investors that participate in the experiment, and the treatments to be tested. Finally, I 
present the hypotheses, which are divided in two sets. The first set lists the hypotheses 
under the ‘Shareholder Salience’ model, and the second set refers to those hypotheses 
outside the model. 
 
2.4.1. The Experimental Setting 
This paper analyses a practice of ‘soft engagement’ led by a group of investors from 
the PRI initiative. The PRI is an international organization that groups asset owners, 
investment managers and providers of professional services with the purpose of 
incorporating six principles in their investment practices (Table 2.3). The PRI works 
in partnership with the UNGC and with the United Nations Environment Programme 
Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and has about 1,400 signatories (PRI, 2015). The 
experiment consisted of an invitation letter to join the UNGC sent by the PRI 
Clearinghouse on behalf of a group of 34 investors (Table 2.4) to those companies 
listed in the FTSE All World index (AW) that were not members of the UNGC as of 
March, 2013. A subset of the sample was considered the control group, this is, firms 
within this group did not receive any invitation. The purpose of the experiment is to 
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test which tactics are most effective for engagement practices. In order to determine 
which tactics should be tested, the PRI carried out focus group meetings with investors 
and the PRI Clearinghouse’s staff. The resulting tactics  include: 1a) contacting the 
CSR department vs contacting the CSR department and the CEO; 1b) addressing the 
letter to the chair as well vs not contacting the chair; 2) referencing the peers of the 
company that were already members of the UNGC vs not referencing; 3) sending an 
invitation via email vs post; 4) mentioning the AUM of the group of investors leading 
the experiment vs not mentioning the AUM; 5) translating the invitation into local 
language vs sending invitations in English; 6) following up the engagement by email 
vs not following up; 7) referencing the target firm’s own ESG performance vs not 
referencing it; and finally, 8) listing the name of the company on a press release or not 
listing it7. The measurement period was from April 1st 2013, the date when the letters 
and emails started to be sent, until December 16th 2013; this period was considered 
appropriate according with previous campaigns carried out by the PRI and UNGC. 







                                                          
7 There were a number of limitations in the data gathering process, for instance: language, 
corporate culture, changes in the corporate culture (merger, split up, complex structure) and 
in the company’s name and also, in a number of cases, the information available via the 
corporate website is limited.  All these issues were amended in the best possible way without 






6TABLE 2.3  
PRI: The Six Principles 
Principle 1 
We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making 
processes 
Principle 2 
We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership 
policies and practices. 
Principle 3 
We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we 
invest. 
Principle 4 
We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the 
investment industry. 
Principle 5 
We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the 
Principles. 
Principle 6 
We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the 
Principles. 
Notes: Adapted from The Six Principles (PRI, 2016a). Retrieved from https://www.unpri.org 
/about/the-six-principles. 
7TABLE 2.4 
Investors Participating in the Experiment 
ATP Dexia Asset Management Syntrus Achmea 
AustralianSuper Folketrygdfondet 





Ownership Services Ltd 
The Central Church Fund of 
Finland 




The Church of England National 
Investing Bodies 
Boston Common Asset 
Management, LLC 




CCLA Mn Services N.V. 










Christian Super   Robeco Walden Asset Management 
Comité syndical national 
de retraite Bâtirente 
Santa Fe Portfolios 
Pension and Health Benefits of 




Cyrte Investments Strathclyde Pension Fund  
Note: This table lists the names of the investors that participate in the experiment. 
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The objective of the letter sent by the PRI Clearinghouse was to raise 
awareness about the absence of the firm in the UNGC as a means of committing to 
social and environmental practices. There were 32 different templates which includes 
a standard letter with the characteristics described in the following lines. The first 
paragraph invited companies to become members of the initiative (objective). The 
second paragraph introduced the UNGC very briefly (what it is, membership size and 
coverage, and purpose). The next paragraph identified the aim of the group of 
investors in stimulating sustainable practices. The fourth paragraph showed why it is 
important for investors that companies adopt the initiative. In the following paragraph, 
investors showed concern about the company not being a member of the initiative and 
invited it again to fully embrace the initiative and provided a link to the UNGC website 
where more information about how to become a member was provided. The sixth 
paragraph asked companies about any reasons for deciding not to take part of the 
UNGC. Finally, the last paragraph stated a date to receive the company’s response. 
The letter was signed by the representatives of the 34 institutional investors leading 
the engagement. Appendix 2.1 contains an example of a standard letter.  
Figure 2.1 shows the dynamic of the engagement process. Institutional investors 
decide to participate in a coalition lead by the PRI Clearinghouse as part of their 
commitments to the six principles established by the PRI for responsible investment. 
These investors have AUM which might influence the decision of target companies. 
All the 32 templates were sent via two channels (email and post) to the CEO, the chair 
and CSR department; if the company did not have a CSR department, the invitation 
was sent to the Investor Relations (IR) Department. The contents of each template 
vary depending on the additional information randomly included/excluded: peers, 
language, and ESG sentences. On the other hand, a number of companies were 
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selected for a follow up and some other were named on the PRI website. Therefore, I 
pose the following hypotheses to answer the first question about engagement: 
 
H1a. Companies that received an invitation letter from the PRI are more 
likely to join the UNGC than those that did not receive a letter. 
 
H1b. Companies that replied are more likely to join the UNGC that those 









22.1 Collective Engagement Process: Analysis of Tactics  
Figure 2.1. This figure shows how the different tactics interact in the engagement process. First, the 
letter is issued by the PRI Clearing House on behalf of the institutional investors and in some cases the 
AUM is indicated. Then, the invitation could be a hard-copy or an email, which objective is to raise 
awareness about non-being a member of the UNGC. This letter might contain different items (i.e. list 
three peer companies’ members of the initiative). Finally, the invitation could be addressed to the chair, 




2.4.2. Testing Investor Salience 
Once the different attributes for investor salience have been discussed in section 2.3., 
we can analyse the tactics employed in the experiment. The first two tactics are related 
to the contact point in the target firms. I test the impact of addressing the letter to the 
CEO and CSR department and to the CSR department only. Table 2.5 shows the 
recipient’s position of the letter. In order to test the strength of this tactic, all the 
invitation letters were sent to the CSR department of each target company in the 
sample and half of the sample also received invitations for the CEO. Furthermore, a 
quarter of the companies in the sample received a letter for the chair. However, in 
some cases despite the company had submitted a sustainability report, it did not have 
a CSR department and the Investor Relations Department or other figure within the 
company was in charge of attending the social, environmental, ethic or governance 
queries. It is a common practice that the CEO is also the chairperson of the company, 
in such cases, only one letter was sent.  
According to a number of studies, the management or the board are the contact 
points (Becht et al., 2009; Sjöström, 2008), although there are cases where the 
interaction involves other executives (Becht et al., 2009; Hamilton and Eriksson, 
2011; Vandekerckhove et al., 2007). However, as the manager is ultimate person who 
signs the letter of agreement to be sent to the UNGC, and the responses to 
stakeholder’s claims depend on how they are perceived by the managers, I propose 
the following hypotheses: 
 
H2. Firms that received an invitation addressed to the CEO and the 
CSR/RI department are more likely to engage with investors than those 





H3. Firms that received an invitation addressed including the chair are 




Recipient of the invitation 
CSR Department 
Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) 
Chairperson 
Investor Relations (IR) President Independent Chair 





CEO, President and 
Director 
Non-executive Chair 
Media/Public Relations Executive Director Vice-Chair 
Chief Financial Officer Managing Director President Commissioner 
Corporate Planning and 
Business Development 
General Manager 
Chair of the Supervisory 
Board 
Environment, Safety and 
Quality Assurance 
Committee 
Chair of the Management 
Board  














Corporate Secretary   
Chief Accountant   
Note: variations for the recipient of the invitation. 
 
 
The third tactic included in the experiment is the AUM of the group of 
investors from the PRI participating in the engagement which are equivalent to $3.3 
trillion dollars coming from renowned investors. It is suggested that coalitions 
increase the coercive and utilitarian power of shareholders (Gifford, 2010; Gond and 
Piani, 2012). However, as stated earlier, the figures of ownership to claim coercive 
power are not clear in this experiment. Utilitarian power makes more sense as the 




avoid investing in a firm if it does not comply with the request. Nonetheless, it would 
be more crucial if investors could divest, which again is difficult to assess in this case. 
Legitimacy is another attribute that can be observed in this tactic and can be visualized 
in all the four level or sub-classifications. As a result, the following hypothesis is 
established:  
 
H4. Firms that received an invitation where the AUM of the group of 
investors is stated are more likely to engage with investors. 
 
Another common activity among active stakeholders is press campaigns 
(Becht et al., 2009; Hamilton and Eriksson, 2011). In this sense, Levit (2014) mentions 
that public campaign (e.g. lawyers, submitting a proxy and advertisement) is more 
effective than private communication with management if there is an impact on the 
market. This type of campaign can be considered as a threat to reputation (Gifford, 
2010). Because the list of firms is published on the PRI website, all the PRI 
membership has access to it, and therefore, other investors might also consider this 
information in their screening process (normative power). Based on these arguments 
I expect the following:  
 
H5. Those companies listed by the PRI in the press are more likely to 
communicate with investors. 
 
The next tactic to be tested is peer effect. Peer effect is related to the societal 
legitimacy attribute which gives the sense that a practice, code or activity is 




instance Pérez-Batres et al. (2010) study Latin American firms listed in the NYSE 
finding a positive relationship between them and the affiliation to the UNGC and/or 
to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). It was agreed with the focus group of 
investors that including three companies that were already members of the UNGC 
would suffice to test this tactic. Two of the peers were the largest global companies in 
the same sector listed in the FTSE All World Index; size was measured according to 
the total assets of each company provided by Datastream. The third peer was a local 
company in the same sector. However, when it was searched, it turned out that in some 
cases: 
a) The local company was the same than one of the global companies; to solve this 
issue the third largest company in the same sector was chosen.  
b) The country did not have a company in that sector. When a peer was not available 
for a target company in specific at the sector level, the one at the industry level 
and country was considered, except for Hong Kong, where we looked first at 
Chinese companies. 
c) In few cases (three), we only have one global company for the same sector; then, 
the second largest company in the same industry was considered. 
d) When the country did not have companies in the same sector and industry, the 
largest company in the same country was selected.  
e) In the particular cases of Ireland (1), New Zealand (3), Peru (1) Philippines (4) 
and UAE (5) where there were not peers members of the UNGC at all, the third 







As a result, the hypothesis for this tactic is: 
 
H6. Firms that received an invitation where the peers are mentioned are 
more likely to engage than those that received an invitation without 
mentioning the peers. 
 
The sixth tactic included in the experiment is ‘follow up’ target companies. 
Basically, this consists of sending reminders through email to some of the target 
companies. Following up on target companies is linked to the urgency attribute where 
investors show the criticality of the issues they are negotiating; target companies and 
campaigners interact constantly in different ways such as phone calls, informal 
meetings, and e-mails (Becht et al., 2009; Hamilton and Eriksson, 2011; Sjöström, 
2008). Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
 
H7. Those firms that were subject of a follow up are more likely to 
communicate with investors than those that did not receive follow up. 
 
2.4.3. Other Helpful Tactics 
The tactics explained in this section were selected by investors in a focus group. The 
coalition of investors engages with companies around the world; target firms are large 
and publicly listed, therefore investors would expect that the management speak 
English. However, they are aware of the benefits of speaking the same language and 
immersing in the culture of the target company; this could increase the legitimacy of 
their claims as it enhances trust. Academic literature in the field of marketing and 




language, but results are contrasting (Louhiala-Salminen and Kankaanranta, 2012; 
Schachaf, 2008). Louhiala-Salminen and Kankaanranta (2012) explore the use of 
English in international internal communication. The authors find that although the 
use of English benefits internal communication in multinational corporations, it does 
also show some concerns due to the different levels of proficiency in the use of the 
language, this is, non-native English speakers feel more comfortable when 
communicating in English with other non-native English speakers as they could use 
‘simple English’. Otherwise, when speaking with natives of English, they feel they 
are being manipulated. Shachaf (2008) investigates the effectiveness of cultural 
diversity and the use of information and communication technology (ICT) on 
international virtual teams. Shachaf (2008) finds that cultural diversity have a negative 
impact on communication, for instance ‘German and Japanese participants reported 
that English language style was more personal than their own language. They felt that 
when they communicated in English they could not maintain the social structure that 
was exhibited in their own language. Their inability to maintain the social structure 
was frustrating’. (p. 134) More important, the author finds that ICT improves 
communication when compared with face-to-face meetings. Therefore following the 
arguments about the use of English, the hypothesis for this tactic is: 
 
H8. Those companies that received an invitation in English have the same 
probability to respond than those that received an invitation in the local 
language. 
 
The next tactic involves creating empathy with target companies by quoting one 




find that empathy of consumers with a social cause is an important driver for 
donations. They emphasize that empathy is closely related to a social behaviour 
regarding disposition and emotions; in other words, if the cause is relevant and/or in 
proximity to them. This is in line with societal legitimacy and to reinforce the 
criticality of the argument, suggesting that firms are aware of the importance of 
undertaking ESG practices. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
 
H9. Those firms that received an invitation with an ESG statement are 
more likely to communicate with investors. 
 
Research into communication channels evaluated advantages and 
disadvantages of email and mail (Danaher and Rossiter, 2011; Kaplowitz, Hadlock 
and Levine, 2004; Shachaf, 2008; Westmyer, DiCioccio and Rubin, 1998). There is 
also a large literature about the effectiveness of surveys send by other different means. 
These include fax, telephone and in hand delivery (Cobanoglu, Warde and Moreo, 
2001). However, there is no clear evidence as to which, post or email, is more 
effective. For instance, Danaher and Rossiter (2011) compared a number of 
communication channels to test their effectiveness in terms of intrusiveness, 
reliability, trustworthiness and opportuneness. Their results show that despite the 
growing acceptance of e-mail, marketing works better when traditional channels as 
mail are used. On the other hand, Cobanoglu et al. (2001) find that email has 
substantial advantages over mail. Responses received by mail took longer than those 
received by email, and the response rate was higher for email (44.21%) than for mail 
(26.27%). Surveys send by email are also cheaper than those by mail (i.e. printing and 





H10.There is no significant difference in the probability to engage with 
investors between firms that received the invitation letter by email and 
firms that received the invitation by post. 
 







Figure 2.2. This figure shows the different tactics used in the experiment and their possible responses. The first hypothesis test if engagement matters, while 
hypotheses H2-H7 are directly related to shareholder salience, and hypotheses H8-H10 refers to other useful tools or tactics could improve investor salience. 
Finally, the possible outcomes of the engagement are portrayed.   
Figure 4 
 




2.5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.5.1. Field Experiment 
Field experiments can be thought of as a combination of laboratory and natural 
experiments. Field experiments use randomization in a natural environment; although 
they are criticized by the diminution of the control over the variables, they allow 
insights from the real world. The experiment developed in this paper, fits within what 
Harrison and List (2004) categorise as ‘Natural Field Experiment’ where participants 
do not know they are taking part of an experiment, they are in their natural 
environment, and therefore, they behave as they would do in any other similar 
situation8. The use of field experiments is common in different areas of research: 
economics (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002); evaluation (Kiernan, Kiernan, Oyler and 
Gilles; 2005); leadership (Dvir, Eden, Avolio and Shamir, 2002; Martin and Liao, 
2013); organizational behaviour (McNatt and Judge, 2004; Stajkovic and Luthans, 
2001); policy (Di Stefano, King and Verona, 2015; Nutt, 1976); and, politics (Gerber 
and Green, 2000; Miller and Krosnick, 2004. Despite the vast literature on field 
experiments, the number of natural field experiments in the literature is limited, 
perhaps because of the infrequent occurrence of necessary conditions. List and 
Lucking-Reiley (2002) carry out an experiment to fund-raise money for the Center for 
Environmental Policy Analysis (CEPA) within the University of Central Florida; they 
test “seed money” and “refund policy” approaches. Based on professional opinion, the 
authors planned rules to maximize the overall contributions. Basically what they did 
was to split the sample of 3,000 donors into six different groups, three with the 
following levels to test seed money: 10 percent, 33 percent, and 67 percent of the 
                                                          
8 For more information about social, natural and field experiments and its classification, please 




target, and another three with the same percentages but with the condition that if the 
target is not met, then they will receive their money back. The authors approached the 
donors with a letter describing the above information; the letter was substantially the 
same, except for the different percentages and rules about donations.  
The experiment contained in this chapter qualifies as a field experiment. I had 
the opportunity to participate in a real engagement project, and to analyse how target 
companies behave in normal conditions. 
 
2.5.2. Model Specification 
In order to test the first hypothesis related to the impact of engagement by the group 
of investors (H1a), I use a simple logistic regression model where Joined is a 
dichotomous variable for all the companies that became members of the UNGC. The 
independent variable is also a dummy variable with the value of one if a company was 
subject of Engagement and if it was part of the control group. 
 
𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
The next equation models the probability of a company joining the UNGC 
when it replies to the PRI’s invitation (H1b). Therefore, Joined is a dummy variable 
for all the companies that received an invitation indicating one if the company joined 
the UNGC and zero otherwise. The independent variable Replied is a dummy variable 
indicating one if the company communicate with the PRI and zero otherwise. What 
this model tells us is the effect of companies that got in touch with the PRI regardless 




the negative decision about adopting the UNGC or requesting additional time to 
decide). 
 
𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
The third equation models the probability of a company to engage with the 
PRI as a result of receiving a letter with any of the nine tactics to be tested (H2-H10). 
The sample is split in three different groups according to their prior probability to sign 
the UNGC (low, medium and high). Each of the tactics is represented in the model 
below as a zero-one variable. In the case of the CEO, zero means addressing a letter 
just to the CSR department and one means the letter was sent to the CEO as well. One 
in the variable Language means that the letter was sent in the local language, this is, 
in the language where the company is based, and zero means that the letter was in 
English. Regarding the variable Channel, it is zero if the letter was sent by email and 
one if it was sent by post. The remaining tactics are represented with a one if the tactic 
was applied, and zero otherwise. The equations is as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖  
 
Treatments and the approximated number of subjects per treatment are shown in Table 
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A1 Contact CSR/IR Department and CEO 960 32 
A2 Contact CSR/IR Department only 960 32 
B1 Include a reference to their peers 960 32 
B2 No include reference 960 32 
C1 Invitation sent by post 960 32 
C2 Invitation sent by email 960 32 
D1 Indication of the AUM of participant investors 960 32 
D2 No indication of the AUM 960 32 
E1 Translate the letters into local language 960 32 
E2 Letter sent in English 960 32 
F1 Have UNGC/PRI Secretariat follow-up with a phone call 
or email to the company 
240 8 
F2 Customize letter with 1-3 sentences with ESG 
performance. 
240 8 
F3 Issuing a press release naming some of the companies 240 8 
F4 Contact the Chair 240 8 
F5 No treatment 960 32 

























Figure 2.3. This figure shows half of the combination of the nine different tactics. 
This is, A1 represents contacting the CSR department and CEO whereas the other 
half has the same distribution but the invitation is addressed only to the CSR 
department. B1 means that the peers of the company are added to the letter. C1 
means that the invitation has been sent by post. D1 equals to adding the AUM to the 
text in the letter. E1 means that the letter has been translated to the local language. 
F1 Have UNGC/PRI Secretariat follow-up with a phone call or email to the company. 
F2 Customize letter with 1-3 sentences with ESG performance. F3 Issuing a press 
release naming some of the companies. F4 Contact the chair. F5 Nothing. 
 
Figure 2.3. This figure shows half of the combination of the nine different tactics. 
This is, A1 represents contacting the CSR department and CEO whereas the other 
half has the same distribution but the invitation is addressed only to the CSR 
department. B1 means that the peers of the company are added to the letter. C1 
means that the invitation has been sent by post. D1 equals to adding the AUM to the 
text in the letter. E1 means that the letter has been translated to the local language. 
F1 Have UNGC/PRI Secretariat follow-up with a phone call or email to the company. 
F2 Customize letter with 1-3 sentences with ESG performance. F3 Issuing a press 







































































2.5.3. Sample Description 
The original sample consisted of those firms listed in the FTSE All World Index as of 
January 2nd 2012. Originally, there were 2,885 firms in the database but after cleaning 
it, only 2,705 were left. I removed Taiwanese companies (political issues Taiwan-
Chine-UN), duplicated firms and those based in Greece, Denmark, Norway, Morocco, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic (administrative reasons). I used this data to 
determine the prior probability employed to distribute firms within experimental 
groups. I developed the following logistic regression model: 
 
     SIGNj = β0+β1SustReportj+β2Employeesj+β3MarketValuej+β4CGScorej+ 
∑ 𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗
10
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗
40
𝑚=1 + 𝑒𝑗 
 
Where:   
SIGNj = The probability of the ith company signing the UNGC,1 if they have 
a high probability to sign, 0 otherwise 
SustReportj = A dummy variable equal to 1 if the ith company has submitted a 
sustainability report as 2010 according to Corporate Register and GRI 
Databases, 0 otherwise. 
Employeesj = It is the natural logarithm of the number of both full and part time 
employees of the company Datastream 2011 
MarketValue = It is the natural logarithm of the share price multiplied by the number 
of ordinary shares in issue Datastream 2011 
CGScore = Measure representing the systems and processes of the governance of 
a company in relation with the long term interest of the investors (in 
percentage) Datastream 2011 
Industry = The industry of the ith company FTSE 2011 
Country = Country where the ith company is located FTSE 2011 





 The dependent variable SIGN is a dummy variable (1 if the company is already 
a UNGC signatory; zero otherwise). The right-hand side of the equation includes the 
submission, or not, of sustainability reports as 2010 according to Corporate Register 
and GRI databases; the size of the target firm, measured by market value and number 
of employees; and, a corporate governance score taken from Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream). Control variables include industry and country. There is a broad 
literature about the reasons for a company to become a UNGC signatory. However, 
studies focused on a particular region (Hamann et al 2009, Perez-Batres, et al 201 and 
2011) or a theory (Bennie et al 2007 Bernhagen and Mitchel 2010; Jo and Harjoto 
2011). The above variables where chosen as they are the most common across studies; 
In addition to the fact that size, country and industry have a high explanatory power 
(Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the results of the model). Tables 2.9 and 2.10 provide an 
overview of the original data used to determine the probability of a firm to become 






 10TABLE 2.7 
  Correlations Full Sample 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1 UNGC Member 1.0000     
2 Sustainability Report 0.3713 1.0000    
3 Employees (ln) 0.2250 0.2851 1.0000   
4 Market Value (ln) 0.2306 0.3482 0.3937 1.0000  
5 Corporate Gov Score 0.1001 0.1658 0.1249 0.2523 1.0000 
Notes: This table shows the Pearson's correlation coefficients for the full sample (N=2,705). 
Size is measured by both market value (ln) and number of employees (ln) as provided by 
Datastream. The corporate governance score is taken from Asset4 and the values can vary 
from 0 to 1. Size and corporate governance values are as of year ended 2011. All the 





Testing Prior Probability to Join the UNGC 
 
Variables Model 1 
Sustainability Report 1.6925*** 
Employees (ln) 0.5174*** 
Market Value (ln) 0.3683*** 
Corporate Governance Score 0.0186*** 




Notes: This table shows the coefficients for the independent variables 
used to determine the prior probability to sign the UNGC (N=2,705). 
Relationships are depicted by the following signs: ***, **, *, and + to 




Once the probabilities were obtained, I prepared the new sample for the 
experiment, this is, I removed all the firms that have joined the UNGC. I distributed 
the firms across the treatment and control groups according to their probabilities. I 
randomly removed 175 firms to form the control group. The remaining firms were 
allocated to 64 groups of 30 companies each (see Figure 2.3). In total, 3,120 letters 
and e-mails were sent. Unfortunately, about 90 emails were bounced back. The sample 
was updated even after of distributing the firms across groups due to companies 
joining while the letter was prepared or due to splits or mergers, resulting in 175 firms 










Sample Description - Country 
Country 
NO UNGC MEMBERS UNGC MEMBERS 
Freq. Percent Cum. Proportion Freq. Percent Cum. Proportion 
AU 86 4.09 4.09 0.88 12 1.90 1.90 0.12 
BELG 8 0.38 4.47 0.57 6 0.95 2.85 0.43 
BRAZ 36 1.71 6.18 0.47 40 6.33 9.18 0.53 
CAN 61 2.90 9.08 0.81 14 2.22 11.39 0.19 
CHL 14 0.67 9.74 0.74 5 0.79 12.18 0.26 
CHN 132 6.27 16.02 0.90 15 2.37 14.56 0.10 
COL 2 0.10 16.11 0.22 7 1.11 15.66 0.78 
CZE 3 0.14 16.25 1.00 0 0.00 15.66 0.00 
DEN 1 0.05 16.30 0.08 12 1.90 17.56 0.92 
EGY 10 0.48 16.78 0.71 4 0.63 18.20 0.29 
FIN 5 0.24 17.02 0.36 9 1.42 19.62 0.64 
FRA 24 1.14 18.16 0.28 61 9.65 29.27 0.72 
GER 23 1.09 19.25 0.43 31 4.91 34.18 0.57 
GRC 5 0.24 19.49 0.63 3 0.47 34.65 0.38 
HK 119 5.66 25.14 0.99 1 0.16 34.81 0.01 
HUN 2 0.10 25.24 0.50 2 0.32 35.13 0.50 
IDA 82 3.90 29.13 0.67 41 6.49 41.61 0.33 
INDO 22 1.05 30.18 0.92 2 0.32 41.93 0.08 
IRE 3 0.14 30.32 1.00 0 0.00 41.93 0.00 
ISR 35 1.66 31.99 0.85 6 0.95 42.88 0.15 
ITA 20 0.95 32.94 0.61 13 2.06 44.94 0.39 
JA 365 17.35 50.29 0.81 87 13.77 58.70 0.19 
KOR 79 3.75 54.04 0.71 32 5.06 63.77 0.29 
MAL 32 1.52 55.56 0.94 2 0.32 64.08 0.06 
MAR 2 0.10 55.66 1.00 0 0.00 64.08 0.00 
MEX 16 0.76 56.42 0.76 5 0.79 64.87 0.24 
NETH 9 0.43 56.84 0.41 13 2.06 66.93 0.59 
NOR 3 0.14 56.99 0.25 9 1.42 68.35 0.75 
NZ 12 0.57 57.56 1.00 0 0.00 68.35 0.00 
OEST 9 0.43 57.98 0.90 1 0.16 68.51 0.10 
PAK 5 0.24 58.22 0.71 2 0.32 68.83 0.29 
PER 2 0.10 58.32 0.67 1 0.16 68.99 0.33 
PHIL 13 0.62 58.94 1.00 0 0.00 68.99 0.00 
POL 11 0.52 59.46 0.69 5 0.79 69.78 0.31 
PTL 3 0.14 59.60 0.33 6 0.95 70.73 0.67 
RUS 24 1.14 60.74 0.92 2 0.32 71.04 0.08 
SAF 57 2.71 63.45 0.79 15 2.37 73.42 0.21 
SI 37 1.76 65.21 0.84 7 1.11 74.53 0.16 
SP 6 0.29 65.49 0.21 23 3.64 78.16 0.79 
SWED 15 0.71 66.21 0.45 18 2.85 81.01 0.55 
SWIT 27 1.28 67.49 0.61 17 2.69 83.70 0.39 
THAI 22 1.05 68.54 0.76 7 1.11 84.81 0.24 
TUR 16 0.76 69.30 0.67 8 1.27 86.08 0.33 
UAE 9 0.43 69.72 1.00 0 0.00 86.08 0.00 
UK 78 3.71 73.43 0.68 37 5.85 91.93 0.32 
USA 559 26.57 100.00 0.92 51 8.07 100.00 0.08 
Total 2,104 100.00   632 100.00   
This table shows the country distribution for firms outside the UNGC and within the 
UNGC. Taiwan firms are excluded as they are not allow to participate in any initiatives of 
the UN. We can observe that the countries with highest representation in the UNGC are 
Japan (13.77%), France (9.65%) and USA (8.07%); however, when we look at the 
proportions considering firms in the same country we find that firms with the highest 
proportions are based in the European Union and that France has a strong membership 








Sample Description - Industry 
Industry 
NO UNGC MEMBERS   UNGC MEMBERS 
Freq. Percent Cum. Proportion Freq. Percent Cum. Proportion 
Oil & Gas             119 5.66 5.66 0.69 53 8.39 8.39 0.31 
Basic Materials 192 9.13 14.78 0.71 78 12.34 20.73 0.29 
Industrials 373 17.73 32.51 0.77 114 18.04 38.77 0.23 
Consumer Goods 251 11.93 44.44 0.75 85 13.45 52.22 0.25 
Healthcare 118 5.61 50.05 0.81 28 4.43 56.65 0.19 
Consumer Services 291 13.83 63.88 0.86 47 7.44 64.08 0.14 
Telecommunications  68 3.23 67.11 0.72 26 4.11 68.20 0.28 
Utilities 118 5.61 72.72 0.73 43 6.80 75.00 0.27 
Financials 470 22.34 95.06 0.80 119 18.83 93.83 0.20 
Technology 104 4.94 100.00 0.73 39 6.17 100.00 0.27 
Total 2,104 100.00   632 100.00  
 
This table shows the number of firms inside and outside the UNGC per industry. Proportions of 
industry members show that general representation is higher for Financials (18.83%) and Industrials 
(18.04%) and lower for Telecommunications (4.11%) and Healthcare (4.43%). In terms of 
representation per industry Oil and Gas (31%) has the highest representation whereas Consumer 
Servicies (14%) and Healthcare (19%) are the less representative.  
 
The final sample comprises 2,051 companies from 40 countries listed on the 
FTSE All World index (AW) that had not signed the UNGC - Ten Principles9 as of 
March, 31 2013. The effect of the prior probability to join the UNGC is tested in some 
of the models as indicated in the following lines. Then, to examine the sensitivity of 
the results, the prior probability is substituted by the different variables used to 
determine such probability (i.e. size, industry and country). I also test the interaction 
of probability with the key independent variables. Table 2.11 reports the number of 
firms included in the experiment and their characteristics per country and industry.  
As we can observe in Panel 1 of Table 2.11, the highest country participation 
comes from the USA, followed by Japan, China and Hong-Kong. Countries with the 
highest prior probability to sign the UNGC are mainly from Europe: Portugal is in 
                                                          
9 Taiwan was excluded from the experiment because of its political issues with China. Czech 





first place, Colombia in second, France in third, and Finland in forth. Therefore, it is 
consistent to see that European firms also have the highest average in submitting 
sustainability reports. Two size variables are included: the natural logarithm of market 
value and the natural logarithm of number of employees. The largest firms in the 
experiment, when looking at market value, are located in North America. And, in 
terms of the number of employees they are based in Russia, Thailand and Egypt. 
Again, the best scores for corporate governance come from European, Canadian and 
American firms.  
Panel 2 of Table 2.11 shows descriptive statistics grouped by industry, which 
is defined according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) system. The top 
three industries in the sample are financials, industrials and consumer services. 
Regarding the highest scores of prior probability to sign the UNGC, oil and gas firms 
are the first, followed by basic materials, technology and consumer goods. However, 
when looking at the highest scores of sustainability reports submitted, the top 
reporting industry is utilities, followed by basic materials and technology. The largest 
firms in terms of market value are oil and gas, telecommunications, and technology; 
and, in terms of number of employees are telecommunications, consumer services and 
industrials. The industries with the highest corporate governance score are oil and gas, 












Panel 1. Distribution by country 











Australia 86 4.19 4.19 0.0938 0.4535 8.1212 4.0067 0.6947 
Belgium 8 0.39 4.58 0.3842 0.6250 8.5960 3.8357 0.7081 
Brazil 36 1.76 6.34 0.3731 0.2222 8.2733 4.2628 0.4771 
Canada 61 2.97 9.31 0.1503 0.4754 9.2562 4.0770 0.7097 
Chile 14 0.68 10.00 0.2401 0.3571 8.9395 4.1468 0.4598 
China 132 6.44 16.43 0.0793 0.1439 7.1073 4.1920 0.4874 
Colombia 2 0.10 16.53 0.6082 0.0000 8.6898 3.4968 0.5507 
Egypt 10 0.49 17.02 0.2823 0.0000 6.9241 4.3722 0.5507 
Finland 5 0.24 17.26 0.4754 0.6000 8.4631 3.9652 0.5789 
France 21 1.02 18.28 0.5278 0.5238 8.4732 3.9686 0.5331 
Germany 22 1.07 19.36 0.3677 0.4545 8.5031 4.0773 0.4168 
Hong Kong 117 5.70 25.06 0.0084 0.1709 8.1834 3.9168 0.4869 
India 82 4.00 29.06 0.2544 0.1220 7.8171 4.0521 0.4199 
Indonesia 21 1.02 30.08 0.0789 0.0952 8.8193 4.0849 0.4475 
Ireland 3 0.15 30.23 0.0185 0.3333 8.8050 3.6428 0.6236 
Israel 35 1.71 31.94 0.0988 0.0857 7.0064 3.7394 0.5140 
Italy 20 0.98 32.91 0.2675 0.5000 8.3823 4.2496 0.5667 
Japan 362 17.65 50.56 0.1568 0.4309 8.0432 3.9176 0.2709 
Korea 74 3.61 54.17 0.2168 0.2703 8.0959 3.6596 0.4537 
Malaysia 32 1.56 55.73 0.0595 0.2188 8.5164 4.3411 0.5038 
Mexico 16 0.78 56.51 0.1820 0.3125 8.8969 4.3044 0.4717 
Netherlands 7 0.34 56.85 0.4312 0.7143 8.3524 4.0756 0.6757 
New Zealand 12 0.59 57.44 0.0188 0.3333 7.2766 3.8723 0.6122 
Austria 8 0.39 57.83 0.0722 0.5000 8.3206 4.2576 0.3340 
Pakistan 5 0.24 58.07 0.2950 0.2000 6.9872 4.2611 0.5507 
Peru 2 0.10 58.17 0.2705 0.0000 8.3095 3.9258 0.5205 
Philippines  13 0.63 58.80 0.0221 0.3846 8.4085 4.1093 0.4274 
Poland 11 0.54 59.34 0.2188 0.0909 8.0310 3.9217 0.3013 
Portugal  2 0.10 59.43 0.7615 1.0000 8.8600 3.8969 0.6299 
Russia 24 1.17 60.60 0.0654 0.2500 9.0757 4.6257 0.4938 
South Africa 55 2.68 63.29 0.1620 0.6727 7.8646 4.1543 0.5386 
Singapore 36 1.76 65.04 0.1338 0.1944 8.0740 4.3212 0.5491 
Spain 4 0.20 65.24 0.4215 0.0000 8.2670 3.3575 0.5524 
Sweden 12 0.59 65.82 0.3811 0.4167 8.4001 3.8869 0.6986 
Switzerland 27 1.32 67.14 0.2617 0.4444 8.6785 3.8337 0.5329 
Thailand 22 1.07 68.21 0.1742 0.1818 8.2486 4.5558 0.4940 
Turkey 16 0.78 68.99 0.2474 0.1250 7.9709 4.1587 0.4678 
UAE 9 0.44 69.43 0.0127 0.1111 7.7812 4.3707 0.5313 
UK 73 3.56 72.99 0.2606 0.7260 8.8449 4.1399 0.8139 
USA 554 27.01 100 0.0728 0.4097 9.1982 4.1473 0.7015 





TABLE 2.11 (Continued) 
Panel 2. Distribution by industry 











Oil & Gas             114 5.56 5.56 0.2057 0.3947 8.9154 3.7594 0.6285 
Basic Materials 190 9.26 14.82 0.1982 0.4895 8.2147 4.0359 0.4931 
Industrials 363 17.7 32.52 0.1532 0.4215 8.1316 4.2272 0.5213 
Consumer Goods 244 11.9 44.42 0.1656 0.4139 8.3299 4.2085 0.4934 
Healthcare 114 5.56 49.98 0.1145 0.2895 8.6656 4.0201 0.5873 
Consumer Services 288 14.04 64.02 0.0855 0.2986 8.3670 4.2354 0.5516 
Telecommunications  62 3.02 67.04 0.1545 0.3387 8.7868 4.2765 0.5432 
Utilities 113 5.51 72.55 0.1444 0.5044 8.5307 3.9016 0.5524 
Financials 459 22.38 94.93 0.1114 0.2309 8.4256 3.8741 0.5296 
Technology 104 5.07 100 0.1659 0.4231 8.7441 4.0418 0.5763 
Total 2,051 100   0.1410 0.3603 8.4078 4.0660 0.5363 
Notes: The sample comprises firms from 40 countries and 10 industries that have not signed 
the UNGC. The table shows the absolute (Freq.), relative (%) and accumulated (Cum.) 
frequency per country and industry. It also shows the prior probability (Prior_Pro) which is 
the value determined as shown before. The sustainability report (Sust_Rep) represents the 
average of firms submitting a CSR report according to Corporate Register database and GRI 
database. Size is measured using market capitalization (MV(ln); in USD) and number of 
employees (Emp(ln)) taken from Datastream; both values are transformed to natural 



















As of December 16th 2013, 132 companies from 27 countries in the treatment groups 
either replied the invitation letter or simply joined the initiative. Most of the 
companies that replied recognized in their letters that the UNGC and the PRI are 
important mechanisms in the field corporate social responsibility and responsible 
investment; however, more than half of the companies turned down the invitation. A 
number of reasons are the following: 
a) They are participating in some other initiatives similar to the UNGC (e.g. GRI, 
ISO, FTSE4Good, and CDP). 
b) Their operations are aligned to the UNGC principles; however, they do not 
consider that joining would benefit the company. 
c) They do not wish to be members/ it is not a priority. 
d) The parent company is already a member of the UNGC. 
e) They do not want to be part of a “checklist crowd” but rather to focus on doing 
the work. 
Figure 2.4 shows the engagement procedure and management reactions to the 
engagement. First, public firms no members of the UNGC are identified. Then, those 
firms are distributed among control and treatment groups. Thereafter, the information 
of the target firms is collected (CEO names, firm address and ESG information among 
others) in order to design the invitation letters which are later on send by email and 
post. Finally, five different types of management reactions were received: a) joined, 
b) joined and contacted the PRI, c) requested additional information, d) did not join 
but contacted the PRI, and e) did not join. The first four responses are considered as 









For most of the companies that replied and turned down the invitation, it was 
important to make clear that they do recognize the Ten Principles of the UNGC: 
 “This should not be interpreted as in any way suggesting a lack of 
support for the ten principles espoused by the UN Global Compact. Our 
decision is based on two factors: we already provide extensive 
reporting on our environmental and social performance and do not 
believe it is necessary to add a further reporting requirement and 
methodology, and we are already a committed and paid member of 
quite a number of CSR organizations, and with current resources must 
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Figure 2.4. This figure shows the procedure followed to invite companies to join the UNGC 
and the reactions from management to that invitation. From five different reactions, only 
four are considered as effective engagement; this is, if a company signed or contacted the 








Furthermore, replies showed a friendly attitude providing plenty information 
about their CSR reports and listing the different awards that such companies have 
received. 
“In light of your request, our CSR tram did look at the potential of 
[Target#34] becoming a signatory to the United Nations Global 
Compact. While we believe it is a worthy and important initiative, we 
feel our limited resources are best spent on enhancing our current 
management and reporting systems which are supportive of the United 
Nations Global Compact principles. One example of enhancement is 
moving our GRI Compliant SD Report towards best practice, which 
includes readying it for external assurance in 2014. As we look at 
continuous improvement as part of our systems, we will certainly review 
this again in the future”. (Target # 34) 
 
 
Some other companies were very short in replying and limited to mention just 
one initiative without providing further information of their social and environmental 
performance. Most of the replies focused in justifying why they turned down the 
invitation; and a few more offered further information showing their availability to 
continue with the engagement, for instance, Target # 115 said: 
“If there is additional information you require for signatories of your 
request, we would be pleased to provide it promptly” 
 
 
Figure 2.5. shows the final responses obtained from companies that 
contacted the UNGC/PRI or simply joined the initiative; a number of this 
responses changed over the period studied (i.e. a company requesting 
additional information, joined the UNGC later on). The larger proportion of 
firms (56%) replied but decided not to become members of the initiative. A 
very small number of companies showed serious interest in adopting the 






Panel 1 of Table 2.12, shows that there is a marginal difference between 
engagement (control vs treatment groups) and becoming member of the UNGC 
(joined vs not joined). The table also shows that there is no significant difference 
between control and treatment groups regarding the submission of a sustainability 
report prior to the date of the experiment. The submission of a sustainability report 
suggests that the company has higher probability to sign the initiative. Panel 2 in Table 
2.12, shows descriptive statistics for the full sample and for the two subsamples: 
control and treatment group. Missing values among control variables: market value, 
employees and corporate governance score were addressed via mean imputation 
(Wothke, 2000). As the following three variables are dummy variables: engagement, 
replied and sustainability report, my regression results will be robust to outliers. Panel 
2 of Table 2.12, also shows that both subsamples, control and treatment groups have 
similar characteristics. Variable Replied denotes that a company contacted the PRI 
Clearinghouse after receiving the invitation; therefore, it only appears in the treatment 

















Figure 2.5. This figure shows the responses obtained from the 132 firms that 
contacted or joined the UNGC during the experiment. 
 
Figure 2.5. This figure shows the responses obtained from the 132 firms that 
contacted or joined the UNGC during the experiment. 





The correlation matrix is shown in Table 2.13 for the dependent and 
independent variables. Engagement, the key variable on the first equation, is 
negatively and marginally correlated with the dependent variable Joined. The 
15TABLE 2.12 
Groups Comparison and Descriptive Statistics (H1a) 
Panel 1. Comparison of Treatment Group and Control Group 
  Control Treatment  
    (n=175) (n=1,876) 
Joined  5 3% 22 1% 
Did not join  170 97% 1,854 99% 
Chi2=3.4960, p=0.062      
Sustainability Report  68 39% 671 36% 
No Sustainability Report 107 61% 1,205 64% 
Ch2=0.6629, p=0. 410      
Panel 2. Descriptive Statistics         
Full Sample Mean Std Dev Max Min N 
Engagement           0.915            0.279            1.000            0.000            2,051  
Probability           0.141            0.166            0.958            0.000            2,051  
Sustainability Report           0.360            0.480            1.000            0.000            2,051  
Market Value (ln)           8.408            1.171          12.850            4.465            2,051  
Employees (ln)           4.066            0.665            6.342            0.000            2,051  
Corporate Gover Score           0.536            0.239            0.960            0.017            2,051  
Control Group Mean Std Dev Max Min N 
Probability 0.145 0.171 0.862 0.001              175  
Sustainability Report 0.389 0.489 1.000 0.000              175  
Market Value (ln) 8.420 1.160 12.193 4.605              175  
Employees (ln) 4.074 0.655 6.342 1.380              175  
Corporate Gover Score 0.558 0.240 0.960 0.020              175  
Treatment Group Mean Std Dev Max Min N 
Probability 0.141 0.166 0.958 0.000           1,876  
Sustainability Report 0.358 0.479 1.000 0.000           1,876  
Market Value (ln) 8.407 1.173 12.850 4.465           1,876  
Employees (ln) 4.065 0.666 5.693 0.000           1,876  
Corporate Gover Score 0.534 0.239 0.960 0.017           1,876  
Replied 0.063 0.243 1.000 0.000           1,876  
Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of firms that joined the UNGC between control and 
treatment groups. The control group includes 175 firms that did not receive invitation to 
become member of the UNGC; the treatment group comprises all the firms that received the 
letter (1,876 firms) regardless of the type of tactic tested through the letter. Joined denotes 
that the firm has sent the commitment letter signed by the CEO; did not join refers to the firms 
that still outside the membership as of 16 December 2013. Sustainability Report denotes that 
the company has submitted at sustainability report in the past. Panel B shows the descriptive 




constructed variable Probability and the result of the experiment, Replied, are 
positively and significantly correlated with Joined (0.11 and 0.13 respectively), which 
are also correlated between them (0.08). The only variable with a correlation 
coefficient greater than 0.50 is the relationship between Probability and Sustainability 
Report (0.59); this is expected as sustainability report is one of the variables to 
determine the prior probability. Size, measured by market value and number of 
employees, and the corporate governance score are only marginally correlated, 










 16TABLE 2.13 
 Correlation Matrix 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Joined 1.00        
2 Engagement  -0.04+ 1.00       
3 Probability 0.11*** -0.01 1.00      
4 Sustainability Report 0.06* -0.02 0.59*** 1.00     
5 Market Value (ln) 0.01 0.00 0.29*** 0.29*** 1.00    
6 Employees (ln) 0.03 0.00 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.34*** 1.00   
7 Corporate Gov Score -0.01 -0.03 0.07** 0.13*** 0.23*** 0.09*** 1.00  
8 Replied 0.13*** - 0.08** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.12*** 1.00 
 
Notes: This table shows the Pearson's correlation coefficients for the full sample 
(N=2,051). Size is measured by both market value (ln) and number of employees (ln) as 
provided by Datastream. The corporate governance score is taken from Asset4 and the 
values can go from 0 to 1. Size and corporate governance values are as of year ended 
2011.                  




The impact of engagement on the adoption of the UNGC 
Table 2.14 reports the results for H1a hypothesis about the effectiveness of 
engagement. Model 1 shows that the treatment coefficient is negative and marginally 
significant (ß=-0.908; p<0.1). Furthermore, when I include the prior probability to 
sign the UNGC (Model 2), the effect of treatment is still negatively correlated (ß=-
0.898; p<0.1), whereas the prior probability is significantly and positively correlated 
with engagement (ß=3.495; p<0.001). General results are similar when I test a) the 
interaction between engagement and the prior probability (Model 3), and b) when the 
prior probability is substituted by its determinants (Model 4). The use of interactions 
in a logistic model makes the results difficult to interpret. I conducted a sensitivity 
analysis for Model 3 in Table 2.14, the interpretation of the logit results are consistent 
with the original interactions. The intercept remains negative in all the models. This 
suggests that engagement through invitation letters does not benefit the UNGC 
membership size, adversely, it seems that target companies are less willing to adopt 
the initiative; therefore, results are inconsistent with H1a. 
 
The impact of replying to the PRI on becoming member of the UNGC 
Although my results above suggest that investor engagement10 does not increase 
UNGC membership levels, my results reported in Table 2.15 indicate that the net 
negative effect is diminished when firms contact the UNGC/PRI. Most probably due 
to being subjected to more intense engagement relative to firms who avoided 
contacting the UNGC/PRI. In general, all models indicate that communicating with 
the PRI is strongly positive and statistically significant (ß=2.204; p<0.001). Thus,  
                                                          
10 It can be debatable if it is correct to call it investor engagement or stakeholder engagement, 
since the ownership of the investors in target companies is unknown; however, the term 
‘investor engagement’ is used in this paper because they have the power to invest or not in 





my results are consistent with H1b. I conducted a sensitivity analysis for Model 3 in 
Table 2.15, to test the effect of the interactions. The interpretation of the logit results 
are consistent with the original interactions. Furthermore, I also tested the models on 
Table 2.15 including only firms with high probability to sign the UNGC and for firms 
in European countries. Results show no variation in the number of significant 
variables except for the interaction between firms that replied and their prior 
probability. The significance of the variables varies, and the coefficients are higher, 
Tables 2.16, 2.17 and 2.18. show the results for these tests.  
 
17TABLE 2.14 
Testing the Effectiveness of Joining the UNGC 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Engagement -0.908+ -0.898+ -1.324+ -1.320* 
 (-1.809) (-1.766) (-1.839) (-2.328) 
Probability 
 3.495*** 2.122  
 
 (4.556) (1.047)  
Engagement*Probability 
  1.638  
 
  (0.748)  
Sustainability Report 
   1.100* 
 
   (2.154) 
Market Value (ln) 
   -0.036 
 
   (-0.146) 
Employees (ln) 
   0.356 
 
   (0.848) 
Corporate Governance Score 
   -0.311 
 
   (-0.253) 
Intercept                      -3.526*** -4.255*** -3.908*** -3.691 
 (-7.772) (-8.340) (-6.122) (-1.496) 
Country/Industry Excluded Excluded Excluded Yes 
Observations 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051 
Pseudo-R2 0.0094 0.0678 0.0699 0.2201 
Notes: This table shows the results of the relationship between Engagement and the 
adhesion to the UNGC. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating one for those 
companies that joined the initiative, zero otherwise. The engagement variable is also a 
dummy variable where one means that the firm received an invitation letter, and zero means 
that firms is in the control group. The model controls for prior probability and determinants of 
prior probability. Relationships are depicted by the following signs: ***, **, *, and + to indicate 







Testing the Effect of Replying on Joining the UNGC 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Replied 2.204*** 2.001***  2.097** 2.872*** 
 (4.855)        (4.316)   (2.762)  (4.364)  
Probability 
 3.509***       3.597***      
 
   (4.001)        (3.481)     
Replied*Probability 
   -0.307  
  
 (-0.159)    
Sustainability Report     
 0.644 
      (1.097) 
Market Value (ln) 
 
 
  -0.111    
 
   (-0.370) 
Employees (ln) 
   0.547  
 
   (1.067)  
Corporate Governance Score 
   0.118 
 
   (0.085) 
Intercept                     -4.825*** -5.534*** -5.560***  -5.959+ 
 (-17.981) (-14.949) (-13.663) (-1.923) 
Country/Industry Excluded Excluded Excluded Yes 
Observations 1,876 1,876 1,876 1,104 
Pseudo-R2 0.074 0.130 0.130 0.309 
Notes: This table shows the results of the relationship between companies replying and its 
adhesion to the UNGC. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for those companies that 
joined the initiative. The Replied variable is also a dummy variable where one means that the 
firm contacted the UNGC/PRI, and zero otherwise. The model controls for prior probability to 
sign the UNGC, the interaction of replying prior probability, and variables used to determine the 
prior probability. This analysis only considers firms that received treatment (N=1,876). 
Relationships are depicted by the following signs: ***, **, *, and + to indicate their significance 















Testing the Effect of Replying on Joining the UNGC - High Probability 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Replied 2.462*** 2.409*** 4.450*** 4.661*** 
 (4.710)        (4.579)   (3.611)  (4.041)  
Probability 
 2.347+ 4.165**    
 
   (1.711)        (2.603)     
Replied*Probability 
  -5.120+  
  
 (-1.796)    
Sustainability Report     
 1.184 
      (0.922) 





   (0.557) 
Employees (ln) 
   -0.073 
 
   (-0.098)  
Corporate Governance Score 
   0.010 
 
   (0.004) 
Intercept                     -4.232*** -5.083*** -5.885*** -7.673 
 (-11.885) (-7.726) (-6.930) (-1.468) 
Country/Industry Excluded Excluded Excluded Yes 
Observations 614 614 614 351 
Pseudo-R2 0.127 0.145 0.168 0.4622 
Notes: This table shows the results of the relationship between companies replying and its 
adhesion to the UNGC for firms with high probability to join the initiative. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable for those companies that joined the initiative. The Replied 
variable is also a dummy variable where one means that the firm contacted the UNGC/PRI, 
and zero otherwise. The model controls for prior probability to sign the UNGC, the interaction 
of replying prior probability, and variables used to determine the prior probability. This analysis 
only considers firms that received treatment. Relationships are depicted by the following signs: 














Testing the Effect of Replying on Joining the UNGC - European Countries 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Replied 2.480** 2.367* 8.470+ 2.777* 
 (2.651)        (2.473) (1.888)  (2.563) 
Probability 
 4.040+ 10.562+    
 
   (1.939)        (1.887)     
Replied*Probability 
  -10.555+  
  
 (-1.696)    
Sustainability Report     
 1.357 
      (1.031) 
Market Value (ln) 
 
 
  -0.615 
 
   (-1.092) 
Employees (ln) 
   1.485 
 
   (1.373)  
Corporate Governance Score 
   -0.051 
 
   (-0.021) 
Intercept                      -4.677*** -6.256***  -10.670* -4.753 
 (-6.584) (-4.759) (-2.455) (-0.774) 
Industry Excluded Excluded Excluded Yes 
Observations 247 247 247 247 
Pseudo-R2 0.1363 0.221 0.314 0.2635 
Notes: This table shows the results of the relationship between companies replying and its 
adhesion to the UNGC for firms based in Europe. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable for those companies that joined the initiative. The Replied variable is also a dummy 
variable where one means that the firm contacted the UNGC/PRI, and zero otherwise. The 
model controls for prior probability to sign the UNGC, the interaction of replying prior 
probability, and variables used to determine the prior probability. This analysis only 
considers firms that received treatment. Relationships are depicted by the following signs: 














Testing Tactics for Engagement a 
Variablesb 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Full Sample HighPr MedPr LowPr 
CEO/Chair  0.584** 0.484 1.522** 0.524 
Market value (ln) 0.321** 0.324+ 0.244 0.595* 
Employees (ln) 0.028 0.096 -0.527 -0.057 
Corporate Governance Score 0.661 2.081* -0.333 -0.676 
Sustainability Report 0.414+ 0.598 -0.472 1.003 
Intercept  -6.772***  -8.463*** -3.855  -7.711** 
Country/Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1603 531 407 491 
PseudoR2 0.1047 0.1562 0.1653 0.0929 
aThis table shows the relationship between engaged companies (columns) and treatments 
and explanatory variables (rows). Relationships are depicted by the following signs: ***, **, *, 
and + to indicate their significance at 99.9%, 99%, 95% and 90% respectively.   
bThe financial industry and the USA are considered as the base of the factor variables.  
 
 
Testing investor salience and other supportive tactics 
The description of the results is limited to the analysis of main or individual effects11. 
Table 2.19 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample with treatment and its 
subsamples divided by tactics and firm characteristics. As we can see from Panel 1 of 
Table 2.19, the distribution of the tactics is nearly the same across the full sample and 
the three sub-samples: from contacting the CEO to Language, the mean is close to 50 
percent meaning that the tactic was apply to half of the sample; whereas tactics from 
Follow up to chair were applied to one eight of the sample. Besides the tactics, there 
is a category called ‘Nothing’ which means that in the last level of interactions 50 
percent did not receive any treatment (Figure 3.D.1 shows the distribution of the 
tactics). The last row in Panel 1 of Table 2.19 indicates the strength of the experiment, 
                                                          
11 I omit to talk about the secondary effects (combination of strategies) as the number of 




this is all the tactics were analysed and added them together, and the strongest option 
counts as one and weakest as zero. Therefore, strength ranks go from 2 points the 
weakest to 6 points the strongest.  For instance, for the first tactic, contacting the CEO 
and the CSR department equals one whereas only contacting the CSR department 
equals zero.  In the case of Language and Channel both account for one point as there 
is not significant difference expected among those that received the treatment and 
those that did not. Panel 2 of Table 2.19, shows the characteristics of the firms 
included in each subsample. It can be observed that low probability goes from 0.000 
to 0.033; medium probability from 0.034 to 0.156 and the high probability from 0.156 
to 0.958; therefore, it can be expected to see that the highest mean for sustainability 
report is within firms with high probability to sigh the UNGC. Largest firms both in 
terms of market value and number of employees are also in the high probability group 
going down to smallest firms in the low probability group. The mean of the corporate 
governance score is similar across the subsamples.  
Table 2.20 shows the comparison of the groups that received the treatment 
with those that did not receive the treatment. Groups are also classified according to 
their prior probability to sign the UNGC. It can be seen that there is no association 
between the treatments (tactics) and the probability group; however, when we look at 
sustainability report, again we can see that those with a sustainability report have high 
chances to sign the initiative while those with medium and low probability have not 
submit a CSR report, at least during the period of study.  
Table 2.21 presents the relationship between target firms (columns) and 
treatments and explanatory variables (rows). Target firms were analysed as part of the 
full sample and also in three different levels according to their probability to sign the 




my results show that contacting the chair (H3) in addition to the CSR department and 
following up (H7) the engagement with target companies are the most effective 
tactics. Furthermore, it is somewhat helpful to contact the CEO (H2). I tested CEO 
and Chair effect in a single variable and results are similar to those in Tables 2.18 and 
2.20. I also find that the engagement process makes a bigger difference when firms 
have a high ex-ante likelihood to sign up to the initiative and are located in countries 
where the concern about environmental, social and governance issues is also 
predominant (i.e. Australia, Sweden). However, the remaining tactics related to the 
following hypotheses: AUM (H4), press release (H5), referencing peers’ companies 
(H6) and ESG statement (H9) are not supported. My results also show that there is no 
significant difference between sending an invitation in English or local language (H8), 
neither in sending it by email nor by post (H10). This means that H8 and H10 are 
supported. 
Results reported in Table 2.22 show that strength is important only in the 
subsample with high probability to sign the UNGC and in the overall sample. 
  





Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample with Treatment and Sub-samples 
Variable 
Full Sample (Treatment) High Probability Medium Probability Low Probability 
(n = 1,876) (n = 614) (n = 630) (n = 632) 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Panel 1. Tactics 
ContactCEO 0.498 0.500 0 1 0.498 0.500 0 1 0.495 0.500 0 1 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Peers 0.501 0.500 0 1 0.493 0.500 0 1 0.503 0.500 0 1 0.505 0.500 0 1 
Post 0.494 0.500 0 1 0.487 0.500 0 1 0.497 0.500 0 1 0.498 0.500 0 1 
AUM 0.497 0.500 0 1 0.495 0.500 0 1 0.497 0.500 0 1 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Language 0.502 0.500 0 1 0.498 0.500 0 1 0.506 0.500 0 1 0.502 0.500 0 1 
Follow up 0.126 0.332 0 1 0.127 0.333 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1 
ESG Sentence 0.125 0.331 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1 0.124 0.330 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Press Release 0.124 0.330 0 1 0.124 0.330 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1 0.123 0.329 0 1 
Chair 0.123 0.329 0 1 0.121 0.326 0 1 0.122 0.328 0 1 0.127 0.333 0 1 
Nothing 0.502 0.500 0 1 0.503 0.500 0 1 0.503 0.500 0 1 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Strength 3.994 0.998 2 6 3.984 0.996 2 6 3.992 0.998 2 6 4.005 1.000 2 6 
Panel 2. Firm Characteristics 
Probability 0.141 0.166 0.000 0.958 0.331 0.163 0.156 0.958 0.081 0.036 0.034 0.156 0.015 0.009 0.000 0.033 
Sustainability 
Report 
0.358 0.479 0.000 1.000 0.735 0.442 0.000 1.000 0.325 0.469 0.000 1.000 0.024 0.152 0.000 1.000 
Market Value (ln) 8.407 1.173 4.465 12.850 8.785 1.182 5.925 12.850 8.329 1.088 4.802 11.972 8.116 1.148 4.465 11.314 
Employees (ln) 4.065 0.666 0.000 5.693 4.322 0.571 1.568 5.693 4.051 0.618 1.079 5.668 3.830 0.709 0.000 5.663 
Corporate Gov 
Score 
0.534 0.239 0.017 0.960 0.546 0.252 0.022 0.960 0.534 0.236 0.018 0.955 0.522 0.229 0.017 0.958 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample and sub-samples of those companies that received treatment. Panel 1 shows the 




Treatment Groups Comparison 
 High Probability 
Medium 
Probability Low Probability 
  (n=614) (n=630) (n=632) 
Contact CEO & CSR 306 49.84% 312 49.52% 316 50.00% 
Contact CSR 308 50.16% 318 50.48% 316 50.00% 






Peers 303 49.35% 317 50.32% 319 50.47% 
No Peers 311 50.65% 313 49.68% 313 49.53% 
Ch2 (2) =0.1845, p=0.912  
 
    
Post 299 48.70% 313 49.68% 315 49.84% 
Email 315 51.30% 317 50.32% 317 50.16% 
Ch2 (2) =0.1907, p=0.909       
AUM 304 49.51% 313 49.68% 316 50.00% 
No AUM 310 50.49% 317 50.32% 316 50.00% 
Ch2 (2) =0.0307, p=0.985       
English 306 49.84% 319 50.63% 317 50.16% 
Local Language 308 50.16% 311 49.37% 315 49.84% 
Ch2 (2) =0.0803, p=0.961       
Follow up 78 12.70% 79 12.54% 79 12.50% 
No Follow up 536 87.30% 551 87.46% 553 87.50% 
Ch2 (2) =0.0131, p=0.993       
ESG Sentence 77 12.54% 78 12.38% 79 12.50% 
No ESG Sentence 537 87.46% 552 87.62% 553 87.00% 
Ch2 (2) =0.0079, p=0.996       
Press Release 76 12.38% 79 12.54% 78 12.34% 
No Press Release 538 87.62% 551 87.46% 554 87.66% 
Ch2 (2) =0.0129, p=0.994       
Chair 74 12.05% 77 12.22% 80 12.66% 
No Chair 540 87.95% 553 87.78% 552 87.34% 
Ch2 (2) =0.1133, p=0.945       
Nothing 309 50.33% 317 50.32% 316 50.00% 
Treatments 305 49.67% 313 49.68% 316 50.00% 
Ch2 (2) =0.0173, p=0.991       
Sustainability Report 451 73.45% 205 32.54% 15 2.37% 
No Sustainability Report 163 26.55% 425 67.46% 617 97.63% 
Ch2 (2) =689.1754, p=0.0000       
Notes: This table compares the number of target companies between groups that received 
the treatment and those that did not received it. Sample is split in high (n=614), medium 
(n=630) and low (n=632) probability to sign the initiative. The first five treatments are applied 
to half of the sample whereas each of the last four treatments are applied to an eighth of the 
sample. The comparison of 'Nothing' vs 'Treatments' refers to the total of these last four 
treatments (n=934) versus those did not received any of those last treatments (n=942). 
Furthermore, the table shows the number of companies that comply with a sustainability 
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24TABLE 2.21 
Testing Tactics for Engagement a 
Variablesb 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Full Sample HighPr MedPr LowPr 
Main effects     
Contact CEO 0.464* 0.200 1.115* 0.737+ 
Peers -0.014 0.633+ -0.542 -0.335 
Post -0.137 0.044 -0.521 0.292 
AUM -0.130 -0.281 0.287 -0.02 
Language -0.259 -0.247 -0.652 -0.206 
Follow up  0.787** 1.273** -0.732 0.781 
ESG Statement 0.506+ 0.484 0.580 0.507 
Press release -0.341 0.813  -1.826+ -1.468 
Chair 0.828** 1.791*** 0.751 -0.04 
Controls     
Market value (ln) 0.325** 0.334+ 0.376 0.658* 
Employees (ln) 0.036 0.084 -0.613 -0.107 
Corporate Governance Score 0.606 2.224* 0.312 -0.732 
Sustainability Report 0.404+ 0.639 -0.514 0.918 
Intercept  -6.715***  -9.353*** -4.025  -8.309** 
Country/Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1603 531 407 491 
PseudoR2 0.1236 0.2126 0.2101 0.1334 
Notes: aThis table shows the relationship between engaged companies (columns) and 
treatments and explanatory variables (rows). Relationships are depicted by the following 
signs: ***, **, *, and + to indicate their significance at 99.9%, 99%, 95% and 90% respectively.   
bThe financial industry, the USA, and no extra treatments (tactics) were considered as the 
base of the factor variables.  
 
25TABLE 2.22 
Testing Tactics for Engagement a 
Variablesb 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Full 
Sample 
HighPr MedPr LowPr 
Strength  0.216* 0.415* 0.173 0.148 
Market value (ln) 0.314** 0.322+ 0.185 0.592*  
Employees (ln) 0.047 0.109 -0.366 -0.027 
Corporate Governance Score 0.645 2.237* -0.472 -0.763 
Sustainability Report 0.403+ 0.578 -0.527 1.107 
Intercept -7.303*** -10.098*** -3.458 -8.054** 
Country/Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,603 531 407 491 
PseudoR2 0.1005 0.1679 0.1176 0.0881 
Notes: aThis table shows the relationship between engaged companies (columns) and 
strength of treatments and explanatory variables (rows). Relationships are depicted by the 
following signs: ***, **, *, and + to indicate their significance at 99.9%, 99%, 95% and 90% 
respectively.   
bThe financial industry and the USA were considered as the base of the factor variables.  
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2.7. DISCUSSION  
The adoption of the UNGC is well received among the European community. The 
PRI, also under the umbrella of the United Nations, is based in London and has 
participated in a number of campaigns encouraging the adoption of the Ten Principles 
promoted by the UNGC (Gond and Piani, 2013). Spanish firms claim to obtain 
economic and reputational gains from the UNGC membership (Arevalo et al. 2013). 
The European financial markets also react positively to the adoption of the initiative 
(Coulmont and Berthelot, 2015; Janney et al., 2009). Scandinavian socially 
responsible investors consider those principles as part of their criteria for investment 
(Bengtsson, 2008). Other important firms such as Robeco, an investment company in 
the Netherlands, has include the violation to the UNGC guidelines as part of its 
exclusion policies (Robeco, 2014). Therefore, we can assume that the participation in 
the UNGC is well regarded by socially responsible investors and it is expected that 
they try to influence companies to comply with it.  
Letter campaign is a recurrent practice in shareholder engagement where low 
social performance or controversial issues are highlighted (soft engagement). The 
campaign analysed in this paper includes a large number of companies around the 
world; however, there were few responses. By using the framework proposed by 
Gifford (2010) for investor salience based on Mitchell’s et al. (1997) Stakeholder 
Theory, I identified the three main attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency) and 
their respective subcategories. Stakeholders participating in the experiment lack or at 
most have weak power, namely coercive, utilitarian and normative. The attribute of 
legitimacy appears in its four categories: individual, organisational, societal and 
pragmatic. Individual and organisational legitimacy are closely related to the PRI 
itself. Societal legitimacy can be observed from the fact that companies based in 
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European countries have greater support for ESG practices in general and showed 
stronger results for this type of engagement. The business case for this engagement 
was not strong enough which is translated into poor pragmatic legitimacy. The third 
attribute that managers consider at the moment of making decisions about a request 
from their stakeholders is urgency, which depends on time-sensitiveness and 
criticality for the stakeholders. The request in the experiment was time-sensitive, as 
there was a deadline for the submission of firms’ response. Furthermore, it was critical 
for this group of shareholders, and it is clearly understandable that the PRI and the 
UNGC work in partnership because both organizations were launched by the United 
Nations; however, it could be the case that it was perceived more as a marketing 
campaign than an engagement to enhance sustainable practices. Previous studies 
mentioned a number of social, environmental or ethical constraints in their letters, for 
instance Becht et al., (2009) and Vandekerckhove et al., (2007). However, this 
campaign was more friendly and limited to inviting companies to join the UNGC.  
The engagement studied reveals to some degree the three attributes for 
stakeholder salience; however, the engagement did not had a strong business case, one 
of the two attributes that Gifford (2010) find to be relevant for successful engagement. 
The other essential attribute is agreement with the values of the managers. Results 
show that it makes a difference to engage with the chair of target companies but this 
could be easily done through the different networking events where it happens to bring 
investors and managers together.  
Another limitation presented in this study is the fact that target companies were 
‘laggards’. In other words, these companies were not interested in joining the UNGC 
at any point since it was launched 12 years ago. The academic literature documents a 
number of reasons to become members of an initiative. These mainly include strategic, 
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ethical and economic reasons, and if we consider that the spectrum of initiatives is 
wide, the existence of a stronger business case to join the initiative is required; as 
Gifford (2010) concludes that the most important elements of investor salience are 
‘the business case and the values of the target company managers’ (p. 97). 
Furthermore, a number of firms argued that they were not ready to take part in an 
initiative such as the UNGC because they were just starting to implement ESG 
practices, therefore another interesting path to investigate would be the level of ESG 
implementation that companies have prior to joining this type of initiatives.  
In addition, a number of companies that contacted the PRI but did not join the 
UNGC argued that they have implemented environmental and social actions, which 
are in line with the Ten Principles but were not interested in joining the UNGC. This 
fact deserves more attention because it could be the case that firms respect the UNGC 
and did not join to show a strong CSR conviction to investors defending their current 
practices by avoiding undertaking the initiative in a symbolic manner (i.e. just to 
comply with investors desires). 
Another recommendation for further research is to follow up with companies 
that joined to see how they have improved since adopting the UNGC, this could not 
be done at the moment as sufficient time is necessary to implement any policy or 
practice within normal operations. The spirit of this type of engagement is to change 
environmental, social and corporate governance behaviour. Therefore, it is not enough 
just to sign: any real change requires to invest human, material and financial resources 
in order to produce an impact. If firms just join but do not improve, then the efficacy 
of the engagement is questionable.  
Moreover, this experiment was worldwide. Results show that responses from 
companies were higher in those countries where ESG is prevalent; therefore, further 
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research could look at what mechanisms work better for Latin-American or African 
countries where the perception of ESG is low and the institutional environment might 
be more difficult to infiltrate.  
 
2.8. CONCLUSIONS  
I have analysed the engagement lead by a group of investors, members of the 
Principles for Responsible Investment with US$3.3 trillion in AUM, inviting 
companies to join the United Nations Global Compact. In so doing, I tested the 
effectiveness of nine different tactics commonly used in soft engagement by investors 
to enhance environmental, social and corporate governance practices. The privileged 
access to develop this ‘natural field experiment’ allows to this paper to contribute to 
the literature on experimental designs. 
 In general terms the experiment might not have shown a successful 
engagement; however it shows assertions presented in previous literature. The 
experiment shows the importance of contacting CEOs and chairs from target 
companies as a means to initiate dialogue. The next step would be to sit with managers 
and have a more natural conversation on the demanded topic as suggested by Thomson 
and Bebbington (2005). Walls and Berrone (2017) point out that CEOs with expertise 
on environmental issues will enhance the environmental performance of the company. 
We could take this finding and extended to social issues as well and expect more 
emphatic CEOs. Furthermore, the arguments used by stakeholders must state a strong 
‘business case’ in order to catch the attention of the management and have a successful 
engagement.  
This paper contributes to the understanding of engagement applied within 
different context showing that this practice works better in countries where ESG 
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claims are more widespread.  Holland (2011) proposes Fund Managers need to study 
the institutional setting and how it is changing. The Urgency element needs to be 
critical within the institutional context of the firm. In this vein, Sakuma and Louche 
(2008) suggest that each country should develop its own model for socially 
responsible investment and therefore, for engagement practices. 
Therefore, this work provides some evidence for shareholder activists and 
other groups of stakeholders and academic literature on the field on how (not) to 
engage with target companies keeping on mind that the invitation letter was regarded 
as the starting point for deeper engagement. Social Movement Theory help us to 
understand the results of the experiment, this is, the social pressures exerted by the 
PRI on firms to join had more impact on European countries where the PRI is 
recognized within the institutional field. The experiment supports previous evidence 
in that firms seen as part of the institutional field, are shaped to its environment, this 
is firms that are sensible to CSR will also consider to join the UNGC or at least to 
respond to the engagement. In addition, European countries are used to be confronted 
by activists either regarding to corporate governance or to environmental and social 
issues, contrary to other countries where this type of practices have negative results 
instead of been seen as fruitful (Adegbite, 2012).  
This study also has implications for target firms which can use this type of 
engagement to their favour by gathering information that might help them to enhance 
their sustainability reports and learn and apply these practices with other stakeholders. 
 Finally, because engagement and its different tactics are multidisciplinary, this 
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ESG drivers for the Adoption of 




This chapter explores the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) 
and the adoption of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) as the strategy for 
disclosure. Moreover, I explore whether the dimensions of CSP, namely 
environmental, social and corporate governance, are different over the  years. I also 
analyse whether the existence of controversies influence the adoption of the initiative 
as pointed by the opponents of the UNGC. The sample covers 2,614 firms from the 
FTSE all world index for the period 2003-2012 generating 12,754 firm-year 
observations. Event History Analysis is employed for the calculation of the results. 
Results show that CSP is different between signatories of the UNGC and not 
signatories, and that those differences change over time. In all the cases, the CSP is 
significant and positively related to the adoption of the Ten Principles; however, the 
impact of the three dimensions is different at different points in time. The contribution 
for academics, practitioners, policy makers and other stakeholders is discussed. 
 
Keywords: changes over time, controversies, ESG, event history analysis, UNGC. 
 
                                                          
12 First drafts of this paper were presented at BAFA Doctoral Colloquium (Manchester, 
2015); ScotDoc (Glasgow, 2015), and CSEAR (London, 2015). 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decades, the number of voluntary initiatives to account for environmental, 
social, and corporate governance (ESG)13 practices has increased (i.e. United Nations 
Global Compact (UNGC), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Business for Social 
Responsibility (BSR)). There are different classifications of these initiatives, for 
instance, Gilbert, Rasche and Waddock (2011) divide these initiatives into principles-
based, awarding certificates, reporting guidelines and standardized processes.  
Academic literature in the field focuses on why companies become members 
of these initiatives (stakeholders’ pressures for example) and whether these initiatives 
impact on the CSR and financial performance of their members. However, in order to 
understand the impact of such initiatives, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
environmental, social and corporate governance practices have been implemented a 
priori and this is an aspect that many studies have failed to consider. In this regard, I 
rise the following question: Does corporate social performance influence the adoption 
of the UNGC? I focus on the UNGC which is one of the largest worldwide initiatives 
based on Ten Principles that cover human rights, environmental issues, labour 
conditions and anticorruption practices. Additionally, I also aim to provide some 
elements to partially help to disentangle the issue risen by Rasche, Waddock and 
McIntosh (2013) regarding the isolation of ‘the effects of the Global Compact 
participation’ (p. 23) in order to measure the impact of the initiative. 
It is argued that voluntary initiatives are adopted by firms as a strategic 
advantage to legitimate CSR practices (see for instance Herremans et al 2009). 
Academic literature on strategic management shows that in general, practices, 
                                                          
13 The terms ESG, CSP and CSR are interchangeable in this paper. I acknowledge the 
difference among both definitions; however, the academic literature in this field tends to 
amalgamate them and difficult to separate for the purpose of this study. 
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programmes or initiatives are not adopted by all participants at the same time. I split 
the sample within three different groups attending similar number of years to caught 
differences across adopters of the initiative. Literature distinguishes that early 
adopters tend to obtain the ‘first mover’ advantage, followed by participants that are 
influenced by mimetic isomorphism and for those participants that resist to change or 
do not want to bear the cost of innovation despite of the potential benefits it might 
generate. While I do not use these labels for the groups, I mention these characteristics 
to highlight that there are differences across members and the point in time when they 
join the UNGC. Having said that, the second aim of this paper is to analyse the changes 
on the level of ESG over time.  
Research on CSR voluntary initiatives in general, and the UNGC in particular 
has created an inconclusive debate where positive results have been diminished by the 
absence of a monitoring framework, free-riding and greenwashing (Hamann, Sinha, 
Kapfudzaruwa and Schild, 2009; O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2009). In this paper, I also 
analyse part of the criticism around the UNGC by considering the existence of 
controversies at firm level to understand if they are related to the adoption of the 
initiative and therefore, if such adoption could be an indicator for bluewashing14. The 
aim is not to claim the existence of free-riding but instead to provide signals for 
potential misbehaviour. 
Findings from the event history analysis and logistic regression models show 
that the existence of ESG practices is significantly and positively correlated to the 
adoption of the UNGC; however, the impact of each dimension (i.e. environmental, 
social and corporate governance) is different over time. Members in Group 1 are 
                                                          
14 The term ‘bluewashing’ refers to the use of the UNGC membership as a mechanism for 
image management (i.e. legitimation) without a substantial change on behaviour (see 
Banerjee 2007 for an extended explanation). 
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particularly motivated by social performance. Corporate governance is an additional 
driver for Group 2. Finally, in the case of Group 3, the three elements are significant 
although no with the same intensity. 
This study is particularly important for academics, policy makers, managers, 
responsible investors and other stakeholders interested in firms’ behaviour towards 
CSR voluntary initiatives. In the academic field, this paper adds to the literature on 
CSR, particularly, to the understanding of the role of the United Nation Global 
Compact in the diffusion and legitimation of CSR practices. For policy makers, the 
findings of this paper contribute to the understanding of the behaviour and strategy 
used by the membership of these frameworks. Managers can find in this paper, 
elements to support their strategic decisions related to CSR implementation and 
legitimation. Stakeholder activists (responsible investors, employees, NGOs and other 
stakeholders) might find this paper useful for engagement purposes (i.e. understanding 
the characteristics of late adopters despite having a good CSP). 
 The next section presents the background and development of hypotheses. The 
third section describes the data and methodology employed in the study. The fourth 
section presents the results obtained from the analysis. Next, the discussion and 
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3.2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.2.1. Introducing the UNGC 
The UNGC, is regarded as one of the most important and largest memberships 
promoting sustainable practices, was launched by the United Nations in July, 2000 
(Kell, 2005; Rasche, Waddock and McIntosh, 2013). The initiative is based in Ten 
Principles that comprise four areas: labour, human rights, environment and 
anticorruption practices (Table 3.1). The initiative do not only admits profit 
organizations but also academia, NGOs and governments (UNGC, 2015b). The 
commitment with the UNGC starts with a letter signed by the management of the 
interested organization to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon manifesting their 
desire to integrate the Ten Principles within their activities, processes and strategies. 
Business participants are committed to submit an annual report, called 
‘Communication on Progress’ (COP), which contains the practices that have been 
implemented in order to align their operations with the principles voluntary accepted. 
Members that failed to disclose such information are classified as non-communicating 
participants and, if the omission is not amended, companies are delisted from the 
initiative (UNGC, 2014). 
From its inception, the initiative has been criticized by NGOs, activists and 
academics for being considered as a tool for clearing corporate image and reputation 
due to the lack of coercive mechanisms for monitoring membership performance 
(Arevalo, 2010; Berliner and Prakash, 2014; Sethi and Schepers, 2014, Williams, 
2004). Nevertheless, the UNGC has evolved by implementing the COP (2005), by 
creating the non-communication status with the risk to be delisted (2007) and more 
recently, by introducing the ‘advanced level’ status (2012) and a voluntary registration 
fee (2014). Figure 3.1 shows the changes in the UNGC framework; all together, these 
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changes are helping to build trust in the initiative (Gilbert and Behnam, 2013). 
Supporters of the initiative argue that the purpose of the UNGC is to serve as a forum 
for learning and networking where members decide to participate voluntary (Gilbert 









UNGC: The Ten Principles 
Human Rights 
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights. 
Principle 2: Make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.  
Labour 
Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining. 
Principle 4: The elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour. 
Principle 5: The effective abolition of child labour. 
Principle 6: The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
Environment 
Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental 
challenges. 
Principle 8: Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. 
Principle 9: Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies.  
Anti-Corruption 
Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion 
and bribery. 
Notes: Adapted from The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact (UNGC, 2016c). 
Retrieved from https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles. 
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Moreover, academic literature on the operational aspect of the UNGC has paid 
particular attention to three themes: a) the impact of UNGC membership, b) 
characteristics of its constituents, and c) reasons for joining (Rasche et al., 2013). The 
evidence about the impact of the UNGC on corporate performance is mixed. In a study 
carry out by Hamann et al. (2009), the authors do not find any effect of the UNGC nor 
of the JSE Socially Responsible Investment Index on firms listed in the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. Arevalo and Aravind (2010) find that active UNGC members based 
on the US are less affected by economic crises than passive members.  
In terms of who joins the initiative, research mainly covers the distribution of 
members across the globe, their industry and size. The first acknowledgment made by 
academics is the extensive acceptance of the Ten Principles in Europe and the lack of 
enthusiasm from American firms (Arevalo et al., 2013; Coulmont and Berthelot, 2015; 
Janney, Dess and Forlani, 2009). In particular industries, for instance in 
telecommunications, Runhaar and Lafferty (2009) find that the UNGC does not 
enhance CSR performance. 
Regarding the drivers of UNGC adoption, research shows that firms have a 
number of reasons to join the initiative. Cetindamar and Husoy (2007) carry out a 
survey among members of the initiative to understand why they adopted it; responses 
were classified within three categories: ethical drivers, economic drivers or both (i.e. 
stakeholders’ pressures; customer and employees’ satisfaction). They find that UNGC 
membership improves the corporate network and image. From the institutional theory 
perspective, mimetic and normative isomorphism are also important drivers (Chen 
and Bouvain, 2009; Pérez-Batres, Miller and Pisani, 2010). Additionally, in a study 
conducted by Janney et al. (2009) it was found that in the short-term shareholders of 
European-based firms react positively whereas shareholders of US-based firms react 
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negatively, suggesting that joining can cause a financial impact disregard of the 
performance. The authors also find a negative reaction of the markets to the firms’ 
omission to submit an annual report (COP) to the UNGC.  
To sum up, despite the academic efforts to know more about the UNGC, the 


































Figure 3.1 This figure shows the main changes that the UNGC-Ten Principles initiative has 
suffered since it was launched in July, 2000 when it started with only nine principles. Then 
principle was added in June, 2004 to incorporate the avoidance of bribery and corruption 
practices. Later on in July, 2005, the reporting mechanism was implemented: business 
participants must submit a communication of progress (COP) report describing the activities that 
they have undertaken to comply with the Ten Principles. In 2008, it was established that those 
companies that fail to submit the COP would be delisted from the membership (the status of 
participants can be check in the UNGC website). From 2011, companies with more experience 






3.2.2. ESG Performance as a Driver for UNGC Adoption 
Usually, firms have established a number of environmental, social and corporate 
governance practices, policies and programmes that are aligned with the Ten Principles 
prior to becoming members of the UNGC (Berliner and Prakash, 2014; Janney et al., 
2009; Rasche et al, 2013; Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009). Companies implement 
environmental, social and corporate governance practices, programmes and policies 
for a number of reasons. One of the reasons, is that they are convince about their 
responsibility towards their community, their shareholders and other stakeholders, so 
their actions are intrinsic and ethical, and might be considered as pure altruism 
(Cetindamar and Husoy, 2007).   
Another reason is the pressure from their stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Pérez-
Batres et al., 2012), in this case, the management of companies pays attention to the 
demands of their stakeholders in the extent that those stakeholders are salient for the 
management (Mitchel at al., 1997). Stakeholders can exert pressures over corporations 
according to their power and urgency of the issue that they are demanding among other 
elements (Gifford, 2010). Scott (2001), based on DiMaggio and Powells (1983) 
isomorphism processes, proposes three basic pillars for corporate change: regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive. The regulative pillar is normally related to the 
application of governmental laws. Whereas the normative pillar is related to 
legitimacy, this is, organizations should behave in such way that their actions are 
believable according to the ´socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions´ (Suchman 1995, p. 574). And the cultural-cognitive pillar is also related 
to legitimacy. In this regard, Matten and Moon (2008) argue that ´The U.S. and 
European cultural systems have generated very different broad assumptions about 
society, business, and government´ (2008, p. 408). This is, aligning behaviour with the 
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cultural context is a way for legitimacy and reputation management. For instance, 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) find that the individualistic culture favours corporate 
social performance in countries with for example Protestant heritage. In this way, 
actors can be perceived by a wider spectrum of stakeholders. In this line, Pérez-Batres 
et al. (2012) find that community and consumers are important drivers for the adoption 
of voluntary CSR initiatives.  
And, a third reason is the result of mandatory policies established by the 
government or the industry. These reasons might be linked to other drivers namely 
monetary or strategic (reputation and legitimacy) (Cetindamar and Husoy, 2007). This 
is related to the regulative pillar proposed by Scott (2001) where the existence of 
monitoring and punishment mechanisms are in place.  Matten and Moon (2008) 
suggest that codes of conducts among other voluntary initiatives can be seen as well 
as part of the coercive isomorphism. Likewise,  Bondy, Matten and Moon (2008) find 
that codes of conduct are tools for complying with mandatory regulations, and that has 
become a widespread management practice which is not precisely related to CSR 
commitment. Mallin, Michelon and Raggi (2013), based on socio-political and agency 
theories, find that environmental disclosure differs from social disclosure in that the 
former helps to communicate outstanding environmental performance (singling) 
whereas the latter is a way for legitimation of poor performance. In other words, the 
higher the environmental performance the better the quality and extent of the 
information released, and the higher the social performance the poorer the quality and 
extent of social disclosure. Therefore, signalling these practices is important for 
corporations as it is a way to conceive reputation (Rao, 1994). Furthermore, firms can 
obtain a competitive advantage if signals emitted by an organization cannot be imitated 
by its peers (Spence, 1973). However, organizations with high quality performance 
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look to collaborate with others in the same level in order to maintain their reputation 
(Poldony, 1994). Being part of a collective effort, in this case the UNGC, helps to 
legitimize CSR actions and strengths corporate reputation, facts that are less likely to 
happen if firms work in isolation (Berliner and Prakash, 2014).  
Therefore the first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between CSP and the adoption of the 
UNGC. 
 
3.2.3. Changes over time 
The characteristics of adopters as well as their reasons to participate within a voluntary 
CSR initiative changes over time. First, we depart from the notion that leaders and 
laggards have different viewpoints to commit to new practices (Herremas et al., 2009; 
Liefferink et al. 2009; Runhaar et al. 2008). Then, we see how the diffusion of certain 
practices have different audiences along the time. 
Referring to participation in new practices Herremans et al. (2009) analyse 
why a number of companies from the petroleum industry in Canada. They found that 
leaders wanted to improve their environmental performance to look good in front of 
their stakeholders whereas their peers (laggards) in the same country and industry 
prefer to remain the same. Based on competing logics, the authors find that the higher 
the pressure from stakeholders, the higher the impact on target companies to adopt 
environmental practices. Furthermore, they find that both institutional and firm level 
factors influence companies’ decision about how to react to stakeholders demands 
even within the same industry; and, that for companies where the focus is on 
shareholders, environmental performance is not a concern. In the same line, Liefferink 
et al. (2009) indicate that there are three common political reasons to become a leader 
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in environmental policy: high pressures from stakeholders, competitive advantage, 
and future international legislation. In another study, Runhaar et al (2008) find that 
environmental leaders are not homogeneous as previous literature suggests but there 
exist differences among them. This fact is very intuitive when comparing large 
companies with small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as done in their study which 
also finds that large companies respond to stakeholder pressures whereas SME might 
be driven by owner’s ideologies or as a competitive advantage. Arevalo et al., (2013) 
study early and late UNGC adopters in the Spanish context and found that internal 
and external forces are import drivers for the adoption of the initiative. Furthermore, 
their findings suggest that both early and late adopters are motivated by image and 
economic gains; however, economic gains desire is stronger in late adopters. Bansal 
and Hunter (2003) suggest two reasons for companies to adopt ISO 14001 as a first-
mover. The first one is to reinforce their current practices and maintain their 
competitive advantage, and second, to reorient their practices and operations.  Their 
findings suggest that reinforcing strategies (i.e. maintaining corporate legitimacy 
among others in the same field) is the clue to be an early adopter.  
In a study carried out by Ramus and Montiel (2005), the authors find no 
difference between the reporting in four different industries; however, when they look 
at the implementation of environmental and social practices they find that those firms 
motivated by an economic aim tend to engage in real changes. They suggest that the 
symbolic adoption is a result of the institutional pressures listed by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983). 
Under the scope of Networking Theory, firms join to learn from member 
leaders of the initiative (Gilbert and Benham, 2013). Similarly, Tashman and Rivera 
(2010; p. 490) argue that “[t]he network structure itself is a platform for mimetic 
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behaviour where CSP laggards can learn from leaders”. Furthermore, Chapple et al. 
(2001: p. 461) find that “firms are more likely to invest in voluntary compliance the 
longer the accreditation scheme has been in existence”; however, they say, there is 
no evidence of substantial commitment. This could be due to the fact that the firm’s 
ESG performance has changed as a result of the diffusion of this type of practices and 
late adopters only seek to legitimize their practices by an institutionalized initiative 
and therefore, no change is observed (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Berliner and Prakash 
(2014) argue that the UNGC should attract ‘average and poor performers’ in order to 
accomplish its goal. These arguments can be summarized as follows: 
Based on these arguments, I hypothesize that: 
H2: Characteristics of adopters (CSP) change over time 
 
3.2.4. Controversial Actions 
In many cases, the adoption of the UNGC has been considered as a symbolic practice 
in the literature, in comparison to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which has 
been regarded as a substantial commitment to CSR (Pérez-Batres, et al., 2010; Pérez-
Batres et al. 2012). However, academics have also identified how firms do use the 
GRI reports to change the perception of their practices by omitting negative aspects 
of their social performance leading to a symbolic disclosure (Hahn and Lulfs, 2013). 
Lyon and Maxwell (2011; p.5) define greenwashing as “the selective disclosure of 
positive information about a company’s environmental or social performance, while 
withholding negative information on these dimensions”.  
 Mechanism for greenwashing has increased in the last years, this implies the 
commitment to reporting initiatives while upholding a poor performance (Delmas and 
Burbano, 2011). In so doing, encourages firms to misbehave by producing negative 
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externalities, or as some researcher will say: providing firms with licence to sin 
(Delmas and Burbano, 2011). On the other hand, firms which avoid to participate in 
controversial business get the benefit of competitive advantage which is translated 
into a positive effect in the market performance (Moura-Leite, Padgett and Galán, 
2011). In a different study, Mahoney et al. (2013) find the firms issuing a standalone 
CSR report tend to be more transparent than those that do not.  
There is a tendency on the critics to the UNGC to highlight how easily firms in 
the dirty industry can “bluewash” their corporate image; for instance the oil and gas, 
and the materials industries, are more likely to join the UNGC; this might be because 
companies in those industries are more susceptible to be involve in issues with the 
environment and human rights (Bennie, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2007; Bernhagen 
and Mitchell, 2010). Although the purpose here is not to determine if companies are 
adopting the UNGC to ‘symbolically’ clear their reputation (it might be the case that 
a company was involved in a controversy but aims to change its behaviour), I instead, 
analyse whether the decision of becoming a member of the initiative is driven by 
controversies in their environmental, social, and/or corporate governance 
performance. As a result, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H3: Firms with ESG controversies are more likely to join the UNGC. 
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Figure 3.2 This figure graphically represents the hypotheses established in this paper. Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
suggests a relationship between corporate social performance, in its three dimensions: environment, 
society and corporate governance, and the adoption of the UNGC as a CSR strategy. Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
proposes that environmental, social and governance controversies contribute to the adoption of the 
initiative. Hypothesis 3 (H3) suggests that the level of CSP to decide to join the UNGC changes over time. 
 
Figure 13 




3.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to understand what characteristics identify firms that have adopted the UNGC 
from those that have not (in terms of ESG disclosure), and how these characteristics 
change over time, I event history analysis15.  
 
3.3.1. Event History Analysis 
Event History Analysis (EHA) is a statistical method used in several fields, for 
example in strategy, economics and medicine to associate the timing of an event to its 
explanatory variables. Roberts and Downling (2002) use this method to link superior 
financial performance to reputation. Wang (2012) employ EHA to study the reasons 
of some cities in California voluntary engage in environmental actions earlier than 
others and why some cities prefer not to do anything at all. EHA is a longitudinal 
dataset that differs from other statistical methods in that it only tracks subjects from 
the beginning of the study until the event happens to each subject or the subject 
disappears from the sample before the event is presented in which case it is said that 
the subject was censored (i.e. die); therefore no observations are disregarded (Allison, 
2014). In this case, EHA is suitable because it measures the conditional probability of 
joining the UNGC in a one-year period based on the disclosure of environmental, 
social and corporate governance information. 
As the data is grouped by years and we observe non-repeated events of a single 
type, discrete-time methods are the best option to carry out the analysis16 (Allison, 
2014). Baucus and Near (1991) employ this type of analysis to study the relationship 
between corporate antecedents (environmental, internal and situational) and corporate 
                                                          
15Event history analysis is also known as duration analysis and survival analysis. 
16 The other variant of survival analysis is the continuous-time method which is used in those 
cases where events happen at very specific points in time (i.e. day), therefore, providing an 
interval for the conditional probability of the event. 
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illegal behaviour; the authors decide to run a stepwise logistic regression, and split 
continuous variables within categorical to reduce the loss of information as suggested 
by Allison (1982). Sherer and Lee (2002) use EHA-discrete method by following a 
logistic regression model to investigate the adoption of innovative human resource 
practices by senior and staff attorneys in the principal offices of firms.  
Furthermore, it is important to mention that although some data can be 
continuous (for instance, exact registration date in the UNGC), it will be treated as 
discrete (only the year of adoption will be considered). This decision will not affect 
the output as both approaches guide to analogous conclusions (Allison, 1982); even 
more, choosing the full date will produce an extensive sample. We must also assume 
that time of censoring is not related to the hazard rate of the event. 
 I develop the following maximum likelihood model based on logistic 









The dependent, P(t), is the conditional probability (hazard rate) that a firm (i) will join 
the UNGC at time t, given that the firm has not yet become a member, and given the 
characteristics of members at time t. This variable is coded ‘1’ if the firm joined the 
UNGC in that year, and ‘0’ otherwise. A firm is right-censored if it disappears from 
the sample or if it did not join the UNGC by the end of the study (random censoring). 
This could have happened because the company merged, split or simply decided not 
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to remain public anymore or because they did not meet the requirements of the FTSE 
AWI Index any longer. Therefore, the dataset contains one observation per year that 
the firm appears in the sample; and, an advantage of this type of analysis is that we do 
not need to correct for the dependence among the observations from the same firm 
(Allison, 1982; D’Angostino et al., 1990).  
 The ESG Index is a key explanatory variable for the average of environmental, 
social and corporate governance practices implemented by firm (i) at time t-1 
according to ASSET4. ASSET4 is a database that provides ESG data for over 5,000 
firms from the most important and largest indices (MSCI, FTSE, S&P to name but a 
few); data is gathered from publicly available sources (i.e. firm websites, financial and 
non-financial reports, NGOs websites and news) and also from the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (i.e. CO2 data). Then, the data is classified into three pillars denominated: 
environmental performance, social performance, and corporate governance 
performance. The three pillars contain 15 categories obtained from 180 key 
performance indicators from 500 individual data points. While some information is 
updated daily (i.e. news), some other data is updated every year (i.e. annual reports). 
The data from each company is compared with the dataset universe (benchmark), and 
standardised (z-score) creating scores between 0 to 100% (Thomson Reuters, 2015)17. 
Furthermore, the model also test the impact of environmental, social and corporate 
governance controversies on the adoption of the UNGC; these controversies are 
represented in the model by ESGContro. Each type of controversy reported by Asset4 
is considered as a variable. 
                                                          
17 In previous versions of the ASSET4 database, Thomson Reuters also considered the 
Economic Pillar; however, this pillar is still available to download. I do not use this information 
because it contains information related to client and shareholders loyalty and financial 
performance. 
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I control for firm characteristics18 that are constant over time (e.g. region and 
industry) and for those that change over time (e.g. size, ROA and leverage).  
Consistent with previous literature, size is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of Employees and the natural logarithm of Market Value. Closely held shares 
are considered as these investors tend to avoid investments in corporate social 
responsibility practices. As leverage measure I employ debt to capital ratio and firm 
profitability is represented by returns on assets ratio. The FTSE database provides 
country and industry variables; the former refers to the country where the firm is listed 
and the latter can be one of the ten categories defined by the index. I use this 
information to create two variables: dirty industries, includes oil and gas, basic 
materials and industrials; and, region, Asia and Pacific, Europe, Canada and US, and 
rest of the world. Region substitutes the variable ‘Market Economy’. Market Economy 
is considered to control for the impact that liberal and coordinated market economies 
have on corporate social responsibility which has been widely documented. A 
description and source of the variables can be found in Table 3.2.  
So far, this model only shows changes in the hazard over time as a result of 
the changes in the time-varying explanatory variables. However, we can also test if 









                                                          
18 Those variables with a skewed distribution were transformed into natural logarithmic values, 
no negative values were reported and ‘zero’ values were omitted. 
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Discrete-time methods also require us to deal with those cases that show 
‘delayed entry’ or ‘left truncation’19. Firms are at risk20 to join the UNGC before the 
start of our study, t>0 (i.e. year 2000 as this is the year when the initiative was 



















                                                          
19 ‘Left censoring’ is different from ‘left truncation’ in that the former applies when we do not 
know when the event occurred; and, the latter refers to the information that is omitted as a 
result of the research design. 
20 Being at risk should be understood as the possibility to have the event and not with a 
negative connotation. 
  










Dummy variable equivalent to '1' if the firm is 

























Average of the environmental, social and 
corporate governance scores (lagged one 
year). 






The environmental pillar measures a company's 
impact on living and non-living natural systems, 
including the air, land and water, as well as 
complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a 
company uses best management practices to 
avoid environmental risks and capitalize on 
environmental opportunities in order to generate 
long term shareholder value (lagged one year). 
ASSET4 
Social Score 
The social pillar measures a company's 
capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its 
workforce, customers and society, through its 
use of best management practices. It is a 
reflection of the company's reputation and the 
health of its license to operate, which are key 
factors in determining its ability to generate long 
term shareholder value (lagged one year). 
ASSET4 
CG Score 
The corporate governance pillar measures a 
company's systems and processes, which 
ensure that its board members and executives 
act in the best interests of its long term 
shareholders. It reflects a company's capacity, 
through its use of best management practices, 
to direct and control its rights and 
responsibilities through the creation of 
incentives, as well as checks and balances in 
order to generate long term shareholder value 




Total of the environmental controversies per 




Total of the social controversies per year at firm 




Total of the corporate governance controversies 
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Table 3.2 (cont.) 
Variables Description 
















It includes all full and part-time 
employees of the company (lagged 
one year). 
Worldscope 
Market Value (ln) 
Market value on Datastream is the 
share price multiplied by the 
number of ordinary shares in issue. 
The amount in issue is updated 
whenever new tranches of stock 
are issued or after a capital change 
USD (lagged one year). 
Datastream 
Closely held shares (ln) 
Represents shares held by 
insiders, includes: cross holdings, 
corporations, holding company, 
government, employees and 
individuals (lagged one year). 
Worldscope 
Dirty Industries 






Total Debt to Capital (long term 
debt + short term debt and current 
portion of long term debt/total 
capital +short term debt and 
current portion of long-term debt 
*100) (lagged one year). 
Worldscope 
ROA 
((Trailing 12 Months Net Profit + 
(Trailing 12 Months Interest 
Expense On Debt * (1-Tax Rate / 
100)))) / Average of Last Year's 
and Current Year’s Total Assets * 
100*(1-Tax Rate)))/Average of 
Last Year's and Current Year's 




Dummy variable indicating '1' if the 
country has a Liberal Economy and 








Region - Asia and 
Pacific 
Japan, Hong-Kong, Australia, 
China, Korea, New Zealand, 
Russia, Thailand, India, Turkey, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines. 




Region - Europe 
Italy, Greece, Austria, Sweden, 
France, Germany, Denmark, UK, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Finland, Portugal, 
Norway, Spain, Ireland, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary 
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Table 3.2. (cont.) 
Variables Description 















Region - Canada and 
US 
Canada and US 




Region - Other 
Mexico, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Morocco, Egypt, South 
Africa, Peru, Colombia, UAE 






3.3.2. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample comprises the firms in the FTSE all world index21 and covers the period 
2003-2012. ASSET4 started reporting in 2002 and because the ESG index and related 
variables are lagged one year, the study starts in 2003 and continues up to the most 
recent year of information available at the moment of the collection (2011)22 obtaining 
a panel of  12,724 firm-year observations for 2,614 firms. I focus on public firms for 
three reasons: first, the data to determine a proxy in large scale for ESG disclosure is 
only available for this segment of participants; second, these firms are the most visible 
to stakeholders; and, third, these type of ratings are mainly used by investors, therefore 
it is not unusual to combine the data from ASSET4 with the data from the FTSE index.  
Table 3.3 shows correlations for the full sample. As expected, there is a high 
and positive correlation between the ESG Index and its three components: 
environmental, social and governance scores; there is also a high and positive 
correlation between environmental and social scores. Correlations among the other 
variables show no problems with multicollinearity. Table 3.4 shows the number of 
firms by country and by industry. It can be seen that the 2,614 firms are located in 46 
                                                          
21 Except for those located in Taiwan, as there exists a political conflict between Taiwan and 
China, and the former is not recognized by the United Nations. 
22 In addition, on March, 2013 the UNGC announced an annual fee, applicable from 
January, 2014, which might have impact on the membership. 
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countries and 10 industries; the USA has the largest number followed by Japan, the 
UK and Australia. Regarding the type of industry, the largest number of firm within 
the sample belong to the financial industry, followed by industrials and consumer 
services and goods. 
From Figure 3.3 we can observe the changes in the trend for environmental 
and social scores for the period 2003-2012. Environmental and social scores follow 
similar patterns. For members in the early years the social score is slightly higher than 
the environmental score and by the end of the period of study, the environmental score 
is higher than the social score. Both scores are in the range of 60%-80%. 
Environmental and social scores for non-members and the average are close to 50% 
over the ten years.  
Figure 3.4 shows the trends for corporate governance scores and for the 
average of the three dimensions. Contrary to the environmental and social scores, the 
governance score for members was lower than the average in the four first years of 
the initiative. Subsequently, the scores for members and non-members were close to 















Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ESG Index 1.0000  
          
2 EnvScore 0.7997*** 1.0000           
3 
Number of Env 
Controversies 
0.1582*** 0.1088*** 1.0000          
4 SocScore 0.8795*** 0.7254*** 0.1157*** 1.0000   
      
5 
Number of Soc 
Controversies 
0.2276*** 0.1793*** 0.2213*** 0.1558*** 1.0000        
6 CGScore 0.6382*** 0.1326*** 0.1403*** 0.3276*** 0.1893*** 1.0000       
7 
Number of CG 
Controversies 
0.0785*** 0.0455*** 0.1082*** 0.0490*** 0.3342*** 0.0860*** 1.0000      
8 Employees (ln) 0.4903*** 0.1338*** 0.1221*** 0.3273*** 0.2410*** 0.6660*** 0.1157*** 1.0000     
9 Market Value (ln) 0.4328*** 0.2817*** 0.1888*** 0.3811*** 0.3402*** 0.3395*** 0.1286*** 0.4317*** 1.0000    
10 Leverage 0.2040*** 0.0417** 0.0209 0.1209*** 0.0590*** 0.3052*** 0.0512*** 0.3500*** 0.1078*** 1.0000   
11 ROA 0.1796*** -0.0067 0.0579*** 0.1015*** 0.0680*** 0.3162*** 0.0045 0.3309*** 0.2008*** 0.0634*** 1.0000  
12 Closely Held Shares (ln) 0.0635***  -0.0821*** 0.0112 0.0660*** 0.0369** 0.1628*** 0.0228 0.4393*** 0.1257*** 0.1393*** 0.1492*** 1.0000 
  N 
          
12,724  
          
12,724  
          
12,724  
          
12,724  
          
12,724  
          
12,724  
          
12,724  
       
11,276  
       
12,110  
       
12,042  
       
11,955  
       
11,656  
 
Mean 49.63 49.73 0.07 49.64 0.52 49.52 0.04 8.09 8.83 0.28 0.05 9.28 
 
Std. Dev. 24.34 31.75 0.45 30.25 1.92 31.96 0.26 2.64 1.10 0.47 0.08 2.65 
 
Min 4.95 8.61 0.00 3.43 0.00 1.24 0.00 0.00 -1.97 -19.73 -1.52 0.00 
  Max 97.56 97.32 11.00 98.87 57.00 98.75 6.00 14.60 13.15 16.69 1.19 19.50 
The table shows the correlation for 10,864 observations from 2003-2012. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10. This table also shows the descriptive 
statistics for all numeric variables. 
  










Panel 1. Distribution by country 
Country Firms Num Obs Percentage 
ESG 
Index 














ARGENTINA 1 5 0.04 50.78 78.99 60.25 13.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.21 9.61 0.41 0.24 13.77 
AUSTRALIA 127 617 4.85 55.11 50.52 48.65 66.15 0.05 0.21 0.07 8.44 8.30 0.33 0.06 11.21 
BELGIC 17 94 0.74 53.28 60.66 54.26 44.92 0.00 0.27 0.00 9.25 8.75 0.41 0.11 11.01 
BRAZIL 45 103 0.81 38.37 42.99 54.35 17.78 0.08 0.08 0.01 8.52 8.67 0.24 0.05 11.91 
CANADA 80 405 3.18 62.37 54.85 56.76 75.48 0.14 0.37 0.04 9.22 9.33 0.35 0.05 8.79 
CHILE 11 36 0.28 34.66 44.97 49.32 9.70 0.06 0.03 0.00 3.08 9.03 0.00 0.00 8.18 
CHINA 89 247 1.94 28.87 31.64 30.54 24.44 0.06 0.15 0.00 8.39 8.36 0.06 0.01 13.13 
COLOMBIA 2 3 0.02 21.12 25.01 28.85 9.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.71 8.12 0.00 0.00 4.40 
CZECH REPUBLIC 4 13 0.1 47.24 51.66 72.78 17.29 0.08 0.31 0.00 6.59 9.37 0.02 0.00 8.82 
DENMARK 12 50 0.39 33.73 46.18 38.57 16.43 0.02 0.10 0.00 7.68 8.28 0.07 0.02 8.34 
EGYPT 8 18 0.14 15.02 16.58 22.60 5.88 0.00 0.06 0.00 6.58 7.63 0.05 0.01 11.17 
FINLAND 13 61 0.48 62.81 71.97 62.99 53.47 0.03 0.08 0.00 9.64 8.52 0.44 0.09 11.26 
FRANCE 60 220 1.73 61.27 70.07 70.36 43.39 0.04 0.33 0.02 9.86 8.93 0.23 0.08 11.10 
GERMANY 53 216 1.7 51.48 66.95 61.06 26.42 0.03 0.33 0.04 10.40 8.84 0.56 0.06 11.10 
GRECE 15 52 0.41 39.75 51.29 54.71 13.24 0.06 0.12 0.00 8.75 8.24 0.55 0.15 12.13 
HONG KONG 107 477 3.75 33.32 33.15 35.78 28.01 0.01 0.08 0.00 7.03 8.69 0.04 0.01 11.94 
HUNGARY 1 4 0.03 65.99 83.53 89.75 24.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.03 8.60 0.00 0.00 5.53 
INDIA 49 102 0.8 38.08 42.63 51.53 20.10 0.02 0.36 0.02 5.34 8.77 0.01 0.00 9.12 
INDONESIA 19 48 0.38 38.40 36.01 55.77 23.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 8.82 0.00 0.00 6.38 
IRELAND 7 45 0.35 53.10 49.82 48.35 61.12 0.00 0.64 0.04 9.67 8.66 0.92 0.04 9.85 
  










TABLE 3.4 (Continued) 
Sample Description 
Panel 1. Distribution by country 
Country Firms Num Obs Percentage 
ESG 
Index 














ISRAEL 13 39 0.31 34.60 35.08 37.99 30.74 0.00 0.64 0.00 7.73 8.60 0.13 0.03 9.55 
ITALY 44 215 1.69 49.63 50.38 63.60 34.90 0.00 0.27 0.02 9.67 8.74 0.69 0.06 12.81 
JAPAN 423 2,505 19.69 37.12 58.08 42.40 10.88 0.01 0.19 0.00 4.69 8.45 0.00 0.00 6.86 
KOREA 77 196 1.54 41.54 58.92 51.29 14.42 0.03 0.49 0.04 1.62 8.72 0.00 0.00 2.80 
MALASIA 36 86 0.68 40.95 36.10 45.87 40.88 0.03 0.07 0.00 8.03 8.70 0.12 0.02 12.46 
MOROCCO 3 9 0.07 26.74 24.32 52.41 3.50 0.00 0.11 0.00 7.10 9.02 0.05 0.01 10.51 
MEXICO 20 62 0.49 27.81 34.98 37.26 11.18 0.05 0.31 0.02 7.48 9.04 0.03 0.01 12.03 
NETHERLANDS 28 99 0.78 73.37 68.19 81.19 70.72 0.11 0.48 0.02 10.43 9.35 0.59 0.12 10.37 
NORWAY 11 22 0.17 40.61 44.39 45.36 32.09 0.05 0.09 0.00 7.17 8.20 0.21 0.03 10.38 
NEW ZEALAND 8 57 0.45 46.98 42.21 43.33 55.41 0.02 0.09 0.00 7.71 7.58 0.31 0.07 11.63 
AUSTRIA 18 67 0.53 40.95 47.19 50.42 25.26 0.01 0.04 0.00 9.17 8.47 0.70 0.05 11.65 
PERU 2 4 0.03 24.13 24.82 22.99 24.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.32 8.68 0.17 0.03 9.83 
PHILIPPINES 13 27 0.21 35.50 37.21 41.81 27.48 0.00 0.04 0.00 5.25 8.47 0.01 0.00 9.81 
POLAND 11 27 0.21 28.20 29.04 39.61 15.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.39 8.58 0.11 0.02 10.77 
PORTUGAL 10 40 0.31 48.60 48.89 63.71 33.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.94 8.39 0.87 0.06 13.27 
RUSSIA 30 77 0.61 43.21 46.92 57.23 25.47 0.14 0.29 0.03 7.57 9.52 0.01 0.00 11.42 
  












TABLE 3.4 (Continued) 
Sample Description 
Panel 1. Distribution by country 
Country Firms Num Obs Percentage 
ESG 
Index 














SOUTH AFRICA 44 91 0.72 61.86 57.56 74.39 53.62 0.02 0.23 0.00 7.68 8.47 0.03 0.02 9.53 
SINGAPORE 45 243 1.91 34.56 32.61 33.34 37.73 0.01 0.09 0.01 8.51 8.04 0.22 0.06 12.84 
SPAIN 26 94 0.74 49.14 57.50 57.17 32.75 0.00 0.09 0.01 8.60 8.63 0.67 0.13 12.02 
SWEDEN 28 117 0.92 57.80 60.17 64.15 49.07 0.03 0.09 0.01 7.12 8.64 0.06 0.01 8.79 
SWITZERLAND 41 185 1.45 55.63 59.57 60.67 46.65 0.07 0.58 0.03 9.29 8.85 0.29 0.07 8.34 
THAILAND 15 41 0.32 46.56 45.31 51.54 42.83 0.10 0.05 0.00 5.74 8.96 0.01 0.00 10.56 
TURKEY 18 52 0.41 32.66 39.81 46.51 11.66 0.00 0.10 0.00 9.07 8.50 0.27 0.05 13.20 
UAE 1 2 0.02 42.46 37.07 36.05 54.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.01 9.12 0.13 0.01 12.11 
UK 151 695 5.46 74.73 72.08 76.37 75.73 0.15 0.85 0.06 10.05 8.61 0.74 0.12 10.31 
USA 778 4,856 38.16 55.00 42.93 48.00 74.07 0.13 0.92 0.08 9.63 9.21 0.40 0.07 9.19 
Total 2,614 12,724 100 44.24 47.84 51.56 33.25 0.04 0.21 0.01 7.64 8.68 0.25 0.04 10.27 
  










TABLE 3.4 (Continued) 
Sample Description 
Panel 2. Distribution by industry 
Industry Firms Num Obs Cum. 
ESG 
Index 














Oil & Gas                      148             691  5.43 56.11 53.03 53.91 61.40 0.52 0.64 0.05 8.19 9.32 0.25 0.07  9.50 
Basic Materials          246          1,035  8.13 56.26 64.80 58.88 45.11 0.16 0.39 0.03 7.32 8.55 0.19 0.04  8.90 
Industrials          449          2,115  16.62 51.72 58.38 51.48 45.31 0.08 0.37 0.02 8.18 8.61 0.24 0.04  8.77 
Consumer Goods          299          1,495  11.75 50.49 56.80 52.75 41.93 0.04 0.61 0.02 7.93 8.69 0.25 0.05  8.94 
Healthcare          161             839  6.59 50.68 43.76 51.00 57.27 0.00 0.81 0.06 8.34 9.03 0.25 0.07  8.87 
Consumer Services          350          1,806  14.19 45.08 39.81 44.66 50.76 0.02 0.64 0.05 8.94 8.70 0.33 0.07  9.78 
Telecommunications            90             397  3.12 51.19 49.83 56.30 47.44 0.01 0.68 0.03 8.63 9.41 0.33 0.05  10.70 
Utilities          129             677  5.32 61.55 66.69 60.32 57.66 0.17 0.27 0.04 8.03 9.01 0.40 0.03  8.90 
Financials          592          2,846  22.37 42.21 36.99 41.37 48.27 0.01 0.39 0.05 7.70 8.93 0.36 0.03  9.73 
Technology          150             823  6.47 52.93 50.87 50.21 57.73 0.02 0.82 0.06 8.07 8.98 0.15 0.06  9.05 
Total 2,614 12,724 100 51.82 52.10 52.09 51.29 0.10 0.56 0.04 8.13 8.92 0.27 0.05  9.31 
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Figure 3.3 These figures show the trends from 2003 to 2012 for environmental and social 
scores as measured by ASSET4 for all the firms in the sample for each year. Scores go 
from 0 to 100% and are lagged by one year. As we can observe, environmental and social 
trends are quite similar. In the case of members, environmental scores fluctuated between 
a range of 60%-80% whereas the social score vary from approximately 65% to 80%. On 
the other hand, non-members and the average score remain almost steady over the ten 





143.3 Corporate Governance - Society 
 



































Figure 3.4. These figures show the trends from 2003 to 2012 for corporate governance 
scores and ESG on average. Both dimensions are lagged by one year and values can go 
from 0 to 100%. The governance score is provided by ASSET4.The ESG score is the 
average of the environmental, social and governance scores. As we can observe, the 
governance score is lower for members than for non-members over the first four years. 
Then, it remains almost the same for both groups. The average of the three categories is 
also higher for members than for no members and with a pattern similar to the 





This section presents the results obtained from the EHA. I discuss the implication of 
these results in relation with the research question that I established at the beginning 
of the chapter.  
 
3.4.1. ESG Practices as a Driver for UNGC Adoption (H1) 
Table 3.5 shows the results for the full sample. In general, the ESG score show to be 
significant and positively related to the adoption of the UNGC. The social score has 
the largest impact of the three dimensions, followed by the environmental and 
governance scores, which are also less significant. When different geographical 
regions are considered instead of market economy, the governance score is negative. 
Therefore H1 is supported. 
 
3.4.2. Members ESG changes over time (H2) 
To test changes over time, I split the sample in three groups as homogenous as possible 
in terms of number of years. I needed these groups to be large enough to identify 
changes in ESG scores but not too small so I could not be able to identify subtle 
changes. The sample is therefore split in three subsamples: Group 1 firms listed from 
2003-2005; Group 2, firms listed from 2006-2009; and, Group 3, firms from 2010-
2012 (see Table 3.6). Table 3.7 presents the binary and categorical variables for the 
full sample and also for each of the three categories or groups. We can observed that 
firms in the dirty industry have smoothly increased while the number of firms in liberal 
economies has decreased by approximately 15%. The number of firms located in 
Europe and USA and Canada has decreased over the years by 12% and 20% 




and firms in the rest of the world in the sample increased by 5.75%. Finally, Tables 
3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 show the correlations and descriptive statistics for the three groups. 
The total number of observations used in Group 1 is 1,905; in the Group 2 is 4,567 
and in Group 3 is 4,392. All the correlations follow a similar pattern to the full sample. 
However, we can observed that correlations between environmental, social and 
governance scores became stronger over time. 
 Table 3.11 shows the results for Group 1. We can observe that the impact of 
ESG on the adoption of the UNGC is significant but smaller than in the general model. 
The table also shows that at the beginning of the initiative only the social score was 
important to decide the CSR strategy. The number of employees is highly significant 
in all the models for this group.  
 Table 3.12 presents results for Group 2, these show positive relationship 
between ESG and the UNGC. In this case, the social score is slightly larger than for 
early adopters and more significant. In addition, the governance score has a marginal 
impact when the market economy is included but not when is substituted by the 
geographical region. Size is marginally significant. 
 Results for Group 3 are reported in Table 3.13 and show a stronger and 
significant relationship between the ESG and the UNGC. This relationship is even 
stronger than in the general model.  Social score is the strongest of the three, followed 
by the environmental score. The governance score is marginally significant when the 
market economy is included. Size is somewhat significant. 
 Hypothesis 2 is also supported. The three subsamples show differences in their 






3.4.3. Controversial Actions (H3) 
Contrary to my expectations, environmental, social and governance controversies are 
not an incentive to become member of the UNGC (Table 3.5). I consider the existence 
of controversies for the three subsamples but they were non-significant in any case. 
Market economy is significant and negatively related to the adoption of the 
UNGC. Size measured by the number of employees is significant; however, all other 
control variables are non-significant. Industry and leverage are marginally significant 
when the geographical regions are considered. Whereas ROA is negative and 
significant. Interesting enough is that there is not significant impact from European 
firms in the adoption of the Ten Principles. 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported, the existence of controversies is not related to 

















Testing ESG Performance on the Adoption of the UNGC (Full Sample) 
  Model 1        Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8    
ESG Index 0.037*** 
 0.037***  0.030***  0.030***               
Environmental Score  
0.007*  0.007*  0.010**  0.010**  
Social Score  
0.021***  0.021***  0.021***  0.021*** 
CG Score  
0.006+  0.006+  -0.005+  -0.005+   
Total Env Contro 
  -0.025 -0.019   -0.123 -0.081 
Total Soc Contro 
  0.002 0.011   0.009 0.018 
Total CG Contro 
  -0.286 -0.306   -0.461 -0.480 
Employees 0.083*  0.097** 0.083* 0.097** -0.032 0.018 -0.030 0.018 
Market Value 0.006 -0.011 0.012 -0.010 0.149* 0.079 0.165* 0.086 
Closely  held shares -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 
Dirty Industry  0.049 0.073 0.052 0.076 0.215+ 0.158 0.237+ 0.171 
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001+ -0.001 -0.001+ -0.001 
ROA -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.019**  -0.015* -0.020** -0.016*   
Market Economy  -2.198*** -1.991*** -2.182*** -1.974*** 
                 
Region - Asia & 
Pacific 
     -0.868**  -0.813**  -0.867**  -0.817** 
Region - Europe 
    -0.112 0.084 -0.102 0.089 
Region - Canada & 
US 
     -2.235***  -1.581***  -2.216***  -1.571*** 
Intercept  -5.503*** -5.509*** -5.556*** -5.521***  -5.284***  -5.294***  -5.445***  -5.362*** 
Log likelihood -1154.143 -1150.029 -1153.726 -1149.588 -1180.928 -1163.044 -1179.284 -1161.726 
#Obs. 
       
10,872  
       
10,872  
       
10,872  
       
10,872  
       
10,872  
       
10,872  
       
10,872  
       
10,872  
 + p<0.1, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001  

















Distribution of Year-Membership 
Adoption Year Joined Did not join 
Total number of 
firms 
Group 1 
2003 35 490 525 
2004 20 551 571 
2005 15 1,035 1,050 
Group 2 
2006 30 1,300 1,330 
2007 26 1,314 1,340 
2008 46 1,350 1,396 
2009 50 1,413 1,463 
Group 3 
2010 43 1,471 1,514 
2011 49 1,708 1,757 
2012 44 1,734 1,778 
  Total 358 12,366 12,724 
This table shows the number of firms that decided to adopt/not to adopt the UNGC during 
the period 2003-2012 (358 out of 2,614). Firms are tracked from 2003 until the moment they 
adopt the initiative. Those firms that did not join over the 10-years period appear in each 

























 Comparison of Binary and Categorical Variables 
 Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
  (n = 12,724) (n = 2,146) (n = 5,529) (n = 5,049) 
Dirty Industry   3,841  30.19% 575 26.79%          1,628  29.44%          1,638  32.44% 
Other industries   8,883  69.81% 1,571 73.21%          3,901  70.56%          3,411  67.56% 
Chi2=25.3516, p<0.001  





Liberal Economies   7,572  59.51% 1,482 69.06%          3,344  60.48%          2,746  54.39% 
Coordinated Economies   5,152  40.49% 664 30.94%          2,185  39.52%          2,303  45.61% 
Chi2=138.3622, p<0.001         
Asia & Pacific   4,775  37.53%             394  18.36%          2,098  37.95%          2,283  45.22% 
Europe   2,316  18.20%             554  25.82%          1,048  18.95%             714  14.14% 
USA & Canada   5,261  41.35% 1,191 55.50%          2,325  42.05%          1,745  34.56% 
Rest of the world      372  2.92% 7 0.33%               58  1.05%             307  6.08% 
Chi2=854.6162, p<0.001         
This table shows the distribution of companies participating in the study at different points in time: Group 1 
(n=2,146), Group 2 (n=5,529) and Group 3 (n=5,049). Percentages of firms in the dirty industry has 
increased over time, contrary to firms based on countries with liberal economies which has decreased. 
Regarding the region where fims are located, the number of firms from Europe and USA & Canada regions 
has decreased while more companies from Asia & Pacific and from the rest of the worls has increased over 











Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics (Group 1) 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ESG Index 1.0000            
2 EnvScore 0.7476*** 1.0000           
3 
Number of Env 
Controversies 
0.1297*** 0.0912** 1.0000          
4 SocScore 0.8459*** 0.6342*** 0.1097*** 1.0000         
5 
Number of Soc 
Controversies 
0.1748*** 0.0987** 0.1128*** 0.1496*** 1.0000        
6 CGScore 0.5138*** -0.0675 0.0726 0.1538*** 0.1207*** 1.0000       
7 
Number of CG 
Controversies 
0.0176 0.0032 0.0485 0.0176 0.1276*** 0.0166 1.0000      
8 Employees (ln) 0.4178*** 0.0563 0.0871* 0.3160*** 0.1548*** 0.5126*** 0.0699 1.0000     
9 Market Value (ln) 0.3944*** 0.2223*** 0.0796* 0.3714*** 0.2459*** 0.2397*** 0.1131*** 0.3820*** 1.0000    
10 Leverage 0.2371*** 0.0442 -0.0079 0.1713*** -0.015 0.2862*** 0.0564 0.4564*** 0.0774+ 1.0000   
11 ROA 0.0966** -0.0561 0.0296 0.0679 0.0284 0.1941*** -0.0240 0.1858*** 0.1074*** 0.0079 1.0000  
12 Closely Held Shares (ln) -0.0197  -0.0972** -0.0035 0.0874* 0.0317 -0.028 -0.0050 0.2976*** 0.0499 0.1568*** 0.0892** 1.0000 
  
Obs 
         
2,146  
         
2,146  
         
2,146  
         
2,146  
         
2,146  
         
2,146  
         
2,146  
1,980 2,029 2,007 1,986 1,951 
 
Mean 49.77 46.83 0.04 48.15 0.37 54.33 0.04 9.00 8.98 0.37 0.05 9.54 
 
Std. Dev. 22.93 31.74 0.29 30.70 1.18 31.01 0.24 2.16 1.17 0.33 0.08 2.36 
 
Min 8.68 11.94 0.00 5.51 0.00 1.32 0.00 1.61 -0.89 0.00 -0.80 0.00 
  Max 97.56 97.32 4.00 98.73 23.00 98.75 4.00 14.35 12.86 4.38 0.48 16.77 
The table shows the correlation for 1,905 observations from 2003-2005. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10. This table also shows the descriptive 











Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics (Group 2) 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ESG Index 1.0000            
2 EnvScore 0.7798*** 1.0000           
3 
Number of Env 
Controversies 
0.1584*** 0.1114*** 1.0000   
   
    
4 SocScore 0.8823*** 0.7084*** 0.1120** 1.0000   
      
5 
Number of Soc 
Controversies 
0.2534*** 0.1995*** 0.2590*** 0.1801*** 1.0000        
6 CGScore 0.6242*** 0.0801*** 0.1364*** 0.3256*** 0.1966*** 1.0000       
7 
Number of CG 
Controversies 
0.0919*** 0.0497 0.1437*** 0.0788*** 0.2516*** 0.0811*** 1.0000      
8 Employees (ln) 0.5427*** 0.1321*** 0.1215*** 0.3711*** 0.2506*** 0.7263*** 0.1141*** 1.0000     
9 Market Value (ln) 0.4720*** 0.3124*** 0.1750*** 0.4224*** 0.3233*** 0.3441*** 0.1243*** 0.4401*** 1.0000    
10 Leverage 0.2207*** 0.0202 0.0143 0.1357*** 0.0596** 0.3427*** 0.0392 0.3916*** 0.1066*** 1.0000   
11 ROA 0.1824*** -0.0238 0.0674*** 0.0985*** 0.0702*** 0.3359*** 0.0178 0.3676*** 0.2196*** 0.1146*** 1.0000  
12 Closely Held Shares (ln) 0.1300*** 
 -
0.0713*** 
0.0315 0.1046*** 0.0619** 0.2613*** 0.0308 0.4706*** 0.1532*** 0.1992*** 0.2057*** 1.0000 
  
Obs 
         
5,529  
         
5,529  
         
5,529  
         
5,529  
         
5,529  
         
5,529  
         
5,529  
4,758 5,048 5,009 4,990 4,819 
 Mean 49.12 49.01 0.05 48.74 0.41 49.62 0.03 7.99 8.85 0.29 0.05 9.11 
 Std. Dev. 24.08 32.03 0.34 30.22 1.50 32.05 0.20 2.68 1.15 0.45 0.09 2.53 
 Min 4.95 9.45 0.00 3.43 0.00 1.38 0.00 0.00 -1.97 -12.01 -1.52 0.69 
  Max 97.03 97.07 11.00 98.87 35.00 97.47 5.00 14.56 13.15 16.69 1.18 18.95 
The table shows the correlation for 4,567 observations from 2006-2009. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10. This table also shows the descriptive 











Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics (Group 3) 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ESG Index 1.0000            
2 EnvScore 0.8430*** 1.0000           
3 
Number of Env 
Controversies 
0.1683*** 0.1122*** 1.0000          
4 SocScore 0.8930*** 0.7806*** 0.12146** 1.0000   
      
5 
Number of Soc 
Controversies 
0.2286*** 0.1872*** 0.2115*** 0.1451*** 1.0000        
6 CGScore 0.7071*** 0.2877*** 0.1745*** 0.4167*** 0.2216*** 1.0000       
7 
Number of CG 
Controversies 
0.0845*** 0.0515+ 0.0999*** 0.0349 0.3949*** 0.1166*** 1.0000      
8 Employees (ln) 0.4875*** 0.1987*** 0.1520*** 0.3225*** 0.2864*** 0.6564*** 0.1415*** 1.0000     
9 Market Value (ln) 0.4212*** 0.2961*** 0.2516*** 0.3596*** 0.4200*** 0.3707*** 0.1511*** 0.4330*** 1.0000    
10 Leverage 0.1943*** 0.0771*** 0.0359 0.1127*** 0.0789*** 0.2783*** 0.0626** 0.2823*** 0.1083*** 1.0000   
11 ROA 0.2202*** 0.0483 0.0740*** 0.1333*** 0.0937*** 0.3481*** 0.0104 0.3500*** 0.2168*** 0.0257 1.0000  
12 Closely Held Shares (ln) 0.0309 
 -
0.0842*** 
0.0027 0.0248 0.0255 0.1320*** 0.0241 0.4503*** 0.1251*** 0.0875*** 0.1212*** 1.0000 
  
Obs 
          
5,049  
          
5,049  
         
5,049  
         
5,049  
         
5,049  
         
5,049  
         
5,049  
4,538 5,033 5,026 4,979 4,886 
 
Mean 50.13 51.76 0.11 51.25 0.70 47.37 0.06 7.80 8.76 0.24 0.04 9.34 
 
Std. Dev. 25.40 31.32 0.59 30.02 2.48 32.05 0.33 2.70 1.02 0.54 0.08 2.85 
 
Min 5.05 8.61 0.00 3.75 0.00 1.24 0.00 0.00 4.69 -19.73 -0.75 0.00 
  Max 95.57 95.01 11.00 97.87 57.00 96.87 6.00 14.60 12.91 5.72 1.19 19.50 
The table shows the correlation for 4,392 observations from 2010-2012. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10. This table also shows the descriptive 
statistics for all numeric variables. 
















Testing ESG Performance on the Adoption of the UNGC (Group 1) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ESG Index 0.029*** 
 0.029***  0.026**  0.027**  
Environmental Score 
 0.003  0.004  0.007  0.007 
Social Score 
 0.018*  0.018*  0.019*  0.019* 
CG Score 
 0.008  0.008  -0.001  -0.001 
Total Env Contro 
 
 
-0.134 -0.168  
 
-0.272 -0.389 
Total Soc Contro 
 
 
0.010 0.013  
 
0.041 0.029 
Total CG Contro 
 
 
-0.358 -0.377  
 
-0.439 -0.460 
Employees 0.386*** 0.374*** 0.387*** 0.374*** 0.299** 0.308** 0.299** 0.309** 
Market Value -0.022 -0.033 -0.023 -0.034 0.150 0.090 0.148 0.087 
Closely                        0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 
Dirty Industries 0.039 0.090 0.043 0.097 0.159 0.129 0.172 0.144 
Leverage -0.011+ -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.018** -0.017** -0.018** -0.017** 
ROA -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.050** -0.046* -0.049** -0.045* 
Market Economy -4.378*** -4.339*** -4.367*** -4.324*** 
    
Region - Asia & 
Pacific 
    -2.215+ -2.167+ -2.383+ -2.438+ 
Region - Europe 
    -1.085 -1.084 -1.248 -1.349 
Region - Canada & 
US 
    -5.693*** -5.204*** -5.848*** -5.439*** 
Intercept -6.605*** -6.453*** -6.615*** -6.463*** -5.844** -5.594** -5.693** -5.352** 
Log likelihood -174.475 -173.691 -174.385 -173.579 -182.888 -180.984 -182.644 -180.661 
#Obs. 
         
1,906  
         
1,906  
         
1,906  
         
1,906  
         
1,906  
         
1,906  
         
1,906  
         
1,906  
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001               
















Testing ESG Performance on the Adoption of the UNGC (Group 2) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ESG Index 0.032*** 
 0.032***  0.028***  0.028***  
Employees         0.107+ 0.100 0.105+ 0.097 -0.059 -0.022 -0.062 -0.026 
Market Value 0.071 0.069 0.059 0.052 0.229* 0.177+ 0.227* 0.166 
Closely held shares -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 
Dirty Industries 0.138 0.203 0.116 0.183 0.316 0.299 0.319 0.294 
Leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003+ -0.003 -0.003+ -0.003 
ROA -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.021* -0.020+ -0.021* -0.020+   
Market Economy  -1.892*** -1.888*** -1.907*** -1.907*** 
                 
Environmental Score 
 0.003  0.002  0.005  0.005 
Social Score 
 0.020***  0.020***  0.022***  0.022*** 
CG Score 
 0.010+  0.010+  -0.004  -0.004 
Total Env Contro 
 
 0.120 0.120 
 
 -0.009 0.034 
Total Soc Contro 
 
 0.014 0.027 
 
 0.025 0.037 
Total CG Contro 
 
 -0.159 -0.164 
 
 -0.281 -0.324 
Region - Asia & 
Pacific 
   
 
-0.449 -0.371 -0.450 -0.376 
Region - Europe 
   
 
0.627 0.876 0.639 0.888 
Region - Canada & 
US 
   
 
-1.170 -0.548 -1.166 -0.542 
Intercept -6.080*** -6.007*** -5.954*** -5.828*** -6.270*** -6.246*** -6.233*** -6.123*** 
Log likelihood -480.529 -478.938 -480.281 -478.582 -488.261 -483.289 -488.043 -482.918 
#Obs.  
         
4,571  
         
4,571  
         
4,571  
         
4,571  
         
4,571  
         
4,571  
         
4,571  
         
4,571  
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001               
















Testing ESG Performance on the Adoption of the UNGC (Group 3) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ESG Index  0.045*** 
 0.044***  0.040***  0.040***  
Environmental Score 
 0.012*  0.012*  0.018**  0.018**  
Social Score 
 0.022***  0.021***  0.018**  0.018**  
CG Score 
 0.009+  0.009+  0.002  0.002 
Total Env Contro 
  -0.107 -0.097   -0.164 -0.128 
Total Soc Contro 
  0.013 0.017   0.029 0.028 
Total CG Contro 
  -0.513 -0.527   -0.668 -0.677 
Employees -0.076 -0.057 -0.075 -0.057 -0.112* -0.067 -0.111* -0.067 
Market Value -0.017 -0.029 -0.004 -0.021 0.050 0.013 0.059 0.021 
Closely held shares 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Dirty Industries -0.039 -0.038 -0.020 -0.021 0.056 0.003 0.085 0.025 
Leverage 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
ROA 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 
Market Economy  -1.729*** -1.531*** -1.687*** -1.488*** 
               
Region - Asia & 
Pacific 
    -0.840* -0.863* -0.839* -0.862*   
Region - Europe 
    -0.793* -0.720+ -0.785* -0.716+   
Region - Canada & 
US 
    -2.387*** -2.061*** -2.360*** -2.042*** 
Intercept -4.901*** -4.983*** -5.010*** -5.052*** -4.487*** -4.640*** -4.579*** -4.708*** 
Log likelihood -471.670 -470.621 -471.045 -470.000 -474.853 -470.859 -473.654 -469.802 
#Obs. 
         
4,395  
         
4,395  
         
4,395  
         
4,395  
         
4,395  
         
4,395  
         
4,395  
         
4,395  
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001               
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3.4.4. Expelled Firms from the UNGC 
This sections shows expelled firms based in the US. The US was used as sample as 
there are not many delisted firms in the sample. As of 19/06/2016 the number of  large 
companies, SMEs, NGOs and other organizations based on the US and members of 
the UNGC was 970; however, only 372 were active, 369 were already delisted and 
229 where classified as non-communicating. The US local network had 709 members 
as of April 2014 (UNGC, 2016d) fact that might indicate a real involvement of 
different organizations with the initiative; however, the performance and impact of 
the American local network is out of the scope of this paper. Figure 3.5 shows the 
status of the US entities that have joined the Global Compact. From 372 active entities, 
128 are large public and private companies. The number of delisted members is about 
the same than the number of active members, but the figure of large companies is 
smaller (74) than in the previous category. On the other hand, the percentage of large 
companies in the non-communicating status is very small in relation to the total (3%). 
The delisting policy was set up in 2005; since then and until the time of this report 
(June, 2016), 48 US firms had been expelled. From this number 32 are private, 8 are 
public and 8 were not identified. As we can see from Figure 3.6, 35% of the firms 
expelled remained in the initiative for about 2 years while only 4% stayed for 7 years, 
this is, just 2 firms. One of these firms belongs to the private sector within the mining 
industry and its last report was submitted in 2013. The other one is also a private firm 
in the construction industry. Figure 3.8 shows that 13 out of the 17 firms that became 
UNGC members in 2011, were expelled in 2013. General Industrials sector has the 
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highest number of delisted firms (Figure 3.8). All the delisted firms in the USA are 





Figure 3.6 Adapted from Our Participants (UNGC,2016c). Retrieved from 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants on 19/06/2016. 
Figure 3.5 Adapted from Our Participants (UNGC,2016c). Retrieved from 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants on 19/06/2016. 
183.5 UN-UNGC Membership 
193.7 Enrolled / Expelled to the UNGC 2003-2016 











Figure 3.8 Adapted from Our Participants (UNGC,2016c). Retrieved from 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants on 19/06/2016. 
Figure 3.7 Adapted from Our Participants (UNGC,2016c). Retrieved from 
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Enrolled / Expelled to the UNGC
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Enrolled Expelled
213.8 Companies Expelled by Sector 
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3.5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
My findings show a positive relationship between corporate social performance and 
the adoption of the UNGC as a CSR strategy for corporate disclosure. According to 
Mallin et al. (2013) firms tend to report more when the social performance is poor and 
report more when the environmental performance is high. The governance score 
shows a weak relationship with the UNGC, this might indicate process and outcomes 
under this heading do not get any benefit from the adoption of the UNGC namely 
reputation. 
 Contrary to what many parties criticize about the UNGC, my results show that 
it is not use as a bluewashing tool. However, these results need to be taken with 
caution, as I only consider the existence but not the number or strength of the 
controversy. It would be interesting to consider this variation in the model. 
 Surprisingly, my results show that size is not significant to make a decision of 
support the Ten Principles. It was significant at the beginning of the initiative but 
attending only to the number of employees and not to the market value. It was 
somewhat important during the following years but currently is not. This might 
suggest that large, notable firms were looking for the first mover advantage and 
followers and late adopters just went with the flow. 
 My findings are also in line with those of academics highlighting the 
uninterested participation of American firms in the Ten Principles (Arevalo et al., 
2013; Coulmont and Berthelot, 2015; Janney, Dess and Forlani, 2009). 
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a non-repeated event (adoption 
of the UNGC for the first time) and do not consider those cases when firms decide not 
to continue being members of the initiative and then join again. Further research can 
focus on this. As I focus on a single event (joined) I either consider when firms are 
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classified as non-communicating or the time for firms to be expelled from the 
initiative. So, future research can use EHA for multiple kinds of events to analyse how 
long does a company remain as a member of the initiative and their reasons to leave. 
Additionally, this study starts in 2003 due to data availability. Constructing a 
new database based in literature on reporting might be useful to replicate this study 
from 2000. 
A limitation to my study is the ASSET4 database. Despite the efforts of rating 
and ranking agencies on the one hand and of academics on the other to measure CSR, 
it is still challenging to find a consensus to assess the results of the implementation of 
policies and programmes related to environmental, social and corporate governance 
issues. Most of the agencies look at information provided by firms themselves on their 
websites, annual reports (financial and non-financial), and other sources. Due to the 
lack of general accepted principles to report non-financial information, firms might 
report much in one aspect, for instance implementation of policies, but omit to report 
about their results (likely the most important); making information difficult to 
compare across firms, industries, countries, etcetera. By providing this information 
firms legitimize their actions, produce long-term relationships with their stakeholders, 
manage their image, and if done properly, create competitive advantage. For this 
reason, it is very important to understand what the available information is telling us.   
Chatterji et al. (2009) analyse the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research and 
Analytics (KLD) which covers only US firms. The authors find that KLD hardly 
measures the quality of firms’ environmental management systems; however, they do 
well in spotting firms with an overall negative past environmental performance. The 
authors also suggest that there is not need to summarize the aggregates within 1/0 
category, but it would be more useful for the stakeholders to have a manageable 
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continuous measure. In line with this study, Semenova and Hassel (2015) compares 
the environmental component of three providers: KLD, ASSET4 and GES. She 
highlights that the strengths and concerns provided by KLD must not be combined 
within a single score as their composition is different. Furthermore, the study shows 
that KLD strengths, GES and ASSET4 are significantly correlated; whereas, KLD 
concerns, GES environmental risk and CO2 Emissions reported by ASSET4 are also 
highly correlated. 
Mackenzie and Rees (2011) compare the similar dimensions from both 
ASSET4 and FTSE4GOOD and find that they are positively and significantly 
correlated. The study also shows that there are some differences caused by the 
measurement method, particularly regarding to risk adjustment. The authors suggest 
that ASSET4 score increases with high-risk while FTSE4GOOD method is more 
rigorous and therefore, the score for firms with high-risk tend to decrease. 
Furthermore, Delmas et al. (2013) present an analysis of the environmental 
score produced by three CSR providers: KLD Research and Analytics, Trucost, and 
Sustainable Asset Management (SAM) (which produces the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Indexes). The authors focus on the environmental element (process and performance) 
of CSR as it is covered by most of the providers and also is easier to quantify (i.e. 
compared with social practices). Results show that the two aggregates can explain up 
to 80% of the data variation, and that financial performance is linked to processes (i.e. 









The UNGC can be considered as a mechanism to legitimize current CSR practices and 
performance. By reporting through the UNGC firms respond to institutional pressures 
(e.g. NGO´s and unions). Research suggest that firms issuing a standalone voluntary 
report should be recompensed as they tend to be more transparent than those issuing 
a different report (Mahoney et al. 2013; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011). My finding show 
that the UNGC is more attractive to report social and environmental performance than 
to report governance improvements. It could be the case that stakeholders rely more 
in this type of initiatives for social and environmental reporting while for governance 
issues they trust more in specific local initiatives as for instance, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. 
 We can also conclude that there are changes in the characteristics of members 
joining the initiative. If it is true that for instance early adopters or leaders are moved 
by a competitive advantage (Porter and Kramer, 2016); followers or late adopters may 
want to legitimize their performance by participating in the same initiative. However, 
the level of corporate social performance between early and late adopters is different 
due to the institutional pressures latent at the time of adoption. More specifically, 
Group 1 in my study was characterized for reporting social performance whereas in 
Group 3, firms joining the UNGC besides reporting social performance, it was 
important to show some degree of environmental and corporate governance 
performance. 
In addition, although some academics mention the UNGC as a symbolic 
initiative, my results do not reflect that perspective at least from an analysis based on 
the number of existing controversies.  Prior research has lighted the possibility of 
using voluntary CSR initiatives to uncover unhealthy practices but at the same time 
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has proposed different practices that can be applied in order to use the available 
information in substitution of mandatory frameworks. 
Finally, it would be interesting to look deeper into expelled firms. 
Unfortunately, for this case, there were not many expelled firms within the sample 
neglecting the opportunity of carrying out further statistical analysis. A point that can 
be rescued from this brief analysis is that listed firms have the institutional pressures 
of reporting on CSR actions and results and therefore, they are less prone to leave the 
initiative. It is important to mention that most of the expelled firms are the result of 
not comply with the Communication on Progress report. 
This study is particularly important for academics, policy makers, managers, 
responsible investors and other stakeholders interested in firms’ behaviour towards 
CSR voluntary initiatives. In the academic field, this paper adds to the literature on 
CSR, particularly, to the understanding of the role of the United Nation Global 
Compact in the diffusion and legitimation of CSR practices. For policy makers, the 
findings of this paper contribute to the understanding of the behaviour and strategy 
used by the membership of these frameworks. Managers can find in this paper, 
elements to support their strategic decisions related to CSR implementation and 
legitimation. Stakeholder activists (responsible investors, employees, NGOs and other 
stakeholders) might find this paper useful for engagement purposes (i.e. understanding 
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This paper explores the relationship between the board of directors and the adoption 
of Voluntary CSR Initiatives, namely United Nations Global Compact (UNGC). 
Drawing upon corporate governance and management literature and primary based on 
Institutional Theory, I examine if and how CSR oriented boards of directors are related 
to the adoption of these type of initiatives. Furthermore, I consider the existence of 
environmental and social practices as a mediator of the relationship. According to 
prior literature, the board of directors can be seen as a) an agent for controlling CEO 
performance and behaviour, and b) as a supplier of resources, which includes advice, 
service and counselling. The latter function provides a link between the firm and its 
stakeholders. In addition, the environmental and social performance contribute to the 
selection of the strategy to communicate with stakeholders. The study of the 
relationship between these three elements has received little attention; therefore, this 
paper adds to the literature on this area. The sample consists of all the firms in the 
ASSET4 database based in the USA. The period of study covers from 2002 to 2013. 
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The relationships are analysed using structural equation modelling (SME). I consider 
multiple dimensions to define the board of directors and the environmental and social 
constructs (latent variables). Results show that the characteristics of the management 
in the selection of the strategy, i.e. the UNGC and the GRI. These findings add to the 
growing literature on the influence of executives on the establishment of CSR 
strategies. 
 
Key words: board of directors, voluntary CSR initiatives, environmental and social 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter investigates the link between the characteristics of the board of directors, 
and voluntary CSR initiatives among US-based firms. I consider the existence of 
environmental and social performance as a mediator of this relationship. In addition, 
I compare the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) to the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), two of the most prominent initiatives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, to identify any similarities and differences in the characteristics of the 
management. I depart from the premise that management adopt these initiatives 
mainly for two reasons: as a mechanism for reputation management and to 
communicate with their stakeholders. Examples such as the recent Volkswagen 
scandal regarding faulty carbon emission tests and the subsequent resignation of the 
CEO suggests that executives are to some extent held responsible for misleading 
product strategies related to the impact on the environment. Furthermore, the growing 
concern of stakeholders (e.g. investors, consumer and employees) about climate 
change, social practices and ethical behaviour of business demands the attention of 
managers (Mitchell et al., 1997; Stern, 2006; UN, 2016; UKCode, 2016). 
Prior research has focused on the influence of corporate governance on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure (Liao, Luo and Tang, 2015; Michelon 
and Parbonetti, 2012; Orlitzky, Siegel and Waldman, 2011) and on corporate social 
performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mallin and Michelon, 2011). More 
recently, the link between these three elements has been explored (Mallin et al., 2013; 
Shaukat, Qui and Trojanowski, 2016). In this chapter, I also establish a relationship 
between the board of directors, the corporate social performance and the CSR 
disclosure but using a different approach, I compare two voluntary CSR initiatives 
used as part of the strategy for communication with stakeholders. Rasche, Waddock 
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and McIntosh (2013) mention that in order to measure the impact of the UNGC, “the 
key challenge will be to isolate the effects of the Global Compact participation, as 
firms often have implemented social and environmental policies before joining the 
initiative” (pp 17-18). This last suggestion supports the path between corporate social 
performance and the adoption of similar initiatives.  
The board of directors has received attention from two streams of the academic 
literature. Traditionally, agency theory has depicted the board as a monitoring 
mechanism to protect the interest of the shareholders (principals) from the personal 
interest of the CEO (agent) (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Meckling and Jensen, 1976). 
However, directors have also been conceptualized from the perspective of resource 
dependence theory as a mechanism for connecting the firm with the external 
environment in order to guarantee its survival (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 
1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). This conceptualization has been extended to the 
CSR field to understand why and how different types of directors can promote more 
environmental and social practices within their organization. For instance, Mallin and 
Michelon (2011) find that independent, community influential and female directors 
are positively associated with corporate social performance whereas CEO duality is 
negatively related. Shaukat et al. (2016) reinforce Mallin and Michelon’s (2011) 
findings by treating endogeneity between CSP and board CSR orientation and find 
that firms with superior CSP tend to further strengthen their board CSR orientation. 
In this paper, I examine four characteristics of the board membership: female 
directors, independent directors, CSR committees and CEO duality.  
In addition to the resource dependence theory, this study also relies on the 
resource-based view to complement the understanding of the reasons for 
implementing environmental and social practices and adopting voluntary initiatives. 
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Barney (2001) points out that the resource-based view analyses the sources that firms 
have to create and sustain a competitive advantage. Hart (1995) proposes a new 
approach to this theory by considering the natural environment of the firm. In the study 
of strategic CSR, Porter and Kramer (2006) suggest that “creating shared value 
should be viewed like research and development, as a long-term investment in a 
company’s future competitiveness” (p.13). In this sense, investing in environmental 
and social practices, programmes and strategies in support of different stakeholders 
can be considered as a driver for creating competitive advantage and enhancing 
reputation. 
The sample comprises all the firms in the ASSET4 database with headquarters 
in the USA for the period 2002-2013. The USA was selected for this study for two 
main reasons. First, the USA´s corporate governance institutions are well established. 
And second, the USA has the largest number of firms participating in the financial 
markets which provides more variability in the dataset I am using (see Table 2.9 in 
Chapter 2). 
The key questions of this study are: a) what characteristics of the board of 
directors encourage the adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives? b) Are the levels of 
environmental and social performance a driver for the adoption of such initiatives? In 
order to answer these questions, I use structural equation modelling (SEM). SEM is 
based on linear regression, path analysis and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
which is appropriate for answering the research questions established.  
Findings show that CSR oriented boards of directors, particularly with CSR 
committees, support the adoption of voluntary CSR initiative through corporate social 
performance. This is in line with resource dependence theory and resource based view, 
which in general suggest that this type of boards can enhance reputation and legitimize 
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corporate social performance, at the same time than creating a competitive advantage. 
My results also show that there is a greater support for the adoption of voluntary CSR 
initiatives from social performance than from environmental performance. 
This work provides a number of contributions. First, this study provides further 
evidence for the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and 
the selection of the CSR strategy.  Therefore, I add to the literature on corporate 
governance, on corporate social performance and CSR disclosure. Second, in terms of 
voluntary CSR reporting literature, previous research has surveyed CEOs to 
understand why they decide to join the initiative but to the best of my knowledge, this 
is the first study on the characteristics of the board of directors and the United Nations 
Global Compact/ Global Reporting Initiative. Third, I consider that this work might 
be beneficial for a number of stakeholders interested in promoting the voluntary 
adoption of CSR initiatives through the board of directors.  
The chapter has the following structure. First, I present the rationale and 
contribution of the study and draw the hypotheses from existent literature. The sample, 
data and methods used are described in the next section under the name ‘Research 
Design’. Then, I comment the outcome of the analysis using SEM. The next section 
contains a discussion of the results, lists the limitations of this paper and makes 
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4.2. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS 
4.2.1. Theoretical Framework 
The main questions this research aims to answer are which characteristics of the board 
of directors and what type of environmental and social performance are related to the 
adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives. Furthermore, I explore how the environmental 
and social performances change according to the firm´s strategy to gain legitimacy. 
The potential existence of these relationships is studied through the lens of resource 
dependence theory (RDT) and resource-based view perspective (RBV).  
Traditionally, the board of directors, its functions and composition, have been 
studied in the corporate governance field as an agent for controlling CEO performance 
and managerial activities on behalf of the shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) emphasize the 
existence of the board of directors as supplier of resources, namely legitimacy, 
networking, and advice and counselling among others. This function, also known as 
advice, strategic or service role, has been portrayed by academic researchers using 
resource dependence theory (Hillman, Canella and Paetzold, 2000; Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand, 1996; Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) and stakeholders’ 
theory. (Aguilera et al., 2007; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Luoma and Goodstein, 
1999; Hillman, Keim and Luce, 2001; Huse, 2005).  
Zahra and Pearce (1989) distinguish between two types of roles for directors 
in addition to the control role: strategy and service. Furthermore, Johnson et al. (1996) 
define a service role and a resource dependence role. Both papers rely on Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s (2003) original work (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) on resource dependence. 
From Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) perspective, the board of directors can be seen as a 
linkage that provides four benefits. The first one is a strategic role coming from 
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interconnecting directors among competitors. The second benefit refers to improving 
communication channels between external organizations and the firm. Third, directors 
can also secure support from outside elements. Finally, board members are regarded 
as a tool for generating or reinforcing the legitimacy of the firm. Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) analyse both controlling and resource provider roles and concludes that they 
do not exist separately but that they are embedded in each other. Resource dependence 
theory has also been employed to understand how directorates affect the 
environmental and social aspects namely performance, strategy and disclosure (e.g. 
Mallin and Michelon, 2011; Mallin et al., 2013; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; 
Shaukat et al., 2016).  
Resource dependency theory is closely related to Institutional Theory. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose that organizations imitate those organizations 
that have been institutionalized, and they do it through isomorphic processes (i.e. 
coercive, mimetic and normative). In so doing, organizations aim to gain legitimacy 
which is defined by Suchman as a ´generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions´ (1995, p. 574). 
Organizations can accept and conform or conversely can resist to those isomorphic 
processes as part of their strategy. Organizations, translated in this case to board of 
directors, will adapt to the institutionalized environment (i.e. adoption of the 
UNGC/GRI) if stakeholders demand to do it and the dependence of resources from 
these stakeholders is large (Oliver, 1991).  
I also use resource-based view approach to explain why companies would 
adopt CSR voluntary initiatives. Previous literature suggests that firms with skilled 
human resources can perform better creating competitive advantages (Castelo and 
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Lima, 2006; Clarkson, Li and Richardson, 2011, Hart, 1995, Porter and van der Linde, 
1995). In words of Hart (1995) “[r]esource-based theory takes the perspective that 
valuable, costly-to-copy firm resources and capabilities provide the key sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage” (p. 986). Hart (1995) proposes to consider the 
natural environment as a resource in addition to internal firm capabilities and other 
external factors originally considered by the resource-based perspective. In addition, 
Porter and Kramer (2006) point out that in order to success, companies need a strong 
society, and societies need companies suggesting that both actors should work under 
the principle of shared value. Furthermore, Castelo and Lima (2006) suggest that a 
disclosure of corporate information regarding its behaviour can enhance reputation, 
attracting and retaining better employees. Thus, it seems quite sensitive to think in the 
implementation of environmental and social practices to create a competitive 
advantage and possibly in adopting initiatives that can help them to achieve that aim.  
In this sense, Shaukat et al., (2016) argue that “firms with more CSR oriented 
boards (…) develop a more proactive and comprehensive board CSR strategy (…) 
such firms in turn achieve superior environmental and social performance” (p.570). 
Mallin et al. (2013) study the monitoring and resource dependence roles separately 
and their effect on the quality and extent of the environmental and social information 
disclosed, using as mediators ‘people’ and ‘product’ categories. In the model I show, 
I test a similar model to Mallin et al. (2013) but using two initiatives: the UNGC and 
the GRI.  
 
4.2.2. Board Composition 
The board of directors is an important piece within the firm structure to enhance 
responsible business. From agency theory, we learn that board members are an 
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important mechanism to balance the personal interest of the CEO with those of the 
shareholders; whereas from resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory we 
acknowledge the service role of the board where different stakeholders are represented 
offering some room for environmental and social practices. Mackenzie (2007) surveys 
UK market to analyse whether CSR performance is in line with the policies, 
programmes and standards established by the boardroom while complying with the 
country’s law where the participation of directors in setting this type of activities is 
compulsory. His findings suggest that directors should focus on tackle the 
incongruences presented by both the market failure (information asymmetry, absence 
of competition and externalities) and internal incentives (executive compensation 
systems) towards CSR performance; however, he also recognizes that attending the 
market place malfunctions is not a panacea for improving environmental and social 
performance as some aspects as discrimination of minority groups do not precisely 
result from such malfunctions. Therefore, board members must ensure that the 
programmes and policies are applied, and must also establish mechanism for 
controlling (i.e. measure and correct) them. 
Moreover, academic research has also paid attention to the attributes of board 
members that reinforce environmental and social practices. For instance, Mallin and 
Michelon (2011) find that board reputation has a positive effect on CSR more 
particularly when considering independent, community influential and female 
directors. I investigate four governance mechanisms of the dual role of the board: 
gender diversity, independent directors, CSR committee and CEO duality which are 
detailed in the next paragraphs. For the purpose of this chapter a CSR oriented board 
is the board of directors that supports the implementation of social and environmental 
policies and activities and their accountability through voluntary reporting initiatives. 
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4.2.2.1. Board Gender Diversity 
Evidence from academic research shows that the inclusion of women on the board of 
directors is growing and that it is related to higher social and environmental scores. In 
a number of countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Spain, 
the presence of female managers is mandatory having to comply with a quota (de 
Beaufort and Summers, 2014). In other countries such as Australia, Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America the approach is comply-or-explain 
(Labelle, Francoeur and Lakhal, 2015). Post, Rahman and Rubow, (2011) find that a 
critical mass of at least three women are needed to produce a change in environmental 
performance. Furthermore, Ben-Amar, Chang and McIlkenny, (2015) explores 
publicly listed Canadian firms, where there is not mandatory statement about the 
presence of women on the management, in order to determine the influence of females 
in strategic decisions as taking part of the Carbon Disclosure Project. Their findings 
suggest that at least two women are required to observe a positive impact on the 
disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions. In a similar study, Liao et al., (2015) find that 
the presence of women is important for both propensity and the level of GHG 
disclosure. Hillman, Canella and Harris, (2002) analyse the differences between 
women, racial minorities and white men directors finding that occupation, education, 
and patterns of directorship make a difference among the groups of study. This is, 
women and racial minorities have backgrounds in non-business careers, have higher 
levels of education, and join boards faster after their second directorship. From a 
different perspective, Nielsen and Huse (2010) also analyse the participation of 
women on boards but focusing on their contribution to decision-making and 
processes. They find that the main difference lies on the leadership style rather in the 
behaviour, for instance, strategic tasks benefits from the presence of women, 
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supporting important corporate practices such as those related to the society and the 
environment. These findings are supported by Mallin and Michelon (2011) study 
where women on the boardroom have a positive and significant relationship with 
community performance, employees’ relations and human rights dimensions. More 
recently, Al-Shaer and Zaman (2016) find the women have a positive and significant 
effect on the quality of ESG reporting. 
 In sum, I expect the percentage of women on the board to favour 
environmental and social practices. 
 
4.2.2.2. Independent Directors 
Current research in corporate governance and CSR indicates that independent 
directors are a critical element within the board as they bring an advantageous blend 
of backgrounds and knowledge to the company. In this regard, Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003) consider that a connection with an external organization can be achieved with 
the interlock of directors with the required expertise and skills. Furthermore, Pfeffer 
and Salancik (2003) argue that independent directors can provide support from outside 
organizations if the directors belong to any of those organizations (i.e. banks), and 
even if their functions are merely symbolic. Therefore, appointing outside directors is 
important for managing relations with different stakeholders.   
Taking these precedents to CSR, Johnson and Greening (1999) find positive 
results for the relationship between outsider directors and environmental and social 
performance, represented by product and people respectively, concluding that the 
diversification of the board makes it more sensitive to the needs of their stakeholders. 
The results from Post, Rahman and McQuillen, (2015) regarding the adoption of 
renewable energy strategic alliances show a positive relationship between the 
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alliances and independent directors. Liao et al. (2015) find that independent directors 
are positively related to disclosure propensity but not to the level of disclosure.  
Contrary to the literature presented, Gul and Leung (2004) find that 
experienced independent directors have a negative effect on voluntary disclosure; 
however, this voluntary disclosure refers to background information, financial 
performance information and non-financial performance. The latter contains a few 
items related to social or environmental issues this might be why their results vary in 
relation to the literature presented above.   
Because of these findings, I anticipate a positive relation between independent 
directorates and the adoption and disclosure of environmental and social practices. 
 
4.2.2.3. CSR Committee 
A company that has a CSR committee is singling its commitment to environmental 
and social practices (Mallin and Michelon, 2011). Zahra and Pearce (1989) manifest 
that the board structure of a company influence the director’s devotion to build the 
strategic plan due to the internal organization and division of tasks among committees. 
In this regard, Mallin and Michelon (2011) provide supporting evidence by analysing 
the US Best Corporate Citizens. Liao et al. (2015) obtain similar results: environment 
committees enhances environmental performance.  
However, results are mixed. Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) find a modest 
relationship between the existence of a CSR committee or director suggesting that age 
of the committee (or directorate position) might be relevant in the analysis. In addition, 
they report that the low levels of variability in the data might influence the results. 
Although, these finding do not show evidence of the prepositions considered by 
resource dependence theory, they seem to be in line with the finding of Mackenzie 
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(2007). From interviews conducted by Mackenzie (2007) with board members of UK 
based firms, he suggests that “CSR committees are aware of the symptoms of market 
failure problems, but do not seem to have a clear diagnosis of their underlying 
economic causes, and so their activities are not targeted at addressing them, at least 
not systematically” (2007, p. 940). Rodrigue et al. (2013) find that environmental 
committees have a symbolic role limited to verify the compliance with regulatory 
frameworks rather than pushing substantive practices. They add that environmental 
issues are considered at the board level from the risk management approach and that 
the role of committee helps to maintain good relations with stakeholders. 
As exposed by the literature, it is not clear if the CSR committee supports the 
implementation of environmental and social practices in order to improve corporate 
performance. 
 
4.2.2.4. CEO Duality 
The figure of the CEO as the chairperson of the board and its relation with 
environmental and social practices is also investigated. Fama and Jensen (1983) states 
that CEO duality is not an effective mechanism for controlling because managerial 
decisions are concentrated in one person. In this same line but focusing in corporate 
disclosure policies, Gul and Leung (2004) argue that CEO duality may inhibit board 
functions and therefore the disclosure of their practices; however, the effect is 
diminished when the percentage of independent directors is high. Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007) also find that concentrated decision-making power negatively 
affects firm information disclosure. Fabrizi, Mallin and Michelon (2014) find that 
CEOs’ incentives (monetary and non-monetary) impact the decision of adopting CSR 
practices. For instance, the authors suggest that incoming CEOs are more willing to 
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adopt CSR practices, as they need to gain legitimacy among a wide number of 
stakeholders and have a long time horizon. It is also suggested that powerful and 
entrenched CEOs engage more in CSR because they have less pressures from the 
market and can address additional concerns.  
Despite the results shown by the literature are mainly negative, resource 
dependency perspective conceives CEO duality an advantage representing a strong 
leadership with a clear aim (Mallin and Michelon (2011); however, this consideration 
is again brought down by Mallin and Michelon (2011) findings. Hence, I expect CEO 
duality to be negatively related to environmental and social performance. 
Based on the above arguments, I posit the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a. CSR oriented boards are positively associated with social 
performance. 
H1b. CSR oriented boards are positively associated with environmental 
performance. 
 
4.2.3. Voluntary CSR Initiatives as Mechanisms for CSR Strategy 
This section describes two of the largest and well-known voluntary CSR initiatives: 
the UNGC and the GRI. In order to test the strategic response of the management, I 
compare these two initiatives. Previous literature on both initiatives poses that their 
adoption would assist the management in the legitimization of their actions (Arevalo, 
2010; Chen and Bouvain, 2009;  Nikolaeva and Bicho, 2011), although some research 
also mentions that the communication will follow a symbolic or substantive approach 
(Pérez-Batres, at al. 2012).   
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Currently, the UNGC accounts for 12,000 members (business and non-
business) (UNGC, 2016a) and comprises Ten Principles related to human rights, 
labour, environment and anti-corruption practices. Business members are required to 
submit an annual report called ‘communication on progress (COP)’ and those that fail 
to submit it are delisted. The process to become member of the initiative is quite 
straightforward: it only requires a letter from the CEO manifesting the corporate 
commitment to the Ten Principles. The UNGC provides advice on how to enhance 
sustainable practices, and creates local and global connections to learn from each 
other.  
Since its inception, the UNGC has have a low participation of US firms, a fact 
that has been highlighted in most of the literature about the initiative (see also Table 
2.9). In a study carry out by Hemphill (2005), he mentions that one of the weaknesses 
of the UNGC to fully flourish is the reduced participation of US firms. Hemphill 
(2005) points out that this reaction could be due to the fear of facing demands from 
stakeholders for not complying with the principles but at the same time suggests that 
it could have been temporal as the UNGC implemented a ‘legal’ letter to protect them 
from stakeholders’ lawsuits. However, this phenomenon goes beyond of lawsuit 
issues, it is crucial to acknowledge the political relationship between the UN and the 
US, which is explained by the work presented, by Patrick and Forman (2002). The 
authors put together a number of studies related to the ambivalence of the US foreign 
policy towards multilateral cooperation; they include climate change, human rights 
and the US relation with the UN among other areas. The authors suggest that it is very 
important that the US citizens and congress account for the convenience of taking part 
of international institutions for managing ‘common goods’. Karns and Mingst (2002) 
evaluate the relationship between the US and the UN suggesting that ‘the nation’s 
   
157 
 
power, domestic politics, and “exceptionalist” traditions – as well as politics within 
the UN itself- have encouraged U.S. ambivalence and scepticism about the UN’s 
value’ (2002, p. 268). In this line, Bennie, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2007) explore 
different logics at country level to determine firm’s participation in the UNGC. Their 
findings suggest that the political environment (e.g. green parties in government and 
political system) and the general antipathy of the US towards any initiative of the 
United Nations (i.e. Kyoto Protocol ratification or Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court) are important drivers for such (non) participation. 
Rasche et al. (2013) make a call for more research illustrating the relationship 
between the adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives and corporate social performance, 
as most of the literature that measures the impact of the UNGC does not take into 
consideration the prior CSP. They mention that “the key challenge will be to isolate 
the effects of the Global Compact participation, as firms often have implemented 
social and environmental policies before joining the initiative” (2013, pp. 17-18). 
This last recommendation provides the path between corporate social performance 
and the UNGC. Probably the closest case to depict this relationship is the study 
presented by Perez-Batres, Doh and Pisani, (2012). They considered the pressures of 
stakeholders (or what others would call CSP23) as a motivation to become member of 
the initiative. Their findings suggests that public American firms that take CSR 
seriously prefer to adopt more structured frameworks (e.g. Global Reporting Initiative 
- GRI) over those with more flexibility in the reporting and auditing activities (e.g. 
UNGC), overall when the firm belongs to a ‘dirty industry’ or has enough financial 
resources to invest on social and environmental practices.  
                                                          
23 Perez-Batres et al. (2012) employed the KLD scores and gave the interpretation of 
stakeholder pressures. 
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Moreover, in a comparative study Chen and Bouvain (2009) analyse the 
communication of German, UK, US and Australian firms regarding their CSR 
performance. The authors show that US firms tend to report more on community and 
employee topics and do also have less preference for third-party assurance. On the 
other hand, from the analysis presented by Arevalo (2010), it can be clearly observed 
that out of 36 firms joining the UNGC in year 2000, only two firms were located in 
the US; however, both firms disclosed more information than the average for the 
period 2001-2009. Both companies also showed full engagement with the initiative 
(i.e. number of COPs submitted and engagement activities).  
On the other hand, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was founded in 1997 
by private international stakeholders in the US. The initiative covers the same areas 
than the UNGC through guidelines that have recently evolved to standards (GRI, 
2018). The main difference is in the structure of the report: the COP is quite flexible 
whereas the GRI report is based on a number of items that members need to assess. 
Furthermore, the UNGC COP is not under revision whereas the GRI report is subject 
of evaluation and a distinction is awarded according to the disclosed information. The 
GRI has strategic alliances with other initiatives as the UNGC and ISO26000. Firms 
deciding to report under this guidelines need to express it in the sustainability report 
which can be a stand alone document or as part of a document displaying financial 
information as well. From 1 July, 2018 it is mandatory to use this new standards but 
there are some facilities for new members. Although it is not clear if the different 
levels on reporting (Hassan et al, 2013) still apply after this date, they were applicable 
for the period of this study.  (Barkermeyer, et al., 2015) 
Considering the arguments in this section, I posit the following hypotheses: 
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H2a. Social performance is positively related to the adoption of the 
UNGC/GRI. 
H2b. Environmental performance is positively related to the adoption of 
the UNGC/GRI. 
 
4.2.4. The Board of Directors and voluntary CSR initiatives 
Prior research has focused on the influence of corporate governance on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) disclosure (Liao et al., 2015; Michelon and Parbonetti, 
2012; Orlitzky et al., 2011) and performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mallin 
and Michelon, 2011) separately. More recently, the link between these three items has 
been put together (Mallin et al., 2013; Shaukat et al., 2016). In a study conducted by 
Mallin et al. (2013) the authors took into consideration the two streams of the board 
of directors: monitoring and stakeholder. Their findings suggest a positive and 
significant relationship between directors and CSP. Furthermore, Mallin et al. (2013) 
find that environmental performance is positively related to extent and quality of 
disclosure; however, social performance is negatively related to both types of 
disclosure. Such findings suggest that environmental issues are taken at the heart of 
the company probably due to more pressure from stakeholders, paying less attention 
to aspects as employee relations, human rights and community relations, which are 
emphasized in reports probably with the intention of legitimizing corporate behaviour 
(Mallin et al., 2013). On the other hand, Shaukat et al. (2016) find that the strategy 
established by the board of directors will improve environmental and social 
performance, and CSP will reinforce a balanced board in terms of CSR. 
The emerging literature mentioned above, invites to undertake research in that 
vein. In the case of the UNGC, CEOs have argued that the decision of participating in 
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the initiative is driven by the economic and reputational impact that it might have on 
their firms (Arevalo et al., 2013; Cetindamar and Husoy, 2007). The 2016 United 
Nations Global Compact-Accenture Stretegy CEO study shows the enthusiasm of the 
executives of firm members of the UNGC. 87% of the CEOs in the survey considered 
that the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals will create sustained value 
(UNGC-Accenture, 2016). While the European markets react positively to firms 
joining the UNGC, US-based firms obtain negative returns for the same action. 
Furthermore, financial returns might drop off if European firms fail to submit the COP 
(Janney, Dess and Forlani, 2009). This suggests that CSR oriented boards of directors 
in the US support CSP and CSR disclosure though not through the UNGC as it can be 
detrimental for the legitimization of their activities and value creation.  
Following the above discussion and under the institutionalized context, I 
would expect that the management of American firms, through environmental and 
social performance, differ between the UNGC and the GRI. Figure 4.1 depicts the 
direction of the hypotheses. 
H3a. Social performance is different for the adoption of the GRI and the 
UNGC 
H3b. Environmental performance is different for to the adoption of the 














4.3.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.3.1. Data and Methods 
I use Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to analyse the link between board of 
directors, environmental and social performance and the adoption of voluntary 
initiatives (i.e. UNGC and GRI). According to Schumacker and Lomax (2010), SEM 
is a combination of regression analysis, path analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. 
By using regression model, we can understand the relationship between variables. 
Path analysis allows us how and why a variable affects the dependent variable, it is 
used as a mediator. And, finally, confirmatory factor analysis helps to integrate the 
unobserved variables. Therefore, SEM makes possible to work simultaneously with 
several equations involving paths and unobservable variables, a fact that is not 
possible when using other statistical techniques (Hair et al., 1995; Schumacker and 















Figure 4.1 This figure shows the relationship between the board attributes and 
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al. (2016) give preference to SEM over other multivariate analysis for controlling the 
endogeneity issues presented in their circular system of three equations with SEM. 
SEM has been used in similar studies in the field (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mallin 
et al., 2013; Shaukat et al., 2016; Westphal, 1998). 
In line with SEM literature, I employ Root-Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Bentler Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI), and Standardized Root-Mean Square Residual (SRMR) to test the statistical 
significance of the model (Hair et al., 1995; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mallin et 
al., 2013; Schumacker and Lomax, 2010; Shaukat et al. 2016; Westphal, 1998). 
RMSEA is a global fit measure and an acceptable rank for this test is between 0.05 
and 0.08. TLI and CFI equal to 1 indicate perfect fit, therefore values over 0.90 are 
acceptable. SRMR≤0.05 also indicates a good model fit. I use Stata15 for the 
computation of the results. 
The first part of the model comprises the Board Attributes. Board Attributes is 
a latent variable constructed by four indicators: female directors, independent 
directors, CSR committee and CEO duality. The second part refers to the mediations 
of CSP in the adoption of the UNGC/GRI; this mediation is constituted by the latent 
variables Environmental and Social Performance. The former is generated by 
resource reduction, product innovation, and emission reduction, and the latter by 
training and development, product responsibility, health and safety, human rights, 
employment quality, diversity and opportunities and community. I test environmental 
and social performance separately because they tend to show different effects, 
particularly when it comes to the disclosure of corporate performance (Cormier, 
Ledoux and Magnan, 2011; Mallin et al., 2013; Shaukat et al., 2016). For instance, 
Mallin et al.’s (2013) find that firms with poor performance in the ‘people’ dimension 
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tend to report more and with more quality, suggesting that disclosure of information 
is used as a tool for legitimization. On the other hand, Mallin et al. (2013) also find 
that environmental performance is positively linked to both quality and extend of 
information. Finally, the dependent variables UNGC/GRI are the standardized 
measure of the adoption of the UNGC/GRI provided by ASSET4. Table 4.1 provides 
a description of the variables included in the models presented above and their source. 
ASSET4 is a database that provides environmental, social and corporate 
governance data for over 5,000 firms from the most important and largest indices 
(MSCI, FTSE, S&P to name but a few). Data is gathered from publicly available 
sources (i.e. firm websites, financial and non-financial reports, NGOs websites and 
news) and also from initiatives as the Carbon Disclosure Project (i.e. CO2 data) and 
the UNGC. Then, the data is classified into three pillars denominated: environmental 
performance, social performance, and corporate governance performance. The three 
pillars contain 15 categories obtained from 180 key performance indicators from 500 
individual data points. While some information is updated daily (e.g. news), some 
other data is updated every year (i.e. annual reports). The data from each company is 
compared with the dataset universe (benchmark), and standardised (z-score) creating 
scores between 0 to 100% (Thomson Reuters, 2015)24. 
I control for a number of firm characteristics that has been widely used on prior 
similar studies. In all the models, I include size measured by market value (ln) and 
number of employees (ln). Larger companies are in the spotlight of larger groups of 
stakeholders, therefore the risk of exposure is higher, and they have more 
responsibilities towards those stakeholders. (Mallin and Michelon, 2011). 
                                                          
24 In previous versions of the ASSET4 database, Thomson Reuters also considered the 
Economic Pillar; however, this pillar is still available to download. I do not use this information 
because it contains information related to client and shareholders loyalty and financial 
performance. 
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Furthermore, academic evidence also shows that size is positively related to CSR 
performance. The same pattern is followed by size and the adoption of the UNGC. 
Profitability is also considered in all the models as it has been shown that it has a 
positive impact on both the adoption of the UNGC and the implementation of social 
and environmental practices (Johnson and Greening 1999; Mallin and Michelon 
2011). Conversely, leverage has a negative impact on environmental and social 
reporting (Cormier and Magnan 2003). Therefore, I expect a negative association with 
the UNGC. Capital expenditure represents the investments done in new technologies 
and machinery, which ideally will be more efficient and require fewer resources 
generating a higher and positive environmental performance (Clarkson et al., 2011, 
Shaukat et al., 2016). Prior literature on the voluntary adoption of  CSR initiatives 
indicates that slack resources are negatively related to them (Perez-Batres et al., 2012).  
Figure 4.6 shows the diagram of the theoretical model including all 
relationships. Rectangles represent observed variables whereas ellipses are latent or 
unobserved variables. The causal relationships are indicated with a one-direction 
arrow and correlations with a bidirectional arrow. Dashed lines represent control 
variables. 


















Standardized score of the dummy variable equivalent to '1' if the firm is member of the UNGC/GRI in a given 





















Percentage of independent board members as reported by the company. ASSET4 
CSR 
Committee 
Dummy variable equivalent to '1' if the firm has a CSR committee in a given year and '0' otherwise.  ASSET4 
CEO Duality 
Dummy variable indicating '1' if the CEO is simultaneously chair of the board and if the chair has been the 














Percentage indicating a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards achieving an 
efficient use of natural resources in the production process. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce the use 




Percentage showing a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards supporting the 
research and development of eco-efficient products or services. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce the 
environmental costs and burdens for its customers, and thereby creating new market opportunities through 





Percentage for a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards reducing environmental 
emission in the production and operational processes. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce air emissions 
(greenhouse gases, F-gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx and SOx, etc.), waste, hazardous waste, 
water discharges, spills or its impacts on biodiversity and to partner with environmental organisations to 
reduce the environmental impact of the company in the local or broader community. 
ASSET4 






TABLE 4.1 (Continued) 
Variables Description 








Percentage indicating a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards providing training 
and development (education) for its workforce. It reflects a company's capacity to increase its intellectual 
capital, workforce loyalty and productivity by developing the workforce's skills, competences, employability 




Percentage indicating a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards creating value-
added products and services upholding the customer's security. It reflects a company's capacity to maintain 
its license to operate by producing quality goods and services integrating the customer's health and safety, 




Percentage indicating a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards providing high-
quality employment benefits and job conditions. It reflects a company's capacity to increase its workforce 
loyalty and productivity by distributing rewarding and fair employment benefits, and by focusing on long-
term employment growth and stability by promoting from within, avoiding lay-offs and maintaining relations 
with trade unions. 
ASSET4 
Human Rights 
Percentage indicating a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards respecting the 
fundamental human rights conventions. It reflects a company's capacity to maintain its license to operate by 




Percentage indicating a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards providing high-
quality employment benefits and job conditions. It reflects a company's capacity to increase its workforce 
loyalty and productivity by distributing rewarding and fair employment benefits, and by focusing on long-
term employment growth and stability by promoting from within, avoiding lay-offs and maintaining relations 










TABLE 4.1 (Continued) 
Variables Description 








Percentage indicating a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining 
diversity and equal opportunities in its workforce. It reflects a company's capacity to increase its workforce 
loyalty and productivity by promoting an effective life-work balance, a family friendly environment and equal 
opportunities regardless of gender, age, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. 
ASSET4 
Community 
Percentage indicating a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining the 
company's reputation within the general community (local, national and global). It reflects a company's 
capacity to maintain its license to operate by being a good citizen (donations of cash, goods or staff time, 
etc.), protecting public health (avoidance of industrial accidents, etc.) and respecting business ethics 










Natural logarithm of the Market Value on Datastream. It is the share price multiplied by the number of 
ordinary shares in issue. The amount in issue is updated whenever new tranches of stock are issued or 
after a capital change. 
Datastream 
Employees (ln) 
Natural logarithm of the number of both full and part time employees of the company. It excludes: seasonal 
employees and emergency employees. 
Worldscope 
ROE 
Profitability ratio. It represents the value of: (Net Income – Bottom Line - Preferred Dividend Requirement) / 
Average of Last Year's and Current Year’s Common Equity * 100 
Worldscope 
Leverage 
Gearing ratio. Determined as: Total Debt to Capital (long term debt + short term debt & current portion of 










Ratio of Capital Expenditure / Net Sales or Revenues * 100 Worldscope 
 
 







































































Figure 4.2 Theoretical Model with variable measurements 
 





23 Figure 4.2 Theoretical 
Model with variable 
measurements 
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4.3.2. Sample Description 
The sample of this study covers US-based firms over the period 2002-2013 included 
in ASSET4 databased. The period starts in 2002 because that is the year when the 
collection of the environmental, social and corporate governance began, and 
concludes in 2013, year with the most complete dataset at the time of collection. The 
pooled cross-sectional and time-series panel includes 7,492 observations, which is the 
intersection of the environmental and social information with the financial 
information and represents 1,011 firms.  The number of firms is the result of firms 
appearing for more than one year in sequence and the loss of observations due to the 
lack of financial data. I retrieve financial data from Worldscope and Datastream.  
 Table 4.2 Panel 1 describes the sample by industry and year. As we can 
observe, overall, most of the firms belong to the industrials category (e.g. construction 
and materials, and industrial goods and services) followed by consumer services 
(includes retail, media and travel and leisure), technology (software and computer 
services, and technology hardware and equipment) and financials (banks, insurance, 
real estate, financial services). Telecommunications (fixed line telecommunications 
and mobile telecommunications) is the less representative industry. These patterns 
seem to be constant over time. Regarding the distribution of firms, the figure increases 
from 316 firms in 2002 to 772 in 2013, with the highest pick in 2010. Panels 2 and 3 
in Table 4.2 show the number of observations per industry per year for the UNGC and 
the GRI respectively. The number of observations for each of the initiatives increases 
over time, being higher for the GRI. I tested the independence between observations 
in both initiatives and results show they are not related (X2 = 880.85, p<0.001). This 
is important because despite firms can use the GRI as part of the COP, we still can 
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consider that firms in this sample participating in the UNGC are not related to those 
in the GRI. 
The descriptive statistics and the correlation of all numeric variables are shown 
in Table 4.3. The correlation matrix shows the expected high correlation between 
environmental and social score, and mean values of 43.5% and 46% respectively. 
There is also high correlation between environmental score and its three components: 
resource reduction, product innovation and emission reduction, which show a mean 
of 44%, 45% and 42% respectively. On the other hand, social components (training 
and development, product responsibility, health and safety, human rights, 
employment quality, diversity and opportunities and community) are also correlated 
with its base: the social score. All social components show an average between 42% 
and 51%. All other values are moderate, suggesting no problems with 
multicollinearity. Furthermore, we can observe that on average only 13.4% of firms 
have females included in their board of directors and around 75% have independent 
directors. The control variables market value (ln), number of employees (ln), ROE, 
leverage, slack resources and capital expenditure show averages of 8.81, 9.31, 
17.95%, 37.19%, 25.40%, and 13% respectively. Table 4.4 and 4.5 shows the 













Industry Obs 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
Panel 1. Full Sample 
Oil & Gas 561 17 19 34 37 37 46 60 64 64 62 60 61 
Basic Materials 461 19 19 27 36 35 39 43 48 50 51 47 47 
Industrials 1,337 51 57 77 85 87 87 128 150 154 154 156 151 
Consumer Goods 868 44 46 55 64 62 65 83 90 95 94 88 82 
Healthcare 683 35 37 54 55 54 55 61 70 71 66 62 63 
Consumer Services 1,189 45 51 68 88 89 87 110 125 130 135 131 130 
Telecommunications 116 6 6 6 7 8 10 12 13 13 12 13 10 
Utilities 501 24 29 35 38 39 37 48 56 54 48 48 45 
Financials 798 24 26 51 57 60 57 77 87 88 92 91 88 
Technology 978 51 56 67 74 72 73 83 97 106 106 98 95 
Total 7,492 316 346 474 541 543 556 705 800 825 820 794 772 
Panel 2. UNGC Members 
Oil & Gas 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Basic Materials 40 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 7 8 
Industrials 51 0 1 1 3 3 3 4 5 6 7 9 9 
Consumer Goods 72 0 0 1 3 3 4 6 9 10 11 12 13 
Healthcare 35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 6 6 6 
Consumer Services 25 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 3 2 3 4 4 
Telecommunications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utilities 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Financials 14 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 
Technology 65 1 1 2 2 3 5 6 8 8 9 10 10 
Total 315 4 5 8 14 14 20 25 36 40 43 52 54 
Panel 3. GRI Members 
Oil & Gas 92 0 0 0 1 3 8 10 12 13 13 17 15 
Basic Materials 155 0 1 1 2 5 6 16 18 25 27 28 26 
Industrials 177 0 1 1 0 2 11 16 21 30 29 31 35 
Consumer Goods 242 0 3 3 6 5 21 29 32 30 39 36 38 
Healthcare 109 1 1 1 2 0 9 9 12 17 18 21 18 
Consumer Services 114 0 1 0 1 0 5 9 18 18 20 21 21 
Telecommunications 12 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 
Utilities 155 0 1 1 3 5 9 18 22 23 23 25 25 
Financials 68 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 7 8 11 15 18 
Technology 177 3 4 5 5 7 13 18 19 24 24 28 27 
Total 1,301 4 12 12 20 28 88 130 162 189 207 225 224 
Note: This Table shows the distribution of 7,492 observations for the period 2002 – 2013 reported by 
ASSET4. Panel 1 presents the number of observations for  the full sample, Panel 2  for UNGC 























Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Board Gender Diversity 1.000
2 Independent Board Members 0.182*** 1.000
3 CSR Committee 0.251*** 0.244*** 1.000
4 CEO Duality 0.031 0.086*** 0.054*** 1.000
5 Env Score 0.262*** 0.256*** 0.587*** 0.059*** 1.000
6 Resource Reduction 0.283*** 0.245*** 0.560*** 0.054*** 0.928*** 1.000
7 Product Innovation 0.163*** 0.204*** 0.425*** 0.049** 0.823*** 0.633*** 1.000
8 Emission Reduction 0.256*** 0.238*** 0.596*** 0.062*** 0.926*** 0.847*** 0.631*** 1.000
9 Social Score 0.294*** 0.271*** 0.529*** 0.066*** 0.771*** 0.757*** 0.578*** 0.740*** 1.000
10 Training and Development 0.251*** 0.224*** 0.447*** 0.047** 0.625*** 0.618*** 0.467*** 0.604*** 0.797*** 1.000
11 Product Responsibility 0.099*** 0.141*** 0.221*** 0.027 0.413*** 0.376*** 0.403*** 0.348*** 0.577*** 0.364*** 1.000
12 Health and Safety 0.165*** 0.221*** 0.441*** 0.054*** 0.650*** 0.614*** 0.487*** 0.650*** 0.726*** 0.506*** 0.343***
13 Human Rights 0.250*** 0.154*** 0.430*** 0.027 0.583*** 0.599*** 0.459*** 0.528*** 0.662*** 0.466*** 0.308***
14 Employment Quality 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.284*** 0.061*** 0.380*** 0.379*** 0.252*** 0.390*** 0.623*** 0.442*** 0.247***
15 Diversity and Opportunities 0.264*** 0.225*** 0.398*** 0.059*** 0.538*** 0.540*** 0.380*** 0.529*** 0.747*** 0.575*** 0.310***
16 Community 0.258*** 0.213*** 0.407*** 0.064*** 0.600*** 0.588*** 0.418*** 0.599*** 0.772*** 0.568*** 0.348***
17 Market Value (ln) 0.176*** 0.116*** 0.298*** 0.039 0.429*** 0.421*** 0.303*** 0.447*** 0.478*** 0.410*** 0.156***
18 Employees (ln) 0.258*** 0.071*** 0.261*** -0.005 0.424*** 0.431*** 0.320*** 0.395*** 0.496*** 0.450*** 0.261***
19 ROE 0.0415+ 0.020 0.020 -0.007 0.023 0.019 0.022 0.023 0.036 0.024 0.010
20 Leverage 0.080*** 0.058*** 0.097*** 0.005 0.087*** 0.078*** 0.030 0.115*** 0.031 0.015 -0.039
21 Slack Resources  -0.043* -0.024  -0.068*** 0.020 -0.034 -0.041 0.051**  -0.083*** -0.016 -0.034 0.113***
22 Capital Expenditure  -0.121***  -0.057***  -0.066*** 0.019  -0.106***  -0.100***  -0.109***  -0.076***  -0.162***  -0.133***  -0.154***
Mean 0.134 0.747 0.329 0.983 0.435 0.440 0.446 0.423 0.460 0.416 0.486
Std. Dev. 0.094 0.167 0.470 0.131 0.311 0.317 0.295 0.308 0.287 0.296 0.282
Min 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.068 0.084 0.073 0.036 0.051 0.025
Max 0.600 0.948 1.000 1.000 0.973 0.974 0.997 0.980 0.989 0.968 0.990
TABLE 5.3 
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics
The table shows the Pearson's correlation for 7,492 observations for the period 2002-2013. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10. This table also 
shows the descriptive statistics for all numeric variables.
43TABLE 4.3 




















Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
12 Health and Safety 1.000
13 Human Rights 0.434*** 1.000
14 Employment Quality 0.333*** 0.285*** 1.000
15 Diversity and Opportunities 0.456*** 0.404*** 0.442*** 1.000
16 Community 0.525*** 0.399*** 0.412*** 0.529*** 1.000
17 Market Value (ln) 0.362*** 0.335*** 0.311*** 0.412*** 0.370*** 1.000
18 Employees (ln) 0.329*** 0.438*** 0.193*** 0.360*** 0.400*** 0.493*** 1.000
19 ROE 0.032 0.031 0.019 0.025 0.033 0.056*** 0.025 1.000
20 Leverage 0.067*** -0.036 0.008 0.047** 0.069***  -0.060*** 0.022 0.041+ 1.000
21 Slack Resources  -0.046** 0.021 -0.026 -0.011  -0.066***  -0.045* -0.033 0.023   -0.398*** 1.000
22 Capital Expenditure  -0.085***  -0.150***  -0.059***  -0.097***  -0.122***  -0.059***  -0.355*** -0.040 0.122***  -0.245*** 1.000
Mean 0.448 0.434 0.483 0.503 0.495 8.815 9.308 0.180 0.372 0.254 0.130
Std. Dev. 0.294 0.300 0.277 0.282 0.305 1.193 1.555 1.722 0.243 0.177 0.314
Min 0.029 0.021 0.029 0.045 0.027 3.829 1.792 -32.294 0.000 0.001 0.000
Max 0.995 0.999 0.983 0.988 0.974 13.146 14.604 104.000 3.391 0.950 4.771
TABLE 5.3 (Cont.)
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics
The table shows the Pearson's correlation for 7,492 observations for the period 2002-2013. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10. This table also 
shows the descriptive statistics for all numeric variables.










Distribution and Characteristics of the Sample by Industry 











Utilities Financials Technology 
Board Gender Diversity 0.0696 0.1163 0.1137 0.1766 0.1482 0.1638 0.1403 0.1621 0.1263 0.1127 
Independent Board Members 0.7585 0.7677 0.7737 0.7405 0.7597 0.6947 0.7309 0.8058 0.7123 0.7517 
Environmental Score 0.3798 0.5897 0.4705 0.5393 0.3712 0.3418 0.3809 0.5926 0.2631 0.4754 
Resource Reduction 0.3769 0.5627 0.4559 0.5511 0.3901 0.3901 0.3601 0.5622 0.2831 0.4717 
Product Innovation 0.3477 0.5744 0.5248 0.5332 0.3864 0.3427 0.4408 0.4654 0.3121 0.5230 
Emission Reduction 0.4361 0.5828 0.4267 0.5027 0.3683 0.3240 0.3581 0.6732 0.2551 0.4366 
Social Score 0.4112 0.5623 0.4789 0.5495 0.4693 0.4213 0.4385 0.5379 0.2893 0.4790 
Training and Development 0.3682 0.4725 0.4277 0.4705 0.4191 0.4186 0.4118 0.4756 0.2909 0.4198 
Product Responsibility 0.3486 0.5801 0.5658 0.5546 0.5621 0.4017 0.3895 0.4366 0.3441 0.5505 
Health and Safety 0.5463 0.6701 0.4798 0.5206 0.4505 0.3247 0.3904 0.5611 0.2550 0.4326 
Human Rights 0.3704 0.4985 0.4330 0.6199 0.3656 0.4719 0.4192 0.3474 0.2665 0.4629 
Employment Quality 0.4610 0.5224 0.4620 0.4827 0.5105 0.4491 0.5356 0.5824 0.4531 0.4942 
Diversity and Opportunities 0.4734 0.4777 0.4769 0.5310 0.5431 0.5052 0.5543 0.5655 0.4231 0.5429 
Community 0.4594 0.5755 0.5152 0.5506 0.4735 0.4793 0.4651 0.6579 0.3428 0.4767 
Market Value (ln) 9.0448 8.5846 8.6530 8.8519 9.0796 8.7394 9.2105 8.8325 8.7986 8.8429 
Employees (ln) 8.3861 9.1504 9.8827 9.7799 9.2265 10.3274 9.7921 8.8411 7.7031 9.0142 
ROE 0.0894 0.1661 0.1759 0.4734 0.1147 0.1633 -0.0395 0.1043 0.1992 0.0952 
Leverage 0.3259 0.4138 0.3650 0.4194 0.3174 0.3437 0.5996 0.5737 0.4928 0.1895 
Slack Resources 0.1655 0.2140 0.2768 0.2543 0.3163 0.2165 0.1134 0.0889 0.1765 0.4590 
Capital Expenditure 0.4580 0.0994 0.0476 0.0335 0.0800 0.0812 0.1572 0.1980 0.3123 0.0657 






















Distribution and Characteristics of the Sample by Year 
Variable 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Female 0.1101 0.1202 0.1207 0.1284 0.1332 0.1362 0.1306 0.1298 0.1313 0.1374 0.1456 0.1538 
Independent 0.5606 0.6482 0.7280 0.7434 0.7480 0.7154 0.7320 0.7359 0.7804 0.7846 0.7980 0.7974 
Environmental Score 0.3469 0.3471 0.3784 0.3960 0.3983 0.4379 0.4273 0.4355 0.4592 0.4723 0.4820 0.4876 
Resource Reduction 0.3475 0.3416 0.3743 0.4005 0.4040 0.4411 0.4315 0.4387 0.4648 0.4795 0.4955 0.5023 
Product Innovation 0.3725 0.3712 0.3924 0.4115 0.4125 0.4442 0.4444 0.4472 0.4687 0.4820 0.4869 0.4863 
Emission Reduction 0.3557 0.3594 0.3878 0.3978 0.3968 0.4275 0.4109 0.4214 0.4399 0.4470 0.4563 0.4647 
Social Score 0.3449 0.3633 0.4215 0.4433 0.4509 0.4913 0.4642 0.4642 0.4812 0.4884 0.4816 0.4889 
Training and Development 0.3293 0.3325 0.3826 0.3920 0.3833 0.4373 0.4216 0.4263 0.4445 0.4414 0.4338 0.4431 
Product Responsibility 0.3930 0.4046 0.4660 0.4821 0.4859 0.5044 0.4876 0.4914 0.5015 0.5026 0.5014 0.5029 
Health and Safety 0.3921 0.4113 0.4287 0.4643 0.4698 0.4788 0.4547 0.4461 0.4440 0.4466 0.4468 0.4517 
Human Rights 0.3667 0.3649 0.3818 0.3885 0.3921 0.4221 0.4142 0.4219 0.4331 0.4728 0.5036 0.5159 
Employment Quality 0.3618 0.3707 0.4212 0.4290 0.4432 0.5088 0.5000 0.4923 0.5188 0.5307 0.5129 0.5218 
Diversity and Opportunities 0.3953 0.4174 0.4566 0.4781 0.4913 0.5180 0.5153 0.5194 0.5464 0.5345 0.5160 0.5121 
Community 0.4130 0.4467 0.4841 0.5102 0.5269 0.5467 0.5002 0.4959 0.4918 0.4958 0.4859 0.4900 
Market Value (ln) 8.6326 9.0324 8.9448 9.1199 9.2222 9.1641 8.2937 8.5694 8.7035 8.6433 8.7613 9.0459 
Employees (ln) 9.6777 9.7651 9.4122 9.5244 9.5749 9.4849 9.2697 9.0947 9.0664 9.1410 9.1934 9.2286 
ROE 0.0605 0.1380 0.1777 0.2375 0.2016 0.2959 0.1609 0.0692 0.1521 0.1613 0.1654 0.3026 
Leverage 0.4097 0.3841 0.3603 0.3541 0.3510 0.3639 0.4032 0.3690 0.3498 0.3687 0.3791 0.3854 
Slack Resources 0.2489 0.2547 0.2617 0.2612 0.2482 0.2463 0.2368 0.2589 0.2672 0.2589 0.2500 0.2513 
Capital Expenditure 0.1098 0.0815 11.4669 0.1078 0.1269 0.1623 0.1439 0.1180 0.1337 0.1367 0.1395 0.1388 




4.4.  RESULTS 
4.4.1. SEM Results 
In this section, I show the results of the theorized model for the relationship between 
board attributes, environmental and social performance, and the adoption of the 
UNGC/GRI. First, I discuss the goodness of fit of the model. Then, I comment on the 
three measurement modes: board characteristics, environmental and social 
performance. Finally, I present the results for the structural model. The interpretation 
of the results are presented in Section 4.5. 
Table 4.6 reports that the goodness of fit criteria support the fit of the model 
for the adoption of the UNGC. RMSEA is a good measure for large samples for the 
fit of a given model based on its X2 (Hair et al., 1995; Mallin et al., 2013). The 
RMSEA for the model I am presenting is equal to 0.058, which is within the 
acceptable range of 0.05-0.08. SRMR equals 0.033, which is less than 0.05, and 
therefore, this measure also supports my model. The last two measures are CFI and 
TLI both of them compare the proposed model with a null model. CFI equals 0.928 
and TLI equals 0.911, very close to 1, which indicate a good fit (Hair et al., 1995; 
Schumacker and Lomax, 2010). Regarding the measurement models, all the 
coefficients of the indicators for the latent variable Board of Directors (BoD) are 
significant at 99.9%. The BoD is mainly driven by the existence of the CSR 
Committee (coefficient is equal to 0.655 at 0.001 level) followed by gender diversity 
and independent members with coefficients of 0.386 and 0.343, respectively, both at 
0.001 level. CEO duality has a rather small impact in comparison to the other 








Results of SEM (UNGC) 
Structural Model         
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables 
UNGC BoD Environmental  Social 
BoD 
  0.718*** 0.636*** 
Environmental Performance 0.059* 
   
Social Performance 0.211*** 
   
Market Value 0.062*** 0.295*** 0.124*** 0.165*** 
Number Employees 0.016 0.222*** 0.121*** 0.228*** 
Slack  0.060*** 
   
Leverage  -0.038** 0.144*** 
  
CapEx  
 -0.004 -0.004 
Intercept 1.008*** 
   
cov(e.Environment,e.Social)     0.664*** 
Measurement Model         
Indicators 
  BoD 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Board Gender Diversity     0.386*** -0.014 
Independent Board Members   0.343*** 3.197*** 
CSR Committee   0.761***  -2.139*** 
CEO Duality   0.079*** 7.202*** 
cov(e.women,e.csr_com)    -0.079** 
cov(e.independent,e.ceo_dual)   0.063*** 
Indicators 
  Environmental 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Resource Reduction   0.919***  -2.637*** 
Product Innovation   0.687***  -1.498*** 
Emission Reduction   0.921***  -2.663*** 
Indicators 
  Social 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Training and Development     0.766***  -2.376*** 
Product Responsibility 
  0.459***  -0.546*** 
Health and Safety 
  0.708***  -1.97*** 
Human Rights 
  0.641***  -1.720*** 
Employment Quality 
  0.510***  -0.778*** 
Diversity and Opportunities 
  0.689***  -1.619*** 
Community     0.726***  -1.961*** 
X2(146) =  3,738.41, Prob > X2 = 0.0000       
RMSEA    0.058 
SRMR    0.033 
CFI    0.928 
TLI       0.911 
Notes: aConstrained. Number of observations = 7,492. Table shows 
standardizedcoefficients. 




In relation to the Environmental and Social latent variables, all the loadings of 
the indicators are highly significant (p<0.001). In the case of the Environmental latent 
variable, resource reduction and emissions reduction have a stronger link (0.919 and 
0.921, respectively) then product reduction (0.687). The links between indicators and 
the Social latent variable vary from 0.459 to 0.766, being product responsibility the 
weakest and training and development the strongest. Environmental and Social latent 
variables show a strong correlation (0.664, p<0.001). 
In regard to the main part of the model, I found strong and significant evidence 
in support of the argument (H1a and H1b) that board attributes with a CSR orientation 
tend to support environmental and social performance (0.718 and 0.636, respectively, 
p<0.001). In terms of the adoption of the UNGC, results show a significant but small 
impact from environmental performance (0.059, p<0.05) while social performance 
has a slightly larger and significant association (0.211, p<0.001). Therefore, the 
positive relationship between CSP and the UNGC depicted on H2a and H2b is 
supported. As expected, size, measured by market value and number of employees, is 
highly significant in most of the cases. Profitability was tested in the original model 
but was not significant and did not provide any support for the final model. The 
positive coefficient of slack resources (0.060, p<0.001) does not support the argument 
presented. Leverage is negatively and significantly related to the adoption of the 
UNGC (-0.038, p<0.01 and positively and significantly linked to the attributes of the 
board of directors (0.144, p<0.001). Contrary to previous research, I found negative 
but no significant impact of capital expenditure on environmental performance (-
0.004, p>0.10) and on social performance (-0.004, p>0.10) (Shaukat et al., 2016). 




Results for the GRI initiative are similar to those for the UNGC (see Table 
4.8).  The goodness of fit criteria also supports the GRI model with small differences 
in the coefficients (i.e. RMSEA, SRMR, CFI and TLI). We can also find these small 
differences in the coefficients of the measurement model, this is, in the board of 
directors, environmental and social indicators. In the structural model in addition to 
the differences in the coefficients, we can also observe differences in their 
significance. The main difference between the UNGC and GRI models relies on the 
independent variables affecting the adoption of the initiatives. Firms reporting under 
GRI principles tend to have higher environmental score coefficient than those 
reporting for the UNGC and are more significant (0.283, p<0.001). Likewise happens 
with the social score coefficient (0.384, p<0.001). Contrary to the UNGC model both 
aspects to measure size, market value and number of employees, are highly 
significant; however, the former is slightly smaller, and latter is negatively related. 
























Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 UNGC 1.000
2 UNGC hat 0.325 1.000
3 Resource Reduction 0.250 0.826 1.000
4 Resource Reduction hat 0.285 0.894 0.950 1.000
5 Product Innovation 0.204 0.637 0.633 0.710 1.000
6 Product Innovation hat 0.285 0.894 0.950 1.000 0.710 1.000
7 Emission Reduction 0.255 0.813 0.847 0.952 0.631 0.952 1.000
8 Emission Reduction hat 0.285 0.894 0.950 1.000 0.710 1.000 0.952 1.000
9 Training and Development 0.205 0.745 0.618 0.693 0.467 0.693 0.604 0.693 1.000
10 Training and Development hat 0.314 0.947 0.865 0.944 0.651 0.944 0.860 0.944 0.804 1.000
11 Product Responsibility 0.128 0.461 0.376 0.418 0.403 0.418 0.348 0.418 0.364 0.482 1.000
12 Product Responsibility hat 0.314 0.947 0.865 0.944 0.651 0.944 0.860 0.944 0.804 1.000 0.482 1.000
13 Health and Safety 0.241 0.682 0.614 0.695 0.487 0.695 0.650 0.695 0.506 0.744 0.343 0.744 1.000
14 Health and Safety hat 0.314 0.947 0.865 0.944 0.651 0.944 0.860 0.944 0.804 1.000 0.482 1.000 0.744 1.000
15 Human Rights 0.281 0.649 0.599 0.624 0.459 0.624 0.528 0.624 0.466 0.674 0.308 0.674 0.434 0.674 1.000
16 Human Rights hat 0.314 0.947 0.865 0.944 0.651 0.944 0.860 0.944 0.804 1.000 0.482 1.000 0.744 1.000 0.674 1.000
17 Employment Quality 0.110 0.494 0.379 0.442 0.252 0.442 0.390 0.442 0.442 0.536 0.244 0.536 0.333 0.536 0.285 0.536 1.000
18 Employment Quality hat 0.314 0.947 0.865 0.944 0.651 0.944 0.860 0.944 0.804 1.000 0.482 1.000 0.744 1.000 0.674 1.000 0.536
19 Diversity and Oportunities 0.213 0.674 0.540 0.611 0.380 0.611 0.529 0.611 0.575 0.724 0.310 0.724 0.456 0.724 0.404 0.724 0.442
20 Diversity and Oportunities hat 0.314 0.947 0.865 0.944 0.651 0.944 0.860 0.944 0.804 1.000 0.482 1.000 0.744 1.000 0.674 1.000 0.536
21 Community 0.182 0.689 0.588 0.665 0.418 0.665 0.599 0.665 0.568 0.762 0.348 0.762 0.525 0.762 0.399 0.762 0.412
22 Community hat 0.314 0.947 0.865 0.944 0.651 0.944 0.860 0.944 0.804 1.000 0.482 1.000 0.744 1.000 0.674 1.000 0.536
23 Board Gender Diversity 0.099 0.306 0.283 0.310 0.163 0.310 0.257 0.310 0.251 0.338 0.099 0.338 0.165 0.338 0.250 0.338 0.174
24 Board Gender Diversity hat 0.262 0.830 0.839 0.918 0.626 0.918 0.853 0.918 0.672 0.900 0.377 0.900 0.651 0.900 0.600 0.900 0.442
25 Independent Board Members 0.039 0.254 0.245 0.280 0.204 0.280 0.238 0.280 0.224 0.290 0.141 0.290 0.221 0.290 0.154 0.290 0.174
26 Independent Board Members hat 0.262 0.830 0.839 0.918 0.626 0.918 0.853 0.918 0.672 0.900 0.377 0.900 0.651 0.900 0.600 0.900 0.442
27 CSR Committee 0.177 0.571 0.560 0.645 0.425 0.645 0.596 0.645 0.447 0.624 0.221 0.624 0.441 0.624 0.431 0.624 0.284
28 CSR Committee hat 0.262 0.830 0.839 0.918 0.626 0.918 0.853 0.918 0.672 0.900 0.377 0.900 0.651 0.900 0.600 0.900 0.442
29 CEO Duality 0.013 0.068 0.054 0.067 0.049 0.067 0.062 0.067 0.047 0.069 0.027 0.069 0.054 0.069 0.027 0.069 0.061
30 CEO Duality hat 0.262 0.830 0.839 0.918 0.626 0.918 0.853 0.918 0.672 0.900 0.377 0.900 0.651 0.900 0.600 0.900 0.442
31 Environmental hat 0.285 0.894 0.950 1.000 0.710 1.000 0.952 1.000 0.693 0.944 0.418 0.944 0.695 0.944 0.624 0.944 0.442
32 Social hat 0.314 0.947 0.865 0.944 0.651 0.944 0.860 0.944 0.804 1.000 0.482 1.000 0.744 1.000 0.674 1.000 0.536
33 BoD hat 0.262 0.830 0.839 0.918 0.626 0.918 0.853 0.918 0.672 0.900 0.377 0.900 0.651 0.900 0.600 0.900 0.442
Mean 0.376 0.376 0.440 0.440 0.446 0.446 0.423 0.423 0.416 0.416 0.486 0.486 0.448 0.448 0.434 0.434 0.483
Std. Dev 0.130 0.040 0.317 0.282 0.295 0.196 0.308 0.275 0.296 0.216 0.282 0.123 0.294 0.198 0.300 0.183 0.277
Min 0.325 0.272 0.068 0.076 0.084 0.192 0.073 0.067 0.051 0.009 0.025 0.253 0.029 0.074 0.021 0.089 0.029
Max 1.000 0.494 0.974 1.008 0.997 0.840 0.980 0.976 0.968 0.932 0.990 0.780 0.995 0.922 0.999 0.872 0.983
Table 5.5 (Cont.)















Variable 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
18 Employment Quality hat 1.000
19 Diversity and Oportunities 0.724 1.000
20 Diversity and Oportunities hat 1.000 0.724 1.000
21 Community 0.762 0.529 0.762 1.000
22 Community hat 1.000 0.724 1.000 0.762 1.000
23 Board Gender Diversity 0.338 0.264 0.338 0.258 0.338 1.000
24 Board Gender Diversity hat 0.900 0.608 0.900 0.639 0.900 0.438 1.000
25 Independent Board Members 0.290 0.225 0.290 0.213 0.290 0.182 0.388 1.000
26 Independent Board Members hat 0.900 0.608 0.900 0.639 0.900 0.438 1.000 0.388 1.000
27 CSR Committee 0.624 0.398 0.624 0.407 0.624 0.251 0.861 0.244 0.861 1.000
28 CSR Committee hat 0.900 0.608 0.900 0.639 0.900 0.438 1.000 0.388 1.000 0.861 1.000
29 CEO Duality 0.069 0.059 0.069 0.064 0.069 0.031 0.089 0.086 0.089 0.054 0.089 1.000
30 CEO Duality hat 0.900 0.608 0.900 0.639 0.900 0.438 1.000 0.388 1.000 0.861 1.000 0.089 1.000
31 Environmental hat 0.944 0.611 0.944 0.665 0.944 0.310 0.918 0.280 0.918 0.645 0.918 0.067 0.918 1.000
32 Social hat 1.000 0.724 1.000 0.762 1.000 0.338 0.900 0.290 0.900 0.624 0.900 0.069 0.900 0.944 1.000
33 BoD hat 0.900 0.608 0.900 0.639 0.900 0.438 1.000 0.388 1.000 0.861 1.000 0.089 1.000 0.918 0.900 1.000
Mean 0.483 0.503 0.503 0.495 0.495 0.134 0.134 0.747 0.747 0.329 0.329 0.983 0.983 1.276 0.133 0.135
Std. Dev 0.135 0.282 0.185 0.305 0.211 0.094 0.032 0.167 0.051 0.470 0.316 0.131 0.009 0.282 0.026 0.032
Min 0.229 0.045 0.154 0.027 0.098 0.000 0.079 0.014 0.660 0.000 -0.212 0.000 0.967 0.911 0.085 0.080
Max 0.805 0.988 0.946 0.974 0.998 0.600 0.207 0.948 0.863 1.000 1.053 1.000 1.003 1.843 0.195 0.209
Table 5.5 (Cont.)
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics of Predicted Values
Notes: This table shows the Pearson's correlation matrix and descriptive values for estimates and postestimation values (N=7,492). Board Gender Diversity hat, Independent
Board Members hat, CSR Committee hat and CEO Duality hat have a correlation of 1 with the latent variable BoD. Resource Reduction hat, Product Innovation hat and Emission
Reduction hat have a correlation of 1 with the latent variable Environment. The seven estimated indicators of Social Performance also have a correlation of 1 with the Soical
variable. Each group of latent variable indicators also have a correlation of 1 among them. The means for all the pair of variables are identical. All the standard deviations of the
predicted variables are smaller than the original values because some of the variation is not explained by the model. The standard deviation of the latent variable BoD is identical
to the one for the predicted value of Board Gender Diversity because the latter was constrained equal to 1, and Environment has the same standard deviation than Resource
Reduction for the same reason.






Results of SEM (GRI) 
Structural Model         
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables 
GRI BoD Environmental  Social 
BoD 
  0.715*** 0.636*** 
Environmental Performance 0.283*** 
   
Social Performance 0.384*** 
   
Market Value 0.041*** 0.293*** 0.127*** 0.166*** 
Number Employees -0.091*** 0.222*** 0.122*** 0.229*** 
Slack  -0.001 
   
Leverage -0.004 0.145*** 
  
CapEx  
 -0.003 -0.004 
Intercept -1.220*** 
   
cov(e.Environment,e.Social)     0.665*** 
Measurement Model         
Indicators 
  BoD 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Board Gender Diversity     0.387*** -0.012 
Independent Board Members   0.340*** 3.211*** 
CSR Committee   0.765***  -2.144*** 
CEO Duality   0.078*** 7.205*** 
cov(e.women,e.csr_com)    -0.077*** 
cov(e.independent,e.ceo_dual)   0.063*** 
Indicators 
  Environmental 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Resource Reduction   0.917***  -2.628*** 
Product Innovation   0.687***  -1.498*** 
Emission Reduction   0.923***  -2.677*** 
Indicators 
  Social 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Training and Development     0.767***  -2.384*** 
Product Responsibility 
  0.455***  -0.526*** 
Health and Safety 
  0.709***  -1.980*** 
Human Rights 
  0.641***  -1.722*** 
Employment Quality 
  0.509***  -0.773*** 
Diversity and Opportunities 
  0.687***  -1.610*** 
Community     0.724***  -1.955*** 
X2(146) =   3784.93, Prob >  X2 = 0.0000       
RMSEA    0.058 
SRMR    0.033 
CFI    0.931 
TLI       0.914 
Notes: aConstrained. Number of observations = 7,492. Table shows standardized 
coefficients. 
 + p<0.1, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
 




4.4.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to test the robustness of the results, I run a number of sensitivity tests. First, 
I include clustered standard errors by firm (Table 4.9 and Table 4.10). This is because 
I am using a panel data where there are observations belonging to the same firm over 
the period of study. The coefficients with clustered standard errors are similar to those 
in the base models. The measurement model remains that same than the base model. 
The coefficients for the structural models are the same but less significant than in the 
base model for the UNGC and keep the same significance for the GRI. Environmental 
performance and size are not significant under this model for UNGC. The only test 
that can be performed under these conditions is SRMR (0.033) which indicates a good 
fit of both models. 
 In another analysis, I substituted the environmental and social latent variables 
by the environmental and social scores provided by ASSET4 (Table 4.11 and Table 
4.12). All goodness of fit criteria are met with this model (RMSEA, SRMR, CFI and 
TLI). The indicator loadings of the BoD are slightly smaller but keep the same 
significance. The coefficients from BoD to environmental and social scores and 
control variables are also smaller but highly significant as in the based models. 
Environmental performance is more significant and larger than in the original models 
for both initiatives. Social Performance is also highly significant but smaller than in 










Results of SEM with Clustered Standard Errors by Firm (UNGC) 
Structural Model         
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables 
UNGC BoD Environmental  Social 
BoD 
  0.718*** 0.636*** 
Environmental Performance 0.059 
   
Social Performance 0.211** 
   
Market Value 0.062 0.294*** 0.124*** 0.167*** 
Number Employees 0.016 0.222*** 0.122*** 0.228*** 
Slack  0.060** 
   
Leverage  -0.038
+ 0.145***   
CapEx  
         -0.004+ -0.004*** 
Intercept 1.008** 
   
cov(e.Environment,e.Social)     0.667*** 
Measurement Model         
Indicators 
  BoD 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Board Gender Diversity     0.387*** -0.015 
Independent Board Members   0.343*** 3.198*** 
CSR Committee   0.761***   -2.137*** 
CEO Duality   0.079*** 7.203*** 
cov(e.women,e.csr_com)   -0.073+ 
cov(e.independent,e.ceo_dual)   0.063** 
Indicators 
  Environmental 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Resource Reduction   0.919***  -2.592*** 
Product Innovation   0.687***  -1.465*** 
Emission Reduction   0.921***  -2.618*** 
Indicators 
  Social 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Training and Development     0.766***  -2.399*** 
Product Responsibility 
  0.459***  -0.554*** 
Health and Safety 
  0.708***  -1.995*** 
Human Rights 
  0.641***  -1.737*** 
Employment Quality 
  0.510***  -0.792*** 
Diversity and Opportunities 
  0.689*** -1.639*** 
Community     0.726***  -1.982*** 
SRMR       0.033 
Notes: aConstrained. Number of observations = 7,492. Standard errors adjusted for 1,011 
clusters by firm. 







Results of SEM with Clustered Standard Errors by Firm (GRI) 
Structural Model         
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables 
GRI BoD Environmental  Social 
BoD 
  0.715*** 0.636*** 
Environmental Performance 0.283*** 
   
Social Performance 0.383*** 
   
Market Value 0.041
+ 0.294*** 0.127*** 0.167*** 
Number Employees -0.091*** 0.222*** 0.122*** 0.229*** 
Slack  -0.007 
   
Leverage  -0.004 0.143*** 
  
CapEx  
         -0.004+ -0.004 
Intercept 1.216*** 
   
cov(e.Environment,e.Social)     0.665*** 
Measurement Model         
Indicators 
  BoD 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Board Gender Diversity     0.387*** -0.012 
Independent Board Members   0.341*** 3.211*** 
CSR Committee   0.765***   -2.144*** 
CEO Duality   0.078*** 7.203*** 
cov(e.women,e.csr_com)   -0.077+ 
cov(e.independent,e.ceo_dual)   0.063** 
Indicators 
  Environmental 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Resource Reduction   0.917***  -2.637*** 
Product Innovation   0.687***  -1.498*** 
Emission Reduction   0.923***  -2.664*** 
Indicators 
  Social 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Training and Development     0.766***  -2.376*** 
Product Responsibility 
  0.459***  -0.546*** 
Health and Safety 
  0.708***  -1.974*** 
Human Rights 
  0.641***  -1.720*** 
Employment Quality 
  0.510***  -0.778*** 
Diversity and Opportunities 
  0.689*** -1.619 
Community     0.726***  -1.961*** 
SRMR       0.033 
Notes: aConstrained. Number of observations = 7,492. Standard errors adjusted for 1,011 
clusters by firm. 








Results of SEM with Environmental and Social Scores (UNGC) 
Structural Model         
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables 
UNGC BoD Environmental  Social 
BoD 
  0.677*** 0.574*** 
Environmental Performance 0.114*** 
   
Social Performance 0.117*** 
   
Market Value 0.084*** 0.296*** 0.099*** 0.147*** 
Number Employees 0.039** 0.223*** 0.123*** 0.210*** 
Slack  0.058*** 
   
Leverage  -0.033** 0.140*** 
  
CapEx  
 -0.004  -0.005 
Intercept 1.649*** 
  -2.601***  -2.877*** 
cov(e.Environment,e.Social)     0.452*** 
Measurement Model         
Indicators 
  BoD 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Board Gender Diversity     0.382*** 0.002 
Independent Board Members   0.346*** 3.180*** 
CSR Committee   0.757***  -2.125*** 
CEO Duality   0.078*** 7.203*** 
cov(e.women,e.csr_com)    -0.063** 
cov(e.independent,e.ceo_dual)     0.063*** 
X2 (146) =   3795.59, Prob > X2 = 0.0000 
   
RMSEA 
   
0.041 
SRMR 
   0.021 
CFI 
   
0.974 
TLI       0.955 
Notes: aConstrained. Number of observations = 7,492. 
  













Results of SEM with Environmental and Social Scores (GRI) 
Structural Model         
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables 
GRI BoD Environmental  Social 
BoD 
  0.677*** 0.574*** 
Environmental Performance 0.344*** 
   
Social Performance 0.253*** 
   
Market Value 0.089*** 0.296*** 0.099*** 0.147*** 
Number Employees -0.049*** 0.223*** 0.123*** 0.210*** 
Slack  -0.010 
   
Leverage 0.007 0.140*** 
  
CapEx  
 -0.003  -0.005 
Intercept 0.425 
  -2.602***  -2.877*** 
cov(e.Environment,e.Social)     0.452*** 
Measurement Model         
Indicators 
  BoD 
  Coefficient Intercept 
Board Gender Diversity     0.382*** 0.002 
Independent Board Members   0.347*** 3.180*** 
CSR Committee   0.757***  -2.125*** 
CEO Duality   0.078*** 7.203*** 
cov(e.women,e.csr_com)    -0.063** 
cov(e.independent,e.ceo_dual)     0.063*** 
X2 (146) =   3795.59, Prob > X2 = 0.0000 
   
RMSEA 
   
0.047 
SRMR 
   0.022 
CFI 
   
0.971 
TLI       0.949 
Notes: aConstrained. Number of observations = 7,492. 
  












4.5. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
I find a positive association from the CSR oriented board of directors to both 
environmental and social performance (H1a and H1b) which is in line with the 
arguments of the service role of the resource dependence theory. Surprisingly, the 
CEO duality coefficient is positive, but smaller than the other coefficients. According 
to Mallin et al., 2013, this positive relationship could be compared to the reputation 
created by a CSR oriented board showing that the firm’s management is committed to 
its stakeholders. From the resource based view theory, we can learn that the board of 
directors can be used as a reputation instrument creating competitive advantage. 
 Also, in line with my predictions about the impact of environmental and social 
performance on the adoption of the UNGC/GRI (H2a, H2b and H3a), I find a positive 
link between both indicators and the adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives. However, 
we can observe that the social indicator is greater and more significant than the 
environmental one in both initiatives. This might suggest that firms joining these types 
of initiatives use them mainly to report activities related to their employees and 
community. An aspect that is odd is that in the case of GRI reporting the number of 
employees is significant and negative, contrary to previous literature that emphasize 
that the disclosure of environmental and social activities is positively related to large 
firms measured by the number of employees as the objective is to attract and retain 
employees (Griffin and Youm, 2018). This could be due to other stakeholders, like 
industry or community pressures that demand better social practices from companies 
but not necessarily in relation to employment. 
Back to environmental performance, firms joining the UNGC barely report 
activities related to the management of carbon emissions for example where more 




specific frameworks) (Chen and Bouvain, 2009). Likewise, Berliner and Prakash 
(2015) find that US firms, members of the UNGC, perform very poorly in comparison 
with non-members when implementing costly human rights and environmental 
programmes/activities. However, UNGC members can be distinguished for 
implementing superficial-low cost programmes. This is supported to some extend by 
the high coefficients in the training and development, and community indicators, and 
the lower coefficient of the product responsibility, the latter suggesting a higher 
demand of financial resources. Contrary to UNGC results and in line with this 
discussion, GRI show that environmental performance is higher and more significant 
within their members, these facts support H3a. 
 Like similar studies, mine does not come without limitations. First of all, the 
sample is limited to publicly traded firms provided by ASSET4, and therefore, 
information is investor driven. ASSET4 does good job in summarizing the policies, 
practices and programmes implemented by firms as well as outcomes for a number of 
categories, it will be interesting to split each category of CSP within processes  and 
outputs (as suggested by Delmas, Etzion and Nairn-Birch, 2013) to have a better 
understanding of the decision to join to any initiative. I acknowledge the difference 
between performance and practices, and the information provided by CSP indexes 
(Gjolberg, 2009; Delmas et al., 2013; Chatterji, Levine and Toffel, 2009). CSP 
indexes have been used in the literature to explain research among them and the 
attributes of board of directors, corporate financial performance and CSR disclosure 
among others (see for instance Mallin et al., 2013; Perez-Batres et al., 2012; Shaukat 
et al., 2016). 
Future research might test the model that I presented within other 




expected strong and positive relationship between CSP and the UNGC. Furthermore, 
it would be interesting to see if the differences between social and environmental 
performance remain when comparing the UNGC and the GRI in a different 
institutional context (i.e. country or a specific industry). Another line of research could 
include the different levels of assessment of the COP in order to learn more about the 
reporting of members at the learners and advance level for instance. It would be 
interesting as well to include mechanisms to control for reverse causality as an extant 
literature considers if the UNGC improves CSP (Berliner and Prakash, 2015; Hamann 
et al., 2009). 
 
4.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this chapter is to shed some light in the relationship between the 
characteristics of the board of directors and the adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives 
as part of strategy to legitimize corporate practices. I focused on the UNGC and the 
GRI as instruments for disclosure of social and environmental corporate performance. 
My sample consisted of US-based firms listed in the ASSET4 database. The US 
provides an interesting context to test the linkages between corporate governance and 
CSR strategies presented by academic research (Liao et al., 2015; Mallin et al., 2013; 
Shaukat at al., 2016). 
As we have learned from the resource dependence theory and research-based 
view, the board of directors influence the strategic plan in favour of responsible 
business which include attention for environmental and social issues (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2006). Aguilera et al. 
(2007) conclude that despite the wide spread diffusion of CSR practices; they change 




different results. This includes the adoption of worldwide voluntary initiatives, they 
are implemented by firms depending on the normative/mimetic pressures as in this 
case where the GRI is preferred over the UNGC and companies adopting the former 
tend to perform better than those in latter initiative. 
My results might be of the interest of academics, stakeholders and 
practitioners. In the academic spectrum, I am providing further evidence of the linkage 
between boards of directors, corporate social performance and CSR strategy, 
relationship that has receive little attention. I also echoed Chen and Bouvain’s (2009) 
suggestion about looking at internal motivations for UNGC adoption such as the 
characteristics of the management. For stakeholders as responsible investors the 
interest might be on how to use their power to shape the board in order to enhance 
CSP. For other stakeholders and practitioners, it might provide tools to evaluate and 
start a conversation about how to strength CSP and report improvements.  My results 
are also relevant for strategy and accounting literature in the sense that the institutional 
context shape the way to account for corporate behaviour while gaining or reinforcing 
legitimacy. This work also concludes that there is not a theory that can explain the 
link between board of directors and the adoption of voluntary initiatives by itself but 
it requires the convergence of the fundamentals of at least institutional theory, 










































This thesis provides further evidence on what drives the adoption of the United 
Nations Global Compact (UNGC), one of the largest voluntary initiatives promoting 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). I explore this issue in three empirical chapters 
with different perspectives and using a variety of quantitative methods and techniques. 
In my first study (Chapter 2), I analyse the adoption of the UNGC through shareholder 
engagement. I test the effect of engagement and of a number of tactics employed in 
the engagement. I found that ‘soft engagement’ (e.g. invitation letters) from investors 
does not matter; however, it improves when the CEO and/or the chair of the board are 
contacted. Engagement also is shown to be useful in countries where there is support 
for CSR lobbying. This suggests that ‘soft engagement’ needs to present a strong 
business case in order to be successful. My second study investigates whether 
corporate social performance (CSP) and the existence of controversies are related to 
the adoption of the UNGC. In addition, this study deepens our knowledge on the level 
of CSP over time. Results show that environmental, social and governance 
performance are important but at difference points in time. I also found that 
controversies are not significant for becoming a UNGC member. The last empirical 
chapter considers the influence of CSR oriented boards of directors in the adoption of 
Voluntary CSR initiatives. I use CSP as the mediator of this relationship. I found 




this suggests that CSR oriented boards are significant predictors of the adoption of 
voluntary CSR initiatives.  
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The general contribution of this thesis is to add to the extensive literature on voluntary 
CSR initiatives in general and to the literature on the UNGC in particular. I focus on 
what Rasche et al., (2013) call the operational aspect of the initiative. The operational 
aspect involves research on motivations (Arevalo and Aravind, 2011; Cetindamar and 
Husoy, 2007; Janney et al., 2009; Pérez-Batres et al., 2011; Pérez-Batres et al., 2012), 
characteristics of participants (Bennie et al., 2007; Patrick and Forman, 2002; Perkins 
and Neumayer, 2010; Williams, 2007), and impact of the UNGC on firm performance 
(Arevalo 2010; Berliner and Prakash, 2014; Hamann et al., 2009; Gond and Piani, 
2013; Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009; Schembera, 2016). 
 For Chapter 2, I had access to privileged data from a large field experiment 
carried out with a group of investors from the Principles for Responsible Investment, 
representing US$3.3 trillion in AUM, and with the UNGC. The experiment tested the 
effectiveness of soft engagement and of a number of tactics involved in the 
engagement. The UNGC was the object of the engagement, that is, investors invited 
target firms to join the initiative. My results show that CEOs and chairs listen to the 
demands of shareholders but the concerns expressed must be powerful in order to be 
successful (e.g. the business case). Furthermore, findings show that the institutional 
environment strengthens the decision to join the UNGC (that is, countries where CSR 
is prevalent are more likely to join the initiative). These findings are in line with those 
from Gifford (2009) showing that power, legitimacy and urgency are important factors 




the management are necessary for engagement. Therefore, this paper adds to the 
literature on stakeholder engagement (Becht et al., 2008; Gifford, 2010; Gillan and 
Starks, 2007; Gond and Piani, 2013; Hamilton and Eriksson, 2010; Mackenzie et al., 
2013; Vandekerckhove et al., 2007).  
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 explore the influence of CSP on the participation in 
the UNGC as part of corporate strategy. Both Chapters show that CSP is significant 
and positively related to the adoption of the UNGC. More specifically, Chapter 3 uses 
survival analysis to show how environmental, social and governance issues are 
relevant, and reveals that these characteristics are not constant, in terms of reasons for 
participation, but change over time for the three subsamples. Social performance 
characterized Group 1. In addition to social performance, corporate governance 
performance was a driver for Group 2 to adopt the initiative. Finally, environmental, 
social and corporate governance performance played an important role in the adoption 
of the initiative for Group 3. This suggests that firms become UNGC participants 
primarily to legitimize their practices and outcomes rather than to use it as a platform 
for learning.  
In addition to the above findings, Chapter 3 also investigates the relationship 
between controversies and becoming a member of the UNGC. Contrary to my 
expectations, the results show that controversies are not significant for firms to decide 
to adopt the Ten Principles proposed by the UNGC. My findings contribute to the 
inconclusive debate about firms using the initiative to bluewash their reputation 
(Arevalo and Aravind, 2010; Bennie et al., 2007; Hamann et al., 2009). 
In the same vein, but using structural equation modelling, Chapter 4 shows 
that environmental and social performance are significant for the adoption of the 




environmental performance. My conclusion in this case is similar to that in the 
previous study: the UNGC and the GRI provide legitimacy for current environmental 
and social practices. However, the GRI seems to be more popular than the UNGC and 
also tends to gather firms with better environmental and social performance which 
might be an indicator of the institutional context  (Bennie et al., 2007; Hemphill, 2005; 
Patrick and Forman, 2002). Another contribution of Chapter 4 is the fact of isolating 
the characteristics of the board from the CSP and considering it as a driver for the 
adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives. I look at gender diversity, independent 
directors, CSR committee and CEO duality as characteristics of a CSR oriented board. 
I found that certain types of boards, particularly with CSR committees, enhance 
UNGC membership. This Chapter contributes to the growing literature on the 
attributes of the board of directors and the selection of the CSR strategy (Mallin et al., 
2013; Shaukat et al., 2016). 
 In general terms, this Thesis provides additional empirical support to 
Institutional Theory. Finding suggest that in order to help to improve CSP, stakeholder 
might approach those companies with less probability to sigh the UNGC as they are 
the most in need of guidance. Any intent to approach corporations in order to exert 
pressures to incorporate social and environmental actions, activities or programmes 
needs to be carefully study, this is, needs to be adapted to the institutional context 
where it will be applied. Furthermore, the UNGC is a double-edge weapon. It is a 
world-wide initiative under the umbrella of the United Nations that can assist 
corporations to gain legitimacy, and but at the same time it cannot be too restrictive, 
otherwise potential members, particularly those starting the learning curve, might not 





LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
Like other studies, the studies within this Thesis are not without limitations. The main 
limitation is perhaps that the three empirical studies rely heavily on information about 
listed firms, therefore adopting an investor approach. The results should not be 
compared to other types of participation in the UNGC (i.e. private or small business 
firms and non-business organizations). 
Another limitation is the use of ASSET4 as a proxy for the various dimensions 
of CSP. Corporate Social Performance is a complex concept to capture. However, 
academic research often employs this database (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Luo et 
al., 2015; Rees and Rodionova, 2013; Rees and Rodionova, 2015) and as it has been 
created for investors it has a certain legitimacy. ASSET4 has a number of advantages 
over other such as KLD. For instance, ASSET4 covers a larger number of firms 
worldwide and provides more detail about the aggregates of each dimension (Shaukat 
et al. 2016).  
 In Chapter 2 despite the exciting setting of the experiment, the secondary effect 
of the tactics (i.e. interactions of tactics) could not be calculated due to the low level 
of responses. The effectiveness of the various tactics used for engagement was a prime 
motivation for the PRI. However, for academic purposes, the low level of response 
made meaningful analysis of the experiment difficult. 
 The shortcomings in Chapter 3 are due to data limitations. The study considers 
as firms that joined from 2003 to 2011 rather than those that joined when the initiative 
was launched in 2000. This is because ASSET4 started collecting CSP in 2002, and 




 The results in Chapter 4 are obtained from employing SEM. I controlled for 
time invariant variables in the panel data but it could be the case that I missed other 
variables that affect my model and that change over time. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
It would be interesting to test some of the tactics in the experiment on Chapter 2 but 
instead of just asking firms to join the UNGC, the invitation could highlight specific 
environmental and social weaknesses of target firms and how the UNGC can help 
them to improve. A more practical suggestion could be that responsible investors 
assume the role of auditors and review the COPs submitted by UNGC participants 
demanding further information where necessary. 
 Another line of research could be to split the environmental, social and 
corporate governance scores provided by ASSET4 in programmes and results. This 
would enhance the results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, particularly in the social aspect 
which is more difficult to measure in comparison to environmental practices and 
outcomes. An additional area to explore is who and why companies are delisted. In 
Chapter 4 there were not enough data available for my sample and the analysis was 
restricted to US firms because it had more variability; however, it was not possible to 
extend my statistical analysis. Therefore, I suggest that a different research design as 
surveys and websites analysis can provide more robust insights. 
 Overall, the UNGC is an important framework for enhancing reputation and 
legitimacy. However, those stakeholders interested in it (e.g. shareholders and NGOs) 
should take up UNGC membership with caution. In other words, participation in the 
UNGC is not as simple as a binary variable where firms are good or bad. Because the 




the same level of compliance to all its members. Nonetheless, the UNGC is 
establishing mechanisms to identify their level of commitment. These mechanisms 
could be used by stakeholders who want to improve any aspect related to 
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